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In Chapter II I analyze eco-labeling in the tourism industry, specifically the 
impact of the Blue Flag label for marinas and beaches on prices of marina slip rentals, 
weekly sailboat charter prices and hotel accommodation prices. The principal findings 
include that Blue Flag certified marinas appear to enjoy an average premium between 
6.6% and 22% for their daily slip rental prices, between 40% and 49% for their monthly 
slip rental prices, and 23% for their yearly slip rental prices.  Within the sailboat charter 
sector, vessels whose home marina is awarded the Blue Flag on average carry a price 
premium between 14% and 20% on a weekly sailboat rental. When it comes to hotel 
accommodation, hotels managing a Blue Flag certified beach enjoy a price premium 
between 45% and 270%. 
In Chapter III I employ a dataset on the global frequency of climate-change-
related natural disasters to explain the probability of the start and occurrence, in a given 
year, of civil war and civil war durations during the last half of the 20th century. Extreme 
cold events are found to have a measurable positive effect on the probability of civil war 
starting in the affected countries, previous years‟ extreme heat events have a positive 
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effect on the probability of a civil war occurring in a given year, and droughts have a 
positive effect on civil war duration.  These findings can be used by policymakers as they 
contemplate climate change mitigation policies.   
In Chapter IV I investigate the determinants of ratification delay of a major oil 
pollution international environmental agreement, MARPOL. Importantly, I analyze the 
impact of oil spills, as well as various country characteristics, on the time a country takes 
to ratify MARPOL. The major contribution lies in the examination of impacts of 
environmental pollution events on international political decision making. I find that the 
amount of oil spilled decreases the time to ratify MARPOL. This is the first study that 
seeks to address this issue in a quantitative fashion. The results should inform 
policymakers by giving them insight into relevant determinants of legislative delay in 
ratifying treaties. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
This dissertation is concerned with two general themes: voluntary approaches in 
environmental policy and the political economy of environmental disasters. In Chapter II 
I focus on eco-labeling as a voluntary approach that has become a popular alternative to 
regulation as means of dealing with various environmental issues. Eco-labeling provides 
consumers with information on environmental impact of their consumption. This allows 
consumers to differentiate goods and services based on their respective environmental 
attributes. This, in turn, allows producers to attach a price premium to a certified product. 
Such a premium provides an additional incentive for producers to meet certification 
standards, leading to an improvement in environmental performance of certified products. 
In this chapter I specifically focus on the issue of the price premium. Previous research 
has identified cases where such a premium exists and ones where it doesn‟t. Without the 
existence of the price premium, eco-labeling would be an ineffective policy as it would 
not incentivize producers to improve the environmental impact of their production.  Thus, 
to answer this question is to evaluate a specific eco-labeling policy.  
In Chapter II I specifically analyze the effects of eco-labeling in service 
industries, expanding the scope of the existing literature focusing primarily on goods 
industries. The study concerns eco-labeling in the tourism industry, specifically the 
impact of the Blue Flag label for marinas and beaches on prices of marina slip rental 
prices, weekly sailboat charter prices and hotel accommodation prices. This study‟s 
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findings suggest that Blue Flag certification of marinas is associated with a significant 
price premium in the market for marina slip-rental prices and sailboat charters. Similarly, 
the Blue Flag beach certification is found to be associated with a price premium in the 
hotel industry. 
 In addition to identifying a price premium associated with a specific eco-label in 
three distinct sectors of the tourism industry, this chapter contributes to the literature in 
voluntary approaches to environmental policy in two other ways. First, I employ an 
empirical strategy that deals with the problem of program selection. Most previous 
research suffers from endogeneity bias, and this chapter of the dissertation addresses this 
issue head on. Secondly, it looks at the impact of an eco-label in a service industry. Great 
majority of previous work focuses on goods, leaving a major gap in knowledge, which 
this chapter addresses by focusing on three service industries.  
Chapter III and IV focus on the political economy of natural disasters. 
Specifically, Chapter III looks at the impact of climate-change related natural disasters on 
several measures of civil war. Chapter IV proposes to study the impact of man-made 
environmental disasters, in this case oil pollution in the oceans, on the length of 
ratification of a major marine pollution international environmental agreement. The 
impact of disasters on political decision making is seldom studied. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that it can be a major determinant of various measures of political 
decisions.  
In the case of environmental policy, an environmental disaster raises the 
awareness about the true costs of such events. This, in turn, increases the demand by the 
public for policies that deal with prevention and adaptation to such events. Governments 
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respond by enacting laws that address the issue. Famous examples are the Love Canal 
incident and the passage of Superfund legislation, and Exxon Valdez oil spill and the 
national oil spill liability law, to name a few. In Chapter III I study how environmental 
disaster s affect the probability of civil war starting and continuing. Disasters primarily 
affect people‟s willingness to pursue violent conflict to pursue political goals. 
Specifically, it is hypothesized that disasters that affect people‟s incomes, also affect 
individual   opportunity costs of fighting.  
Chapter III I examine the effect of climate change on violent conflict. This 
chapter employs a dataset on the global frequency of climate-change- related natural 
disasters to explain the probability of the start and occurrence, in a given year, of civil 
war, and duration, during the last half of the 20
th
 century. Extreme cold events and 
epidemic outbreaks are found to have a measurable positive effect on the probability of 
civil war starting in the affected countries; previous years extreme heat events have a 
positive effect on the probability of a civil war occurring in a given year; and droughts 
have a positive effect on civil war duration.  These findings can be used by as they 
contemplate climate change mitigating policies.   
In Chapter IV I use continuous-time hazards model framework to investigate the 
impact of oil spills, as well as various country characteristics, on the duration of time 
taken to ratify the international environmental agreement on marine pollution called 
MARPOL. This is a first study that seeks to address this issue in a quantitative fashion. 
The results can inform policy makers by giving them insight into relevant determinants of 
legislative delay of this treaty 
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CHAPTER II 
ECO-LABELING OF SERVICES: THE BLUE 
FLAG 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Environmental or eco-labeling has recently received attention as an alternative to 
command and control regulations as means of relieving consumption and production 
pressures on the environment. Eco-labeling informs consumers about the environmental 
effects of their consumption decisions. The desired effect is a change in consumption 
patterns toward more environmentally friendly products, as well as the creation of 
incentives for firms to produce such goods and services. Moreover, such practices are 
often intended to encourage governments in setting environmental standards for products 
and services.  
 The literature has explored the effectiveness of eco-labels to achieve these goals 
in various settings. However, most of these studies have focused on the labeling of 
tangible goods. Extension of the idea to services does not seem to have been addressed in 
the literature. Given the ever-increasing share of services in the economy, this analysis 
aims to fill the gap in the literature by identifying the determinants of price premia 
associated with eco-labeling in service industries.  
To illustrate eco-labeling in service industries, I use an example concerning the 
“sun-and-beach” sector of the tourism industry in Croatia. This segment of the industry is 
inextricably tied to the environment where leisure and recreational activities take place, 
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and it can be presumed that environmental quality is of positive value to the individuals 
who consume these activities. Thus, a region endowed with a relatively cleaner 
environment is more likely to attract such consumers, ceteris paribus. Moreover, when 
businesses in a region are also proactive about protecting the environment, maintaining 
certain standards to insure environmental quality, then that region is also likely to attract 
environmentally conscious consumers. However, prospective consumers may not have 
enough information to gauge the difference in environmental quality between alternate 
destinations. 
To bridge the information gap between consumers and providers of services, 
labeling or certification schemes are often provided by an independent organization. In 
the case of marinas and beaches, which are pivotal components of sun-and-beach tourism 
recreation, this information is supplied by the Blue Flag certification. Thus, the presence 
of certified marinas and beaches in the region should influence the prices of the tourism 
services in this sector, including marina slip-rental prices, sailboat charter prices and 
hotel room prices. 
The Blue Flag certification is displayed by awarded sites with a flag hoisted on a 
pole. Thus anyone passing by the certified site is clearly informed about its certification 
status. Each site also displays information regarding environmental programs pursued in 
accordance with the certification on a publicly displayed board.  Hotel, marina and 
sailboat charter companies prominently display their Blue Flag certification status on all 
promotional materials including brochures and websites.        
The Blue Flag environmental label was started in France in 1985 as a label 
awarded to environmentally minded local governments. In 1987 the program became a 
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part of the Foundation for Environmental Education in Europe (FEEE), non-
governmental (NGO), non-profit organization promoting sustainable development 
through environmental education. The program was then extended to beaches and 
marinas across Europe. Some 244 beaches and 208 marinas from 10 countries have been 
awarded the Blue Flag (The Blue Flag, 2007). With the growth in participation came the 
standardization of criteria. In 1992 the program started using stricter criteria set by the 
EEC Bathing Water Directive. In 2001 FEEE decided to expand its reach beyond Europe 
to become the global organization Foundation for Environmental Education (FEE). FEE 
is an international umbrella organization with one national member organization per 
country which represents FEE on the national level and manages the implementation of 
FEE programs nationally. FEE has member organizations in 48 countries in Europe, 
North and South America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. It is active through five 
environmental education and labeling programs: Blue Flag, Eco-Schools, Young 
Reporters for the Environment, Learning about Forests and Green Key. Since 2001, FEE 
has worked with the World Trade Organization and other international institutions on the 
expansion of the Blue Flag program, which is, as a consequence, currently active in 
South Africa, Canada, Morocco, New Zealand and in the Caribbean region. The program 
has plans to expand to Chile, Argentina, Brazil and the USA (The Blue Flag, 2008). 
In 2008, over 3300 beaches and marinas worldwide were awarded the Blue Flag.  
The award of Blue Flag beach and marina certification is based on compliance with 29 
criteria for beaches and 23 criteria for marinas, covering many aspects of environmental 
education and information, water quality, environmental management, and safety and 
services (Appendix B). Furthermore, these criteria are grouped by their relative 
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importance into three categories: imperatives, guidelines, and non-applicable (NA) for 
certain regions. All imperative requirements have to be fulfilled to gain certification, and 
a minimum number of guidelines must be met in addition. Blue Flags are awarded on a 
season-by-season basis, only. 
Blue Flag certification, and the information it conveys, is relevant to public 
benefits of services that this certification induces. For example, entities applying for Blue 
Flag certification are required to display information relating to coastal zone ecosystems 
and natural, sensitive areas in the coastal zone (Appendix B). This information, in turn, 
implicitly informs tourists of the potential detrimental effects to these ecosystems that 
their activities may create. However, it can be argued that some of the information 
provided by the certification allows for the extraction of private benefits as well. For 
example, the requirement for adequate beach or marina waste management not only 
provides a public benefit, but signals a service that privately benefits local consumers. I 
treat the certification as primarily relevant to public benefits. For my empirical analysis, 
available information about the nature of services in a given marina or a beach has been 
collected, and any remaining quality variables are left as unobserved heterogeneity, 
accommodated analytically via panel data methods. 
I choose the Croatian Adriatic Sea region, located in south-eastern Europe, as the 
venue for this empirical illustration because of its unique natural endowments that 
support sun-and-beach tourism. It is a particularly suitable case for this study because 
water quality, a possible confounding factor that might affect prices of tourism services 
and certification statuses, does not have much variation in the area. Some 95% of 
locations tested for water quality by the Croatian Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
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Physical Planning and Construction have been found to have “excellent” water quality. 
The remaining locations have “good” water quality. Croatia is a representative case of a 
tourism based economy, with tourism sector share of GDP of 20%. It is a top 20 tourism 
destination in the world, with majority of arrivals concentrated in the Adriatic Sea region.     
Croatia‟s coastline is 5835 kilometers long, of which 4058 kilometers are 
attributed to its 1185 islands of which only 66 are permanently inhabited (see Figure 1).
1
  
The Adriatic region is characterized by a mild Mediterranean climate where summers are 
hot and dry and winters mild. Average August air temperature is between 22°C and 25°C, 
while the Adriatic Sea has an average temperature of 25°C during the summer.
 2
  In 2008, 
there were some 57 million tourist night stays, of which 95.6% occurred in the Adriatic 
Coast Region.
3
  Some 89% of all overnight stays were consumed by foreign tourists. 119 
beaches and 18 marinas in Croatia have been awarded the Blue Flag certification, and 
customer satisfaction in the Croatian hotel and nautical tourism sectors ranks the highest 
in the natural beauty category and high in the ecological preservation category.
4
 
In this paper I employ an original dataset pertaining to the sun-and-beach sector 
of the tourism industry in Croatia to analyze the effects of the Blue Flag eco-label for 
marinas and beaches on daily, monthly and yearly marina slip-rental prices; weekly 
sailboat charter prices; and average monthly hotel room prices. In my econometric 
analysis, I explore least squares, random effects and simultaneous equations methods. 
The paper‟s main contribution lies in its focus on the services sector, as well as its use of 
                                                 
1
 CIA World Factbook listing for Croatia 
 
2
 Croatian National Tourist Board 
 
3
 2008 Croatian Tourism in Numbers, Institute for Tourism 
 
4
 2007 TOMAS – Summer and 2007 TOMAS - Nautical 
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simultaneous equation techniques to model selection into the certification scheme. The 
price and amenity data have been extracted individually from online hotel, sailboat  
 
Figure 1. Croatian Adriatic Region 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
charter and marina brochures for the Croatian Adriatic Sea region in 2008. The data on 
Blue Flag certified marinas and beaches have likewise been collected from the brochures 
provided online by the FEE. The results suggest that Blue Flag certified marinas do 
command higher prices. In addition, sailboats whose home marina is awarded the Blue 
Flag carry a price premium for weekly sailboat rentals.  Similarly, hotels managing a 
Blue Flag certified beach enjoy a significant price premium as well. 
10 
 
 
2.2. Literature Overview 
A recent literature overview of eco-labeling literature by Blackman and Rivera 
(2010) provides a good summary of papers and issues commonly encountered in this 
literature. They identify 37 relevant studies focusing on the socioeconomic and 
environmental impacts of eco certification. Only 14 of these studies are found to use 
credible empirical strategies to identify the effects of certification. Specifically, these 
studies properly address the issue of selection into certification programs by using quasi-
experimental methods and devising counterfactual outcomes.   Only five of the 14 studies 
find positive socioeconomic impact of eco-labeling.  
All but one of the five aforementioned studies focus on the impact of eco-labels in 
the agricultural sector. Fort and Ruben (2008) analyze the impact of fair-trade certified 
bananas on farmer incomes and profits in Peru. They construct a control group using 
propensity score matching based on several household characteristics. The authors find 
that fair-trade certification is associated with higher farmer incomes and profits.  Arnould 
et al. (2009) focus on the impacts of fair-trade coffee certification on the volume of 
coffee sold and price of coffee in Nicaragua, Peru and Guatemala. They find evidence for 
both the price premium associated with the fair-trade certification.  Becchetti and 
Costantino (2008) focus on fair-trade certification of a variety of agricultural products 
(lemons, mangos, etc.) in Kenya. They estimated its impact on a variety of 
socioeconomic outcomes, and find that fair-trade label is related to higher satisfaction 
with living conditions and superior nutritional quality among farmers participating in the 
program. Bolwig et al. (2009) study the impact of organic coffee certification on farmer 
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incomes in Uganda. They employ the Heckman selection model and find that organic 
coffee certification increases net revenues by 75 percent on average.   
There is only a single study that focuses on the impact of eco-labels in the tourism 
industry.  Rivera (2002) analyzes the impact of Costa Rican national eco-tourism label, 
Certification for Sustainable Tourism, on the prices and sales of hotel rooms. Rivera 
employs a two-stage Heckman model to address selection of hotels into the label. His 
findings suggest the existence of a price premium associated with the Certification for 
Sustainable Tourism label. 
One of the earliest papers on environmental labeling is Henion (1972) who 
analyzes changes in the market shares of various brands of detergent in response to the 
provision of information on each product‟s phosphate content. In the 1970‟s, phosphates 
had been found to produce a negative impact on the environment, primarily through over-
fertilization of surface waters. Being a major contributor to the release of phosphates into 
the ecosystems, detergents came under intense public scrutiny, and a voluntary labeling 
scheme was devised to inform concerned consumers about the phosphate content of some 
brands. Henion (1972) found that labeling detergents with low phosphate counts had a 
positive effect on the market shares for these labeled detergents.  
„Blue Angel‟ is one of the oldest environmental labels in the world, having 
operated independently in Germany since 1977. A Study by Hemmelskamp and 
Brotkmann (1997) look at the impact of the „Blue Angel‟ label by estimating market 
shares for different brands of emulsion lacquer paints. The Blue Angel is a multi-category 
label, with specific criteria dictating each category. Their findings show that the label 
helps a product attain a greater market share, even when it is sold at a higher price. 
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However, authors note that,  
“The success of an environmental label is to be expected, particularly 
for those products where the individual consumer can expect a personal 
positive advantage by utilizing the labeled product. This can be an 
immediate individual benefit as well as an indirect benefit through a 
perceivable and comprehensible contribution to environmental 
protection. Environmental labels awarded to other product categories 
missing these characteristics will probably not be able to contribute 
substantially to the market performance of the labeled product” 
(Hemmelskamp & Brotkmann, 1997). 
The only published study on Blue Flag certification by Nahman and Rigby (2008) 
estimates the costs associated with reduced water quality and withdrawal of Blue Flag 
status in Margate, Kwazulu-Natal. The authors use travel costs and contingent behavior 
methods and find that the cost of loss of Blue Flag status ranges between R17 and R25 
million per annum.  
In the existing eco-labeling literature, one of the commonly used empirical 
models has been the hedonic model. This model has proven to be especially useful in the 
examination of the relationship between a good‟s market price and consumer preferences 
for its different attributes.  In the context of the present paper, the rental price for 
sailboats, marina slips and hotel rooms are modeled as functions of the bundles of 
attributes that each good represents. Hedonic price specifications can be constructed 
relatively easily, as all one needs is the service rental price, service and area attributes, 
and a plausible specification for the functional relationships between each different price 
13 
 
and the relevant attributes. 
 
2.3. Data 
 
2.3.1. Marina Slip-Rental Prices 
The data on all existing nautical tourism marinas in Croatia have been collected 
primarily from an online database provided by the Croatian Tourism Board (CTB). The 
dataset consists of records on marina characteristics, as well as links to daily, monthly 
and yearly slip-rental price brochures of all CTB categorized marinas. The entire marina 
population is available, so there is no possibility of selection bias. The dataset on daily 
marina slip rental prices contains price information for 43 marinas, i, each supplying slips 
in some 22 boat-length categories, j, providing 9369 observations. Some marinas do not 
offer monthly slip rentals so the dataset on monthly marina slip rental prices contains 
information on 27 marinas and consequently has 5315 observations. Finally, the dataset 
consisting of yearly slip-rental prices consists of 38 marinas and 616 observations and is 
a cross-sectional dataset (since there is no month-to-month variation in yearly slip-rental 
prices within 2008 data).  
For the year 2008, the following information on marina characteristics has been 
obtained from the FEE website and online marina brochures: marina Blue Flag 
certification status (the key variable in this study), the number of available slips, number 
of available dry dock berths, marina category, ACI (Adriatic Croatia International) 
membership (an established company known for quality of service), distance to the 
closest airport, distance to the closest marine fuel station, availability of laundry facilities, 
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grocery stores, restaurants, a travel lift
5
, a crane, on-site car parking and slipway 
launching ramp. About 45%, 51% and 52% of the marinas have been awarded the Blue 
Flag certification in the daily, monthly and yearly slip-rental price datasets, respectively; 
most have a restaurant and car parking (as do all marinas in the yearly slip-rental dataset), 
and a grocery store on premises, while about a third in all datasets own a travel lift crane. 
Marinas offer only berthing services (i.e. parking spots for boats, often with hook-ups 
available for electricity, water, and pump-out services for sewage holding tanks) and they 
do not participate, themselves, in sailboat rentals. Descriptive statistics for all of the 
variables used in the marina slip-rental specifications featured in this paper are presented 
in Table 1. 
The dependent variable in the marina slip-rental price specifications is marina slip 
rental price for daily, monthly or yearly periods. These rental prices are expected to vary 
with marina characteristics. Marinas typically price each slip by the length of the boat it 
is designed to accommodate. These price differentials are warranted by the higher costs 
incurred by the marinas for larger boats, in terms of the quantity of services provided.  
Longer boats typically accommodate more passengers, for example, so they will tend to 
use more electricity and water and they are thus expected to pay higher slip-rental prices. 
From the point of view of the marina, longer slips at a marina come at the cost of fewer 
smaller slips, so this pricing differential also reflects opportunity costs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Elevator 
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Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Marina characteristics
1( Blue Flag certified marina) 0.453 -- 0.514 -- 0.521 --
Slip rental price (Euros) 88.1 89 1192 1021 5887 3939
1(ACI Marina) 0.542 -- 0.687 -- 0.513 --
2.22 0.744 1.98 0.637 2.06 0.658
Slips (number of available spots) 307 219 282 164 320 215
Dry dock (number of available spots) 87.6 97.8 70 67.6 90.5 91.6
1(Travel lift) 0.366 -- 0.388 -- 0.386 --
1(Grocery store) 0.951 -- 0.941 -- 0.95 --
1(Restaurant) 0.977 -- 0.971 -- 1 --
1(Laundry facilities) 0.589 -- 0.614 -- 0.66 --
1(Crane) 0.768 -- 0.758 -- 0.824 --
1(Parking) 0.947 -- 0.972 -- 1 --
1(Slipway) 0.582 -- 0.632 -- 0.664 --
Locational characteristics
Marine fuel station distance (km) 2.81 3.99 2.51 3 2.41 3.96
Airport distance (km) 30.7 19.3 34.2 20.36 30.6 19.3
1(Island  location) 0.355 -- 0.368 -- 0.295 --
Population (of the associated urban area) 18810 37595 18323 41342 21248 38976
1(Urban location) 0.901 -- 0.972 -- 0.97 --
Average county monthly tourist arrivals 140043 177502 149136 182697 9516 6127
Notes: Data on 2008 daily slip rentals have 9528 observations; monthly slip rentals have 5319 observations; yearly slip rentals have 616 
observations.
Table 1. Summary statistics for marina daily, monthly and yearly slip rental prices and associated characteristics
Marina category  (1 through 3, and 
uncategorized)
Monthly slip rentals Yearly slip rentalsDaily slip rentals
 
 
2.3.2. Sailboat Charter Prices 
The dependent variable in the second set of models is the weekly sailboat charter 
price. This specification assumes that sailboat charter prices are a function of various 
sailboat characteristics, as well as various locational characteristics. The sailboat charter 
data have been collected from the brochures of a single tour agency.
6
  Since this is a 
                                                 
6
 Adriatica.net 
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convenience sample, there is some concern regarding selection bias.
7
  The dataset 
contains information on sailboat characteristics such as: weekly price, home marina Blue 
Flag certification status, boat age, length, number of beds, water and fuel capacity, as 
well as other various amenities, ranging from the availability of stove/cooker to radio 
equipment.  
 The dependent variable, weekly sailboat charter prices, typically varies by week 
over the season and is collected for all 52 weeks of the year, for 273 boats, to produce a 
dataset of 16307 observations. Weekly charter prices range from a low of 300 Euros 
during October through April, to about 7500 Euros at the peak of the season in the mid-
August. On average, however, a weekly sailboat rental costs about 1957 Euros. Charter 
companies typically pay 3959 Euros for a yearly slip rental at their home marina. The 
average sailboat in the sample is about twelve meters long and is around ten years old. 
Roughly 70% of boats are housed in Blue Flag certified marinas. Descriptive statistics for 
all of the variables used in the sailboat charter price specifications featured in this paper 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
2.3.3. Hotel Room Prices 
 The final dataset, consisting of average monthly hotel room prices and 
characteristics data, has been collected from individual hotel brochures. Data on all of the 
registered hotels in Croatia was obtained from the Croatian Ministry of Tourism (CMT). 
From this list I selected a “county-by-hotel category” stratified sample (Table A1) from 
the coastal counties in Croatia. Given the stratified random sampling strategy, selection 
                                                 
7
Adriatica.net, one of the largest Croatian tour agencies, provides services for the entire Adriatic Sea region 
and personal interviews with firm managers indicate that no specific region or boat type are over or under 
represented in their offer. 
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bias is of minimal concern. The sample consists of 97 hotels (out of 440 in the population, 
Table A1) for which information was collected on variables such as: average monthly 
hotel room prices, hotel beach Blue Flag certification status, number of rooms, hotel 
category (2 through 5 stars), distance to an airport, population of the associated urban 
area, an indicator for air-conditioning in rooms and sports facilities. Some 9.5% of all the 
hotels in the population, and 9.3% in the sample, are associated (as both applicants for the 
certification and in charge of maintenance) with beaches that have been awarded the Blue 
Flag (Appendix A Table 1). 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
1(Blue Flag certified marina) 0.694 --
Marina yearly slip rental price (Euros) 3959 900
Weekly sailboat charter price 1957 895
Ship length (meters) 12.5 1.9
Number of beds 7.07 1.92
Vessel age (years) 10.3 111
Vessel weight (tons) 4.48 4.59
Fuel capacity (liters) 0.176 0.09
1(Nautical charts and guides) 0.947 --
1(Global positioning system) 0.931 --
1(Marine VHF radio) 0.978 --
1(Electric refrigerator) 0.52 --
1(Gas cooker with oven) 0.361 --
1(Electric winch for anchor) 0.009 --
Average county monthly tourist arrivals 119688 152145
Notes: Data on 2008 weekly sailboat charters have 16307 observations.
Table 2. Summary statistics for weekly sailboat charter price and associated characteristics
Marina characteristics
Vessel characteristics
Locational characteristics
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Variables Mean Std. Dev.
1 (Blue Flag awarded to the hotel beach) 0.0927 --
Hotel room price (Euros) 73.9 52.8
Hotel category (2 through 5 stars) 3.17 0.799
Number of rooms 98.5 95.5
1(Air-conditioning) 0.619 --
1(Sports facilities) 0.309 --
Airport distance (km) 35.5 25.4
Population (in associated urban area, in thousands) 22.9 45.7
1 (Island location) 0.268 --
Average county monthly tourist arrivals (in thousands) 143 175
Table 3. Summary statistics for hotel room prices and associated characteristics 
Hotel characteristics
Locational characteristics
Note: Data on 2008 hotel room prices have 969 observations.
 
 
2.4. Empirical Methodology 
2.4.1. Marina Slip-Rental Prices 
The hedonic price equation for the marina data uses a standard semi-log 
functional form, with the logarithms of either marina daily, monthly or yearly slip rental 
prices as dependent variables.
8
 This specification is adopted because of its widely 
accepted use in the hedonic literature (Palmquist, 1991). The primary goal of estimation 
is to identify the implicit marginal prices associated with Blue Flag certification of 
marinas, while controlling for other attributes of each good. The logarithms of the daily, 
monthly and yearly slip rental prices are, therefore, regressed on an indicator for marina 
Blue Flag certification status, as well as other marina-level and locational (city and 
county) controls, using least squares methods, random effects specifications for the error 
term, and simultaneous equations methods. Fixed effects specifications cannot be used 
                                                 
8
 Slips can be rented at any of the three durations. 
19 
 
since the variable of interest, BlueFlagi, is a time-invariant dummy within each year and 
no new Blue Flags were awarded during the time-period.
9
 The random effects 
specification is used to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
10
  Thus the following 
econometric specification is proposed, 
0 1ln cijt i i i c c ct ct cijtSlipPrice BlueFlag X Z Z              (1) 
where SlipPricecijt refers to the daily slip-rental price, in county c, at marina i, for each 
boat length j, at time t; BlueFlagi is an indicator for  marina Blue Flag certification status, 
which is expected to be positively related to SlipPricecijt; the vector Xi contains time-
invariant marina specific attributes such as: number of slips, dry dock berths,  marina 
category, distance from an airport and marine fuel station, and dummies for the 
availability of a grocery store, a restaurant, laundry facilities, a travel lift, a crane, a 
parking, a slipway and an Adriatic Croatia International (ACI) club; Zc contains data on 
time-invariant characteristics of the area where the marina is located, such as: indicators 
for urban and island locations, and the population of the associated urban area. Zct 
contains data on average monthly county-level tourist arrivals, which is a time-varying 
(across the months of 2008) characteristic of the area where the marina is located. The 
coefficient on average monthly county-level tourist arrivals is estimated only for daily 
and monthly slip rental prices, since yearly slip rentals are time-invariant annual 
contracts.
11
  
                                                 
9
 Data are only available for the twelve  months of 2008. 
 
10
 The unobserved effect is dealt with by assuming that each error component which captures unobserved 
heterogeneity is being drawn randomly from a given distribution. 
 
11
Yearly slip rental data are thus cross sectional. 
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 To attain Blue Flag certification, marinas have to apply with the local 
representative of the FEE and provide extensive information on their environmental 
management policies, environmental education and information programs, safety 
measures and water quality. Therefore, it is apparent that some form of selection into the 
certification scheme may exist, because some marinas are likely to be more prepared, 
informed, and inclined to pursue the certification. To control for the potential 
endogeneity of a marina‟s Blue Flag certification status, I propose two instruments: the 
number of other Blue Flag certified marinas in the county, CountyBFMarinasc, and the 
number of other Blue Flag certified marinas owned by the firm which owns marina i, 
FirmBFMarinasi. The former increases the awareness about the label in the county and 
consequently is likely to prompt other local marinas to look into applying for the label. 
The latter performs a similar function, as firms that have already had experience applying 
for and obtaining the certification are going to be more informed about the application 
process and the label itself, and thus find it less costly to apply for certification for 
another marina they own. The proposed first-stage specification is, 
 (2) 
The second stage is estimated by equation (1). Xi contains all the time-invariant marina 
characteristics. The set of equations is estimated using both the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator, as well as a generalized least squares (GLS) random effects two-stage 
least squares (RE 2SLS) estimator. 
 
 
 
i 0 1 2c i i i iBlueFlag CountyBFMarinas FirmBFMarinas X        
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2.4.2. Sailboat Charter Prices 
The second hedonic price equation is estimated using the sailboat charter data and 
is also specified with a semi-log functional form. Again, the goal is to identify implicit 
marginal prices associated with various sailboat attributes. Fixed effects specifications 
are again precluded because the variable of interest, BlueFlagi, is a time-invariant 
indicator. Thus, using least squares methods and a random effects specification for the 
error term, the logarithm of sailboat charter price in county c, home marina i, sailboat s, 
at time t, is regressed on the indicator for the Blue Flag status at the home marina, yearly 
slip rental price of the home marina, as well as other sailboat level and locational (city, 
region and county) controls using the following econometric specification: 
0 1 2ln Re
HM
cist i is s s ct ct cistCharterPrice BlueFlag Slip ntal X Z             (3) 
where CharterPricecist refers to the sailboat charter price in county c, home marina i, 
sailboat s, at time t; BlueFlagi is an indicator for the Blue Flag certification status,  which 
is expected to be positively related to CharterPricecist; SlipRentalli
HM
 is the yearly slip 
rental price for the home marina representing a fixed cost for boat parking that each 
charter company must incur;  Xs contains time-invariant sailboat attributes such as: length, 
age, number of cabins and beds, water and fuel tank capacity, as well as binary indicators 
for the availability of an electric refrigerator, a gas stove, nautical charts, a Global 
Positioning System (GPS), VFH radio, and electric anchor winch; Zct contains data on 
average monthly county-level tourist arrivals, a time-varying location-specific 
characteristic. 
  Again, in order to address the potential of endogeneity of Blue Flag certification 
status I propose two instruments (for the same reasons as in the previous case of  
22 
 
marinas): the number of other Blue Flag certified marinas in the county, 
CountyBFMarinasc, and the number of other Blue Flag certified marinas owned by the 
firm which owns marina i, FirmBFMarinasi. Thus, the proposed first-stage specification 
is, 
0 1 2is c i i is isBlueFlag CountyBFMarinas FirmBFMarinas X          (4) 
whereas the second stage is estimated by equation (3). Xi contains time-invariant marina 
and sailboat characteristics, such as the number of slips and ACI status. Again, the set of 
equations is estimated using both the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, as well as 
generalized least squares (GLS) random effects two-stage least squares (RE 2SLS). 
Specification (4) is different from specification (2) in that it includes only the home 
marinas associated with sailboats in the sample, not all marinas.  
 
2.4.3. Hotel Room Prices 
 The final hedonic specification is estimated using hotel data. Again, a semi-log 
functional form is used to identify implicit marginal prices associated with various hotel 
characteristics. Consistent with the previous two cases, the logarithm of average monthly 
hotel room price i, at time t, is regressed on the indicator of Blue Flag status for the 
hotel‟s own beach, as well as other site and locational controls. The following 
econometric specification is proposed:  
0 1ln cit i i i ct ct i citHotelRoomPrice BlueFlag X Z             (5) 
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where HotelRoomPriceit refers to the average daily hotel room price
12
 at hotel i, in a 
county c, in a month t; BlueFlagi  is an indicator for the Blue Flag certification status of 
the hotel‟s own beach13, which is expected to be positively related to HotelRoomPriceit;  
Xi contains time-invariant hotel attributes such as availability of air-conditioning in rooms, 
availability of sports facilities on the premises and number of rooms; Zct contains data on 
average monthly county-level tourist arrivals; γi stands for city fixed effects shared by all 
hotels associated with a given city. Such fixed effects are warranted in this specification, 
as tourists staying in hotels tend not to come for the hotel itself or even just for the sun-
and-beach‟ attributes of the hotel. They also come for various other amenities (historical, 
architectural and gastronomic) offered by the local culture. These sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity are captured by city fixed effects. 
As in the case of marinas, for a hotel to attain Blue Flag certification for the 
hotel‟s own beach, it has to apply to the local representative of the FEE and provide 
extensive information on its environmental management policies, environmental 
education and information programs, safety and water quality. Consequently, the issue of 
endogeneity arises again and to deal with this problem I propose two instruments: the 
number of other Blue Flag certified beaches in the county, CountyBFBeachesc, and the 
number of other Blue Flag certified beaches owned by the firm which owns hotel i, 
FirmBFBeachesi. Thus, the proposed first-stage specification is, 
 (6) 
                                                 
12
 Hotel room price data were collected specifically as the per-person cost of renting a two-bed park-view 
(as opposed to a sea-view) room that includes half-board.  
 
13
 All hotels in the sample are in close proximity to the sea. 
i 0 1 2c i i i iBlueFlag CountyBFBeaches FirmBFBeaches X        
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whereas the second stage is estimated by equation (5). The set of equations is estimated 
using both the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, and a generalized least squares 
(GLS) random effects two-stage least squares (RE 2SLS) estimator. 
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
2.5.1. Marina Slip-Rental Prices 
The estimated results for daily marina slip rental prices are presented in Table 4. 
Column 1 displays least squares estimates, and column 3 gives the corresponding random 
effects estimates. Column 2 presents 2SLS second stage estimates for equation (1), and 
column 4 displays the random effects 2SLS second stage estimates for equation (1)
14
. For 
the estimator in the same order, Table 5 presents estimated results for the monthly marina 
slip-rental price specification and Table 6 presents estimated results for yearly marina 
slip-rental price specification. These specifications vary somewhat across the different 
durations of marina slip-rentals because not all marinas offer all three of daily, monthly 
and yearly services.
15
 Specifically, while all 42 marinas in the sample offer daily rates, 
only 27 marinas offer monthly slip rentals. Similarly, 38 marinas offer yearly slip rental 
services, and all of these marinas happen to have restaurants. Also, the yearly marina 
slip-rental prices do not exhibit changes during the time frame (a single year, 2008) for 
the sample. Yearly service is created for individuals and companies wishing to make a 
particular marina their home marina. These customers are important for marinas, since 
they consume other marina services in the off-season. To attract them, marinas offer 
                                                 
14
 First stage results are presented in the Appendix A Tables A2, A3 and A4 for daily, monthly and yearly 
marina slip-rental specifications. 
 
15
 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) cannot be applied here, since the regressors are identical in all 
three cases. 
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fixed yearly contracts at an effective daily rate that is much lower than for transient boats. 
All marinas in the sample are specialized as nautical tourism marinas, and they do not 
offer significant services other than the ones used in this study (i.e. yacht clubs catering 
to other social events are not common). 
Most importantly, the results of the four proposed specifications suggest that 
marinas awarded Blue Flag certification enjoy an average premium between 6.6% and 22% 
in terms of their daily slip-rental prices; an average premium between 40% and 49% in 
terms of their monthly slip-rental prices; and a 23% premium in terms of their yearly slip-
rental prices. In case of instrumental variables specifications, the proposed instruments 
seem to be appropriate
16
.  The number of slips in a marina significantly impacts monthly 
and yearly slip-rental prices. For monthly rates the results suggest decreasing economies 
of scale, while for yearly rates they imply increasing economies of scale. The difference 
in estimates between the two kinds of slip rental rates suggests dissimilarities in the 
nature of these contracts. Smaller marinas tend to face lower costs and thus have an 
advantage over their larger counterparts in offering cheaper long term boat parking 
service. 
                                                 
16
 F-stat= 4877 for daily; F-stat= 6311 for monthly; and F-stat= 339 for yearly marina slip-rental price 
specifications. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS RE RE 2SLS
1(Blue Flag certified marina) 0.215*** 0.0669* 0.228*** 0.0895
(0.026) (0.037) (0.086) (0.12)
log(Slips) (number of available spots) -0.0208 0.00941 -0.0369 -0.0098
(0.023) (0.024) (0.076) (0.078)
1(ACI Marina) 0.359*** 0.330*** 0.365*** 0.338***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.075) (0.077)
1(Second tier marina) -0.144*** -0.163*** -0.137* -0.154*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.083) (0.083)
1(Third tier marina) 0.0262 -0.0795** 0.0407 -0.058
(0.033) (0.038) (0.11) (0.13)
1(Uncategorized marina) 0.272*** 0.222*** 0.276 0.229
(0.053) (0.054) (0.18) (0.18)
Dry dock (number of available spots) 0.000371** 0.000364** 0.000446 0.000447
(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00053) (0.00054)
1(Travel lift) 0.0963*** 0.0449 0.116 0.0688
(0.031) (0.033) (0.1) (0.11)
1(Grocery store) 0.0377 0.0413 0.0278 0.0303
(0.037) (0.037) (0.12) (0.12)
1(Restaurant) 0.249*** 0.251*** 0.258 0.261
(0.054) (0.054) (0.18) (0.18)
1(Laundry facilities) 0.0251 0.0790*** 0.0205 0.0712
(0.026) (0.027) (0.085) (0.091)
1(Crane) -0.257*** -0.273*** -0.249*** -0.264***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.096) (0.097)
1(Parking) -0.484*** -0.426*** -0.487*** -0.433**
(0.053) (0.054) (0.17) (0.18)
1(Slipway) -0.136*** -0.162*** -0.138** -0.163***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.058) (0.06)
Locational characteristics
log(Airport distance, km) 0.0299** 0.0367** 0.0363 0.0433
(0.015) (0.015) (0.049) (0.049)
Marine fuel station distance (km) -0.00645*** -0.0102*** -0.00537 -0.00879
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0079) (0.0082)
1(Island location) 0.00263 0.0716** -0.0117 0.0523
(0.028) (0.031) (0.094) (0.1)
Population (of the associated urban area, in thousands) 0.00214*** 0.00233*** 0.00219** 0.00237***
(0.00026) (0.00027) (0.00087) (0.00088)
1(Urban location) 0.601*** 0.566*** 0.586*** 0.551***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.12) (0.12)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals) 0.0980*** 0.0955*** 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Constant 2.688*** 2.622*** 2.479*** 2.397***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.45) (0.45)
R
2
0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
Marina characteristics
Variables
Table 4. Determinants of Daily log(Marina Slip-rental Prices) (n=9396)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS RE RE 2SLS
1(Blue Flag certified marina) 0.489*** 0.407*** 0.497*** 0.418***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.12) (0.14)
log(Slips) (number of available spots) -0.235*** -0.243*** -0.263* -0.273*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.14) (0.14)
1(ACI Marina) 0.336*** 0.326*** 0.353*** 0.345***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.11) (0.11)
1(Second tier marina) -0.289*** -0.327*** -0.288** -0.325***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.11) (0.12)
1(Third tier marina) -0.144*** -0.191*** -0.138 -0.184
(0.041) (0.043) (0.14) (0.15)
1(Uncategorized marina) -- -- -- --
-- -- -- --
Dry dock (number of available spots) 0.00260*** 0.00275*** 0.00279** 0.00295**
(0.00041) (0.00041) (0.0014) (0.0014)
1(Travel lift) 0.478*** 0.447*** 0.498*** 0.469***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.14) (0.14)
1(Grocery store) 0.173*** 0.187*** 0.166 0.18
(0.038) (0.038) (0.13) (0.13)
1(Restaurant) -0.124* -0.0655 -0.12 -0.0626
(0.071) (0.073) (0.25) (0.25)
1(Laundry facilities) -0.349*** -0.328*** -0.359*** -0.339***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.095) (0.097)
1(Crane) 0.114*** 0.0958*** 0.128 0.112
(0.036) (0.036) (0.12) (0.12)
1(Parking) -- -- -- --
-- -- -- --
1(Slipway) 0.209*** 0.179*** 0.208*** 0.180**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.076) (0.08)
Locational characteristics
log(Airport distance, km) 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.133** 0.131**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.059) (0.058)
Marine fuel station distance (km) 0.0155*** 0.00901 0.0167 0.0105
(0.0053) (0.0056) (0.018) (0.019)
1(Island location) -0.482*** -0.411*** -0.503*** -0.436**
(0.049) (0.053) (0.17) (0.18)
Population (of the associated urban area, in thousands) 0.00238*** 0.00267*** 0.00245** 0.00274**
(0.00031) (0.00032) (0.0011) (0.0011)
1(Urban location) -1.345*** -1.286*** -1.348*** -1.291***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.22) (0.23)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals) 0.0470*** 0.0459*** 0.0598*** 0.0598***
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Constant 7.909*** 7.935*** 7.857*** 7.878***
(0.2) (0.2) (0.66) (0.65)
R
2
0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Table 5. Determinants of Monthly log(Marina Slip-rental Prices) (n=5315)
Variables
Marina characteristics
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. S  
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(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
1(Blue Flag certified marina) 0.232*** 0.137
(0.072) (0.01)
log(Slips) (number of available spots) 0.124* 0.148**
(0.065) (0.066)
1(ACI Marina) 0.167** 0.144**
(0.063) (0.064)
1(Second tier marina) -0.196*** -0.210***
(0.070) (0.070)
1(Third tier marina) -0.0537 -0.119
(0.091) (0.10)
1(Uncategorized marina) 0.139 0.0923
(0.21) (0.21)
Dry dock (number of available spots) -0.000126 -0.000176
(0.00046) (0.00046)
1(Travel lift) 0.0701 0.0321
(0.092) (0.09)
1(Grocery store) 0.161 0.167
(0.10) (0.10)
1(Restaurant) -- --
-- --
1(Laundry facilities) 0.0511 0.0868
(0.071) (0.075)
1(Crane) -0.104 -0.124
(0.089) (0.089)
1(Parking) -- --
-- --
1(Slipway) 0.182*** 0.162***
(0.05) (0.050)
Locational characteristics
log(Airport distance, km) -0.106*** -0.104***
(0.040) (0.040)
Marine fuel station distance (km) -0.0140** -0.01650**
(0.0064) (0.006)
1(Island location) -0.0688 -0.0114
(0.089) (0.09)
Population (of the associated urban area, in thousands) 0.000351 0.000485
(0.00073) (0.00074)
1(Urban location) -0.115 -0.169
(0.14) (0.14)
Constant 8.00*** 8.00***
(0.32) (0.32)
R
2
0.2 0.2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 6. Determinants of Yearly log(Marina Slip Rental-prices) (n=616)
Variables
Marina characteristics
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Marinas owned by ACI, command an average premium between 33% and 36% in 
terms of their daily slip rental prices; an average premium between 32% and 35% in 
terms of their monthly slip rental prices; and an average premium between 14% and 17% 
in terms of their yearly slip rental prices. Across the four specifications, the estimates for 
second-tier marinas (as defined by the Croatian Tourist Board) suggest that second-tier 
status has a significant and negative impact on all three slip-rental rates, relative to the 
highest quality, first-tier, marinas. However, these effects are less statistically significant 
for third-tier (although they are negative when significant) and uncategorized marinas. 
Furthermore, marinas offering travel lift, crane and slipway services command a price 
premium for monthly slip-rentals, while these features seem to have be negatively 
associated with daily slip rental prices. This points to a difference in the nature of the two 
types of contracts. Marinas that invest in heavy machinery (such as cranes) tend to cater 
more to consumers who seek mechanical and boat maintenance services. These services 
are typically associated with longer stays, so these marinas may exploit different demand 
elasticities, by channeling the associated capital costs to customers demanding these 
services, while relieving short term patrons of these costs. The results also indicate that 
dry dock parking services are also passed on to longer-term patrons, such as customers 
renting slips at monthly rates.  
In terms of marina locational characteristics, accessibility matters for some types 
of slip-rentals: distance from an airport negatively affects the yearly slip-rental prices. 
For every 1% increase in the distance between a marina and the nearest airport, the 
average price of a yearly slip-rental decreases by 0.21%. On the other hand, a 1% 
increase in distance from the nearest airport leads to an average increase of 0.13% in the 
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monthly slip-rental price. This suggests that long-term patrons are willing to pay a 
premium for proximity to the main transportation hubs. Among other variables, marinas 
located on islands tend to charge a 43% lower price, on average, for a monthly slip-rental 
than marinas on the mainland. However, this impact is not robust across specifications 
for daily and yearly slip rentals. Such results suggest that accessibility might matter in the 
case of very short-term customers, such as tourists, since islands are less convenient and 
more costly to reach than mainland locations. Average monthly tourism flows have a 
positive and significant impact on daily and monthly rental prices and this result is robust 
across specifications.  
 
2.5.2. Sailboat Charter Prices 
The estimation results for equation (3) are presented in the Table 7
17
. Again, 
column 1 displays least squares estimates, and column 3 gives random effects estimates. 
Column 2 presents 2SLS second stage estimates from equation (3). Column 4 shows 
random effects 2SLS second stage estimates from equation (3). 
Overall, the main estimation results suggest that sailboats berthing in a marina 
certified with the Blue Flag command, on average, a price premium between 14% and 20% 
on a weekly sailboat rental. In case of instrumental variables specifications, the proposed 
instruments seem to be appropriate
18
. This result is robust across specifications. This is in 
line with the theoretical prediction which suggests that eco-labeling certification attained 
by a home marina provides a signal of local environmental quality. This certification is, 
                                                 
17
 First stage estimates are presented in Appendix A Table A.5. 
 
18
 F-stat=768. 
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in turn, reflected in weekly sailboat rental prices, which are more likely to reflect tourist 
demands.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables OLS 2SLS RE RE 2SLS
Marina characteristics
1 (Blue Flag certified home marina) 0.158*** 0.140*** 0.181*** 0.205***
(0.0062) (0.0055) (0.033) (0.034)
log (Marina yearly slip rental price) -0.0225 0.0617*** -0.0855 -0.121*
(0.014) (0.0073) (0.072) (0.073)
Vessel characteristics
log(Sailboat length) (meters) 2.199*** 2.209*** 2.257*** 2.295***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.13) (0.13)
Number of beds -0.0360*** -0.0393*** -0.0381*** -0.0384***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0089) (0.0087)
Vessel age (years) -0.0115*** -0.0103*** -0.01000** -0.0104**
(0.0008) (0.00079) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Vessel age
2
 (years)/10
6
0.572*** 0.515*** 0.499** 0.521**
(0.04) (0.039) (0.21) (0.21)
Vessel weight (tons) /10
3
0.00286*** 0.00296*** 0.00295 0.00275
(0.00044) (0.00044) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Fuel capacity (tons) 0.558*** 0.470*** 0.605*** 0.617***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.17) (0.16)
1(Nautical charts and guides) 0.0915*** 0.107*** 0.0896** 0.0864**
(0.007) (0.0068) (0.038) (0.037)
1(Global positioning system) 0.0451*** 0.0587*** 0.0382 0.0307
(0.007) (0.0067) (0.038) (0.037)
1(Marine VHF radio) 0.0266** 0.0399*** 0.024 0.0112
(0.011) (0.011) (0.058) (0.057)
1(Electric refrigerator) 0.0212*** 0.0271*** 0.0134 0.016
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.026) (0.026)
Gas cooker with oven (1 if available,  0 otherwise) 0.0351*** 0.0249*** 0.0376 0.0392
(0.005) (0.0048) (0.027) (0.026)
1 (Electric anchor available) -0.000422 -0.00799 0.00632 0.00585
(0.016) (0.016) (0.088) (0.086)
Locational characteristics
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals,  
thousands) 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00074) (0.00074)
Constant 0.726*** -- 1.083** 1.285**
(0.096) -- (0.5) (0.5)
R
2
0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83
Table 7. Determinants of the log(Weekly Sailboat Charter Price) (n=16651)
 
The estimated effects of other variables of interest, including vessel length, 
weight and age are all statistically significant with predicted signs, and robust across the 
four specifications. For example, a 1% increase in sailboat length yields, on average, a 2% 
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increase in its weekly charter price. Interior space (i.e. hull volume) increases faster than 
vessel length, so this result is not surprising. Availability of a nautical charts and guides 
increases the rental price by 9%, while an extra bed decreases it by about 4%, controlling 
for boat size. The number of tourist arrivals in the county (a variable proxying for 
demand conditions) is positively and significantly related to weekly sailboat charter 
prices. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for the effect of yearly marina slip-rental 
prices on the weekly sailboat charter price is fragile and mostly insignificant. 
 
2.5.3. Hotel Room Prices 
The estimation results for equation (5) are presented in the Table 8
19
. Again, 
column 1 displays least squares estimates, and column 3 random effects estimates. 
Column 2 presents 2SLS second stage estimates from equation (5) and column 4 exhibits 
random effects 2SLS second stage estimates from equation (5). Most importantly, though, 
hotels whose beaches were awarded Blue Flag certification seem to command a 
significant price premium. Specifically, certification is associated with an increase in 
price of a hotel room between 45% and 270% in the OLS specifications, and between 49% 
and 237% in the random effects specifications. In case of instrumental variables 
specifications, the proposed instruments seem to be appropriate.
20
 
In terms of the control variables, hotels categorized as 4-star and 5-star also carry 
a price premium, relative to 2-star hotels. Coefficient estimates suggest that a 4-star hotel 
carries a price premium between 33% and 51%, while a 5-star hotel carries a premium 
                                                 
19
 First stage estimates are presented in Appendix A Table A.6. 
 
20
 F-stat=101. 
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between 100% and 118%. The number of beds is negatively and significantly related to 
hotel room prices, across specifications, which indicates presence of economies of scale. 
Other controls displaying robust coefficient estimates include the availability of air-
conditioning in rooms and average county monthly tourist arrivals.   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables OLS 2SLS RE RE 2SLS
1 (Blue Flag awarded to the hotel beach) 0.453*** 2.705*** 0.491* 2.376**
(0.06) (0.31) (0.25) (1.2)
log(Airport distance, km) -0.222* -1.286*** -0.294 -1.182
(0.11) (0.22) (0.53) (1.05)
1(3-star hotel) 0.00988 0.101* -0.00243 0.0851
(0.033) (0.052) (0.15) (0.26)
1(4-star hotel) 0.495*** 0.337*** 0.518*** 0.354
(0.042) (0.068) (0.19) (0.33)
1(5-star hotel) 1.180*** 1.002*** 1.166*** 1.022**
(0.053) (0.084) (0.24) (0.42)
log(Number of rooms) -0.190*** -0.207*** -0.178** -0.209*
(0.016) (0.025) (0.072) (0.12)
1(Air-conditioning) 0.303*** 0.425*** 0.338** 0.412*
(0.031) (0.051) (0.14) (0.24)
1(Sports facilities) 0.000312 -0.563*** 0.00778 -0.4
(0.044) (0.1) (0.19) (0.4)
1(Island location) 0.0861 2.836*** 0.669 -1.266
(0.38) (0.36) (0.63) (2.65)
log(Population, in associated urban area, in thousands) -0.119* -0.645*** -0.158 -0.352
(0.07) (0.13) (0.32) (0.25)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals, in thousands) 0.122*** 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.0069) (0.011) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Constant 4.477*** 8.055*** 4.276 9.257*
(1.12) (1.21) (3.27) (5.26)
R
2
0.83 0.56 0.82 0.68
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. City fixed effects are included in the 
specification, but are supressed in the table for expository convinience.
Table 8. Determinants of log(Hotel Room Prices) (n=969)
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2.6. Conclusion 
This study extends the existing literature concerning price premia associated with 
eco-labeling programs. In contrast to earlier work, this application focuses on services, 
which have been largely overlooked in the eco-labeling literature. A further contribution 
arises from the fact that this work specifically addresses the issue of selection into eco-
labeling programs. I explicitly model the endogeneity of certification status using 
appropriate simultaneous equations techniques.  In the analysis, three sectors of the 
tourism industry have been used to examine the effects of eco-certification on prices. 
Independently awarded eco-certification signals higher environmental quality and 
marinas awarded the Blue Flag certifications appear to be able to charge higher prices for 
their services. Moreover, charter companies associated with a marina that carries such a 
certification seem also to enjoy some benefits. 
 This study‟s principal findings include that Blue Flag certified marinas enjoy an 
average premium between 6.6% and 22% for daily slip rentals;  40% and 49%  for 
monthly slip rentals; and 23% for yearly slip rentals.  Furthermore, within the sailboat 
charter sector, vessels whose home marina is awarded the Blue Flag carry a price 
premium, on average, between 14% and 20% on a weekly sailboat rental. When it comes 
to hotel accommodation, hotels managing a Blue Flag certified beach enjoy a price 
premium between 45% and 270%. 
 These results suggest the importance of eco-labeling as a tool to decrease 
information asymmetry between consumers and service providers. The Blue Flag gives 
consumers information that reveals the relative environmental quality of marinas. This 
consequently increases demand for this comparatively more desirable recreational 
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opportunity, which translates into higher price premiums charged by service providers. 
Furthermore, such a profit incentive can be expected to lead more marinas to make an 
effort to conform to the requirements for Blue Flag certification, in the hope that they too 
might be eligible for Blue Flag label. Therefore, the results of this analysis can be used in 
practice by marina-management companies to aid them in their decisions about whether 
to invest in environmentally friendly practices. These empirical insights may also be 
valuable to sailboat charter firms as they consider their selection of a home marina. More 
generally, this paper has shown that eco-labeling can be successfully applied to a service 
industry, and as such might encourage further research regarding similar certification 
programs that may emerge in other service industries. 
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CHAPTER III 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CIVIL WAR 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Climate change is predicted to have a range of potentially serious consequences in 
both the short and long terms. Near-term impacts may result from changes in regional 
temperature and precipitation averages and extremes (IPCC, 2001). Higher maximum 
temperatures lead to a host of impacts on both biological and physical systems. They are 
associated with increased incidence of death and illnesses in older age groups and 
amongst the poor, increased demand for electricity, damage to a variety of crops, 
livestock and wildlife. Higher minimum temperatures can lead to an increase in the range 
and activity of some pests and disease vectors. More intense precipitation events also 
negatively affect agricultural production, increase soil erosion, and increase the 
probability of floods and landslides. 
Extended periods of low precipitation levels can lead to persistent droughts, 
leading to decreased crop yields and decreased water resource quantity and quality (IPCC, 
2011). Furthermore, dry conditions increase the supply of combustible vegetation, 
increasing the risk of wildfires. The complex interaction between temperature and 
precipitation also impacts complex climate phenomena such as storms. For example, 
tropical cyclones derive energy primarily from evaporation from the ocean. Such 
37 
 
evaporation increases with the increase in temperature, and is thus likely to increase the 
intensity of cyclones. Increase in cyclone peak wind and precipitation intensities lead to 
increased risk to human life, coastal erosion and damage to infrastructure. Finally, 
epidemics are likely to increase in frequency with increase in minimum temperatures, 
precipitation and flooding (IPCC, 2011). Longer-term impacts may include sea level 
changes with associated threats to coastal infrastructure and the potential for more 
frequent and severe outbreaks of vector-borne diseases (European Parliament, 2006). 
The scope of these climate-induced challenges to human societies adds urgency to the 
need to identify and measure the potential effects of different types of disasters on 
various types of human activities. The goal of this research is to identify some of these 
effects and thereby inform climate change mitigation or adaptation policies. Recent 
research has predominantly considered the effects of climate change on economic activity 
and human health. However, the potential effect of climate change as a contributor to the 
outbreak of violent conflict has not been addressed in much detail until very recently in 
the quantitative literature (Blattman & Christopher, 2010). Economists and political 
scientists have just begun to look at these effects, but have yet to establish a persuasive 
weight of evidence that identifies the direction or the magnitude of the effects of different 
climate-related phenomena on violent conflict. 
This study provides new evidence concerning the apparent impact of climate change on 
violent conflict. Specifically, I focus on climate change effects on the outbreak of civil 
war (onset), the persistence of civil war (incidence
21
) and the overall duration of civil war. 
I employ a dataset on the occurrence of climate-change-related natural disasters such as 
                                                 
21
 The variable called incidence is an indicator for whether there is a state of civil war in each country in 
each period   
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droughts, floods, storms, temperature extremes, wildfires and epidemics.  I also take 
advantage of several standard datasets concerning civil wars from the political science 
literature compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2004).  By combining these 
datasets, I provide the first evidence that (a.) the frequency of extreme cold events and 
epidemic outbreaks appears to have a measurable effect on civil war onset; (b.) the 
frequency of the previous year‟s extreme heat events seems to affect civil war incidence; 
and (c.) the frequency of drought events appears to affect civil war durations. These 
climate-related events act as shocks to agricultural production, raising food prices and 
depressing incomes. In addition to these direct effects, these events also decrease the 
opportunity costs of conflict for the afflicted groups. The statistical regularities identified 
in this paper should be important to policymakers who struggle to decide upon optimal 
policies for international disaster relief related to extreme weather associated with climate 
change. In a broader context, these findings are also relevant to governments which must 
decide how aggressively to pursue climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature. Section 3 discusses the 
data. Section 4 explains the econometric specification and Section 5 summarizes the main 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature Overview 
The impacts of climate change on various measures of civil war have been the 
focus of study by social scientists since the 1980s.  It was first addressed in the 
environmental security literature. Employing qualitative research methodology, these 
studies found that conflict arises due to resource scarcity, which is in turn impacted by 
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climate change. The quantitative approach to analyzing the issue is more new, first 
becoming the focus of political scientists in the 1990s, and only recently by economists. 
This paper contributes to the quantitative conflict literature by proposing a new set of 
explanatory variables, concerning climate-change-related disasters, previously not used in 
this literature, as major contributors to civil wars. It contributes to the larger conflict 
literature by identifying which climate-change-related disasters have an effect on civil 
war and which ones don‟t. 
3.2.1. Civil War Literature 
A literature review by Blattman and Christopher (2010) gives an excellent 
account of recent developments in research on the determinants of civil war. Using the 
terminology of Blattman and Christopher, this paper falls into the category of “cross-
country empirical conflict research”. This literature, and the associated theoretical 
research, is still evolving and many hypothesized relationships have yet to be thoroughly 
explored in empirical contexts. Much of the current quantitative research is based on civil 
war data collected by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and from Fearon (2004). This particular 
study uses civil war conflict data from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and from Fearon (2004) 
and extends specifications proposed in those papers, as well as in research by Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998). 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) are motivated by the observation, in much of the prior 
descriptive research, that civil wars seem to be sparked by religious and ethnic 
antagonisms. However, their empirical results fail to confirm this perception.  These 
authors argue that the onset of civil war is best explained by factors that induce or 
facilitate an armed insurgency against the government. Such factors include terrain 
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accessibility, large populations and, most importantly, low incomes. High income 
countries are less likely to experience civil wars. 
Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2008, 2009) develop a global game-theoretic 
model incorporating information asymmetries between actors. Enemies, in this case, do 
not know each other‟s costs of conflict. Their main finding suggests that higher incomes 
are linked to lower levels of conflict. Negative economic shocks, on the other hand, 
increase incentives for violent conflict since opposing groups experience a decrease in 
their opportunity costs of conflict (in terms of lower returns to production). Miguel et al 
(2004) address the issue of endogeneity of income growth in civil war incidence models. 
Specifically, they use rainfall variation as an instrument for economic growth in 41 
African countries during 1981–99. This approach, however, cannot be applied in the case 
of climate-change-related disasters. Unlike rainfall, which is likely to influence civil war 
incidence only through an income shock to agricultural production, disasters affect the 
whole society in a variety of ways. They destroy infrastructure, such as schools and roads, 
and might affect access to education, contribute to migration, change in social customs (if 
a particular social group is affected, such as elderly and infants), etc. 
Fearon (2004) is amongst the first papers that attempt to answer the question of 
why do certain civil wars last longer than others. He employs duration models in his 
analysis and finds that civil wars arising from coups or revolutions, and those originating 
in Eastern Europe and former colonies, tend to have shorter durations.  Civil conflicts 
between ethnic minorities and government-backed migrants of a dominant ethnic group 
what the author terms “the sons of the soil” wars have longer durations. The same effect 
is found for conflicts in which the rebels have access to income from contraband (e.g. 
41 
 
opium, diamonds or coca). Other notable papers focusing on civil war duration find that 
outside interventions limit war duration (Reagan, 2002); presence of multiple actors 
players prolong it (Cunningham, 2006); conflicts located at considerable distance from 
the main government stronghold, along remote international borders and in regions with 
valuable minerals last substantially longer (Buhaug et al., 2009); and inequality lengthens 
civil wars (Collier et al, 2004). 
   
3.2.2. Effects of Temperature and Precipitation on Civil War 
In addition to the standard conflict literature, several recent attempts have been 
made to quantify the potential effects of climate change on various measures of violent 
conflict. The idea is that climate-change-related alterations in temperature and 
precipitation act as a negative income shocks which, according to Chassang and Padro-i-
Miquel (2008, 2009), implies a higher potential for violent conflict. 
A few recent empirical studies link climate change to violent conflict. Hendrix 
and Glaser (2007) study the determinants of civil war onset specifically in Africa 
between 1981 and 1999. They use two different civil war datasets by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and use the PRIO/UCDP
22
 data to construct their civil war onset variable. The 
Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) database provides annual rainfall 
estimates as one measure of climate change. Fearon and Laitin‟s three main explanatory 
variables are (i) climate suitability for agriculture (using the Köppen-Geiger climate 
system scale), (ii) land degradation (percent of total land area degraded), (iii) and year-to-
year interannual variance in rainfall (based on average annual rainfall in milliliters per 
                                                 
22
 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) / Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
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year). The results suggest that inter-annual variability in rainfall significantly affects the 
onset of civil war in Africa. 
Burke et al. (2009) also focus on Africa for the period between 1981 and 2002. 
Their dependent variable is civil war incidence (i.e. the propensity for a country to be in a 
state of civil war) in country i in year t. For this variable they also utilize the PRIO/UCDP 
dataset. Their main contribution lies in modeling the effects of climate change on the 
incidence of civil conflict using both temperature and precipitation variables. Several 
specifications are proposed. Most control for lagged values of temperature and 
precipitation, and some include controls for per capita income and type of political 
regime. The results suggest that higher temperatures tend to increase the incidence of 
civil war. This result is robust across a variety of specifications, but the statistical 
significance of the coefficient on temperature diminishes to only 10% level in their most 
comprehensive model. 
Other empirical research has analyzed much longer historical series. Zhang et al. 
(2006) use the data on frequency of conflict (wars and rebellions in three distinct climate 
regions) in China between 800 BCE and CE 1911. The climate data for the Zhang study 
come from Briffa and Osborn (2002) who collect and recalibrate five common climate 
series over the last millennium for the Northern Hemisphere. Zhang et al. then employ 
pair-wise correlation analysis and find that the frequency of annual, decadal and “phase 
level” (cold or warm) rebellions and wars tends to be correlated with the temperature 
anomalies associated with lowest and average temperatures, but not high temperatures. 
The results seem to be robust to the inclusion of temperature lags, especially at the annual 
level. 
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The results of Zhang et al. (2006) suggest that the correlation between 
temperatures and conflict is mostly significant for the Central China region. The authors 
argue that these regional differences in conflicts associated with weather conditions arise 
from marked local climate fluctuations. Thus, South China, endowed with subtropical 
and tropical climates, has a greater capacity to adopt alternative crops when climate-
related shocks occur. Central China, however, is characterized by monsoon cycles. 
Monsoons tend to bring a cold Siberian air mass during the winter. If this cold is 
persistent, it can result in a much greater susceptibility of agricultural production to cold 
temperature shocks. The Central China region has a lower adaptive capacity in terms of 
alternative crop introduction (due to its more temperate climate), so wars are more likely 
to occur as a consequence of a sustained and atypical cold spell. In further research, 
Zhang et al. (2007) extend their analysis to Europe and find that the frequency of civil 
wars is again correlated with unusually cold spells. 
Tol and Wagner (2010) likewise analyze the effects of changes in average 
temperature and precipitation changes on the frequency of violent conflict in Europe. For 
their dependent variable, the authors use data on all historically recognized violent 
conflicts in Europe between 1000 AD and 1990 AD, while their climate data are drawn 
from various reconstructions of historical average temperatures and precipitation.
23
 These 
authors utilize regression techniques to estimate several specifications where they model 
the passage of time by using quadratic time trends. They also model the changing 
relationship between violent conflict and temperature by using interactions between time 
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 Tol and Wagner collect their European conflict data from http://www.warscholar.com/; their historical 
temperature data are drawn from research conducted by Luterbacher et al. (2004) and NOAA and von 
Storch et al. (2004); their historical precipitation data comes from research conducted by Pauling et al. 
(2006). 
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and temperature to permit temperature effects to vary systematically over time.  
Additional autoregressive specifications control for the number of conflicts in the 
previous two years with additional controls for the period of the Protestant Reformation. 
The results of the model with interactions suggest that conflict was more prevalent during 
colder periods. However, the results are not robust to alternative temperature 
reconstructions or to all sub-periods of the data. For example, the results imply no effect 
of temperature on conflict frequency during the industrialized era (from 1750 to 1990).
24
 
Thus the hypothesis that extended periods with poor harvests lead to violent conflict 
appears to hold only for earlier societies that relied more heavily on agriculture. 
 
3.2.3. Extreme Weather Effects on Civil War 
The main argument in this literature is that changes in patterns and frequencies of 
natural disasters such as droughts, storms, floods, wildfires, and periods of extreme hot or 
cold temperatures can create negative income shocks via their negative effects on 
agricultural production. Consequently, these events might decrease the opportunity cost 
of pursuing conflict, thus increasing the chance that conflict might arise and persist. 
Research concerning the effects of different extreme weather events related to climate 
change (other than temperature and precipitation) on various aspects of civil wars, such 
as their onset, occurrence (incidence) and duration, has received even less attention. Nel 
and Righarts (2008) appears to be the only study that attempts to study the influence of 
climate-change-related disasters on civil war onset. They employ a dataset consisting of 
187 political units for the period 1950-2000 and find that natural disasters significantly 
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 Autoregressive model presented in Toll and Wagner (2010) Table 6 and 7, pp.12. 
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increase the risk of civil violence. They identify rapid-onset geological and climate 
related disasters as posing the highest overall risk. These authors aggregate disasters into 
either “climate” or “geological” groups, so the study has not answered the question about 
which specific types of disaster events have the greatest tendency to precipitate a civil 
war. This is an important question to address, since appropriate mitigation or adaptation 
policies will differ by the type of a disaster. The present paper thus extends Nel and 
Righarts (2008) by distinguishing and controlling for specific types of events such as: 
droughts, extreme temperatures, epidemics, floods, storms and wildfires. 
Besley et al. (2009) develop a theoretical model for current civil war status 
(incidence) over time and accross countries and test it empirically. This appears to be the 
only paper that attempts to measures the impact of climate-change-related disasters on 
civil war incidence. They use an OLS specification and add time and year fixed effects to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity related to each country‟s unique cultural and 
institutional characteristics.  They include an aggregate measure of “weather shock” and 
find that it has a positive impact on a country‟s civil war status (incidence). They 
construct their weather shock variable by aggregating floods and extreme heat events into 
a single measure. I extend the Besley et al. (2009) paper by disaggregating, to look into 
the effects of individual disaster types on civil war status. 
Fearon (2004) appears to be the only published paper that explores the 
determinants of civil war duration. Civil war duration is defined as the number of years it 
takes for the conflict to finish. This is different than civil war incidence, which is the 
occurrence of conflict in country i in year t. I am not aware of any papers that have 
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attempted to study the effects of natural disasters or any other measure of climate change 
on civil war duration. 
 
3.2.4. Environmental Conflict and Security Literature 
In addition to aforementioned quantitative conflict literature there is a much older 
and well established qualitative literature on environment and security. Homer-Dixon 
(1994) analyzes several case studies and identifies causal links between conflict and 
environmental degradation. He suggests that environmental scarcity causes conflict that 
tends to occur at a sub-national level and tends to be persistent. Scarcities in water, forest 
and agricultural resources are identified as major sources of environmental conflict. 
Climate change is argued to have an effect as well, but not in its own right, but through 
interactions with the mentioned resources. The author also argues that population 
pressures as well as unequal resource distribution contribute to the incidence of 
environmental conflict. 
Homer-Dixon (1991) describes three theoretical perspectives on conflict: frustration-
aggression theories, group-identity theories and structural theories. In the first case the 
conflict is argued to arise from individuals‟ frustrations with an entity that they perceive 
is obstructing them from reaching their goals. Group-identity theories approach the issue 
from the perspective of social psychology and focus on ethnicity, nationality and 
religious issues as major causes of conflict. Structural theories are consistent with 
economics approach to conflict. These theories stress that conflict arises from 
calculations made by rational actors facing external constraints. Based on the three 
approaches Homer-Dixon hypothesizes that environmental degradation produces three 
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types of conflicts: simple scarcity conflicts, group identity conflicts and relative-
deprivation conflicts. The first type is best explained by structural theories and suggests 
that conflict arises from key resource scarcity. Author provides an example case in 
support of this perspective. It involves water access issues between Turkey and Syria 
whereas Turkey‟s plans to build massive system of dams and irrigation canals on the 
Euphrates have come at a cost to water deprived Syria. This, in turn, is suggested to fuel 
internal civil war in Turkey, between the government and the Kurdish insurgents acting 
as a proxy for Syria on the issue. 
Levy (1995) provides a different perspective on the issue of environment as a 
national security issue. He argues that much of the concern voiced by many researchers is 
more of an artifact of time when these studies have been written and the general attention 
environmental issues have received since the 1980s, than an actual concern that 
environmental issues could cause conflict. In other words, the author suggests that even is 
environmental issues affect national security they are of little importance. He points to 
previous conflict literature that fails to mention environmental issues as a potential 
national security issue. He does acknowledge that the only environmental degradation 
cases that might matter are ozone depletion and climate change. Finally, Levy argues that 
it is better to deepen the understanding of other causes of individual conflicts, endemic to 
each case, than to focus on smaller causes, such as the environmental degradation. 
Several recent studies have summarized major perspectives on environment and 
security. Khagram and Ali (2006) discuss the differences between two perspectives on 
environmental conflict: environmental scarcity and environmental abundance theories. 
Environmental scarcity theories suggest that scarcity can be induced by supply factors 
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such as degradation of natural resources; demand factors, such as increased consumption; 
and structural factors, such as unequal distribution of resources. The main empirical 
finding in this literature suggests that environmental scarcity causes civil strife, but not 
international conflict. Environmental abundance literature, on the other hand, proposes 
another pathway for conflict. In this case, it is the relative abundance of resources, most 
often in mineral resource sectors, that causes conflict. Furthermore, conflicts arising from 
resource abundance tend to be short lived and end in a military defeat of one of the 
parties in the conflict. Authors conclude that more empirical research is needed to resolve 
this issue. Furthermore, they advocate moving from anecdotal evidence provided by 
much of the earlier research to more rigorous empirical work. 
Detraz and Betsill (2009) analyze how environmental conflict and environmental 
security perspectives are adopted by the 2007 United Nations security debate on security 
aspects of climate change. Environmental conflict perspective is based on the resource 
scarcity approach as a major source of conflict. Environmental security literature, on the 
other hand, takes a broader perspective and is more concerned with impact on all of 
humanity, as opposed to focusing on the state. The aforementioned United Nations 
security debate is said to be more reliant on the environmental security perspective. 
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3.3. Data 
Like several other researchers, I also use the civil war database constructed by Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) as a source for dependent variables: civil war onset and status.
 25
  A 
conflict in a particular country is coded as a civil war if the following three selection 
criteria are satisfied: 
(1) the conflict involves fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and 
organized, nonstate groups who seek either to take control of a government, to 
take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies; 
(2) the conflict kills at least 1,000 people in total over its course, with a yearly 
average of at least 100 conflict-related deaths; 
(3) at least 100 people are killed on each side (including civilians attacked by rebels 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
There are 6278 country-year observations in the sample and the rate of conflict is 1.67 
per 100 country years. Civil war duration data are described in Fearon (2004). 
26
 
The climate and weather-related disaster data come from a global database on 
natural and technological disasters called EM-DAT.
 27
  This database contains disaster-
level data on some 18,000 disasters that have occurred since 1900. The database is 
maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the 
School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. The data are 
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 Fearon and Laitin were inclined to construct their own database to correct for certain types of exclusions 
in other existing databases. Their data are available for downloading at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/data/apsr07repdata.zip 
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 Data available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/data/jprrepdata.zip 
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 Available at http://www.emdat.be/ 
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compiled from various sources including national governments, UN agencies, and other 
non-governmental organizations (such as the Red Cross). The selection criterion for 
disasters requires 10 or more people to die in a given disaster, and 100 or more people to 
be affected by it, a declaration of a state of emergency and a call for international 
assistance. The database is updated daily with all new disasters satisfying the 
aforementioned criteria. 
For the purposes of this study I utilize the available meteorological data from the 
EM-DAT database on storms; hydrological data on floods; climatological data on 
extreme temperatures (low and high), drought and wildfire; and epidemiological data on 
severe outbreaks of disease. Furthermore, I aggregate the EM-DAT disaster data to 
country-by-year disaster counts. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Note that 
the average incidence of a given type of disaster is low. Floods occur at the highest 
average rate of 0.267 per country-year, while extremely hot temperatures (caused 
primarily by heat waves) take place at rate of only thousand country-years in the data. 
The remaining control variables for civil war onset and incidence come from 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) as well as some additional sources. The measure of 
“mountainous terrain” is constructed by A. J. Gerrard for the World Bank DECRG 
project on civil wars. Income per capita comes from the Penn World Tables. Population 
data come from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators (WDI). The so-called 
Polity IV regime index is a commonly used indicator of political authority.
 28
 The regime 
authority spectrum ranges from -10 for a hereditary monarchy to +10 for a consolidated 
democracy. In the analysis, I use a dummy variable indicating whether the country had a 
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 Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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three-or-greater change on the Polity IV regime index in any of the three years prior to 
the year in question, as do Fearon and Laitin (2003). Countries with mixed democratic 
and authocratic characteristics, often called anocracies, are included by constructing an 
indicator that equals 1 if the Polity IV  score ranges between -5 and 5, and 0 otherwise, 
per Fearon and Laitin (2003). Oil exports are obtained from the World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and are included by constructing an indicator for when 
fuel exports exceed one-third of export revenues. Fearon and Laitin (2003) constructed 
variables for prior wars, noncontiguous territories (i.e. when a part of the country is 
physically separated from the “mainland”) and new states themselves. 
Summary statistics are provided for civil war onset and incidence models in Table 
1. They suggest that civil wars occur in some 15% of country-years. Table 2 provides 
correlations between different types of environmental disasters and Table 3 presents 
further evidence of multicollinearity between these disasters. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables:
1(Civil_War_Onset) 0.0167 0.128 -- --
1(Civil_War_in_Progress) 0.147 0.354 -- --
Additional conflict variable
Prior war 0.132 0.339
Counts of climate-related natural disasters
Droughtt 0.0908 0.293 0 2
Extreme Coldt 0.0141 0.130 0 2
Extreme Heatt 0.0103 0.107 0 2
Epidemict 0.0943 0.397 0 6
Floodt 0.277 0.757 0 14
Stormt 0.269 1.13 0 27
Wildfiret 0.0251 0.184 0 4
Prior war 0.133 0.340 -- --
Sociodemographic, geographic, and political controls
GDP/capita, lagged 3.66 4.54 0.048 66.7
log(Population Densityt) -3.38 1.54 -14.4 1.55
log(% mountains) 2.17 1.40 0 4.55
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.173 0.379 0 1
1(Oil producer) 0.129 0.336 0 1
1(New State) 0.0294 0.169 0 1
1(Instability) 0.146 0.354 0 1
PolityIV -0.472 7.52 -10 10
1(Anocracy) 0.223 0.416 0 1
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Civil War Onset and Incidence Models (n=6278 
country-years, from 1945 to 1999)
Drought Extreme Cold Extreme Heat Epidemic Flood Storm Wildfire
Drought 1
Extreme Cold 0.0459 1
Extreme Heat 0.0427 0.1203 1
Epidemic 0.0951 0.1007 0.0917 1
Flood 0.1311 0.1698 0.1748 0.1965 1
Storm 0.0866 0.1575 0.2166 0.0711 0.4233 1
Wildfire 0.0676 0.0803 0.1026 0.0863 0.1726 0.3016 1
Table 2. Correlation Matrix for All Disaster Events in Civil War Onset and Incidence Models, 1945-1999 
(n=6278)
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For the civil war duration models, variables coded by Fearon (2004) are used for 
coups and revolutions, colonial wars, the presence of indigenous populations (sons of the 
soil) fighting migrants to their areas, and contraband-related financing of war. Summary 
statistics for duration data and corresponding controls are displayed in Table 4. Table 5 
provides correlations between different types of environmental disasters and Table 6 
presents further evidence of multicollinearity between these disasters.  
 
Variable R2
Drought 0.024879
Extreme Cold 0.048792
Extreme Heat 0.065269
Epidemic 0.054179
Flood 0.226041
Storm 0.25512
Wildfire 0.099035
Table 3. Tolerance for Each 
Event in All Disasters Civil War 
Onset and Incidence Models
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Dependent variable:
Civil War Finishes 0.0826 0.2750 -- --
Counts of climate-related natural disasters:
Drought 0.178 0.398 0 2
Extreme Cold 0.046 0.251 0 2
Extreme Heat 0.027 0.178 0 2
Epidemic 0.285 0.731 0 6
Flood 0.758 1.34 0 8
Storm 0.616 1.59 0 11
Wildfire 0.033 0.182 0 2
Sociodemographic, geographic, and political controls
1(Coup/revolution) 0.0515 0.221 -- --
1(Eastern Europe) 0.0352 0.184 -- --
1(Not contiguous) 0.190 0.392 -- --
1(Sons of the soil) 0.302 0.459 -- --
1(Contraband) 0.256 0.436 -- --
GDP/capita (lagged, in 1000s) 1.93 2.07 0.0500 14.9
log(Population Densityt) -3.00 1.270 -5.98 -0.0674
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) -0.498 6.77 -10 10
Table 4 . Summary Statistics for Civil War Duration Models (n=1102 country-years, from 
1945 to 1999)
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3.4. Econometric Specification 
3.4.1. Civil War Onset 
To model the determinants of civil war onset, I propose the following logit 
discrete outcome econometric specification analogous to those common in the conflict 
literature, 
itit    XDisasterOnsetCivil_War_ :O1  Model it10it  (1) 
 
The dependent variable Civil_War_Onsetit is a binary variable equal to 1 if a civil war 
starts in a country i in year t, and 0 otherwise. Disasterit is the frequency of one given 
given type of disaster in country i in year t. These disasters are: droughts, epidemics, 
extreme cold temperatures, extreme hot temperatures, floods, storms and wildfires. 
Drought Extreme Cold Extreme Heat Epidemic Flood Storm Wildfire
Drought 1
Extreme Cold -0.0113 1
Extreme Heat 0.0552 0.1294 1
Epidemic 0.0241 0.1971 0.2505 1
Flood 0.1116 0.267 0.2363 0.3034 1
Storm 0.1213 0.2149 0.1448 0.1277 0.4608 1
Wildfire 0.029 0.0828 0.0268 0.3326 0.1037 0.0338 1
Table 5. Correlation Matrix for All Disaster Events in Duration Models, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
Variable R2
Drought 0.0229286
Extreme Cold 0.0992429
Extreme Heat 0.1018733
Epidemic 0.226383
Flood 0.3051134
Storm 0.2287929
Wildfire 0.1153389
Table 6. Tolerance for Each 
Event in All Disasters Duration 
Models
55 
 
Across a sequence of analogous specifications, I rotate through this list of disaster types, 
featuring one type of disaster at a time. Vector Xit contains the following control variables: 
occurrence of civil war in the previous year, income per capita lagged one year 
(thousands of 1985 U.S. dollars), the logarithm of the population density also lagged one 
year, the logarithm of the percent of the country‟s terrain classified as “mountainous.” an 
indicator for states with noncontiguous territories, an indicator for whether this is an oil-
producing country, an indicator for a newly formed state (such as countries formed after 
dissolution of the Soviet Union), an index of political instability (Polity IV),  indicator for 
whether the country is in the state called “anocracy”. Possible endogeneity of the GDP 
per capita variable is addressed by using the lagged values of these variables instead of 
the contemporaneous ones. Again, this list of auxiliary variables is fairly standard in the 
literature for the determinants of civil war onset and has been used in previous research, 
most prominently by Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
 As measures of climate change, the majority of the previous literature has tended 
to use only average temperature and precipitation. These variables are constructed from 
“projection and reconstruction” raster data to produce aforementioned variables. 29  A 
contribution of this paper is the extension of the model to include individual discrete 
counts of an array of natural disasters as a measure of climate change. Climate change is 
likely to be manifested in a wide variety of weather-related phenomena beyond just 
temperature and precipitation changes, such as an increased frequency of natural disasters 
like droughts, epidemics, extreme cold and hot temperatures, floods, storms and wildfires. 
                                                 
29
 Meteorologists produce historical climatological data by dividing the globe into a grid consisting of equal 
size areas. These areas do not fit country borders, so interpolation is necessary to produce country level 
data. 
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 As a robustness check, the basic specification in equation (1) is expanded by 
introducing up to three annual lags for each of the pertinent disaster frequencies. 
Furthermore, I consider alternative specifications with time fixed effects, to control for 
the impacts, common to all countries that vary by year. Such a generalization seems 
warranted since it is plausible that some time periods have unique common effects (for 
example, the colonial wars for independence that characterized the first few decades of 
the sample). Time fixed effects may be particularly important in this application, since 
natural disasters are more likely to have gone unreported earlier in the sample period and 
time fixed effects may control for this to a certain extent.
30
  
Another possible specification is to include all the different type of disasters 
simultaneously as explanatory variables in the same specification. Such a model, 
however, may have difficulty in discriminating between the effects of different types of 
disasters if these have tended to covary, as may be the case for storms and floods.  
Thus the kind of specification where we are most likely to discern the effect of 
one type of disaster includes time fixed effects as well as varying degrees lagged effects
31
, 
ittit
s
  

XDisasterOnsetCivil_War_ :O8  Model
3
0
s-it0it  
(2) 
where t are the time fixed effects, and Disasterit-s is the frequency of a given disaster in 
country i at time t-s. 
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 Burke et al.(2009), for example, use country specific time trends to control for variables that evolve over 
time. This would not be applicable in this case, since natural disaster measurement problems (i.e. potential 
omission of events during earlier periods) require time fixed effects, not trends. Despite this, I have 
estimated models with country specific time trends and found no significant differences relative to the 
model with time fixed effects. 
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 The logic for the labeling of these models will be explained in the appendix section. Intermediate models 
O2 through O7 are also estimated. 
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When it comes to control variables countries with higher incomes and prior wars 
are expected to be systematically less likely to experience the onset of a civil war. The 
former variable acts as a proxy for government strength relative to that of insurgents. 
Each of the remaining controls is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of 
onset of a civil war. Specifically, a greater population density induces greater competition 
for scarce resources and thus increases the chance that such competition will turn violent 
within the country. Mountainous terrain makes the country harder to govern, since 
insurgents could more easily take advantage of the protection afforded by harder-to-
access terrain to develop and cultivate their insurgency against the government.  
Oil exporting countries tend to have less well-developed bureaucracies, since they do not 
have as much of a necessity to raise tax revenues from the local population to pay for the 
services of government. A weaker state thus increases the chance that someone will try to 
topple it. The”weaker state” argument also applies to new states, unstable states, 
noncontiguous states and anocracies.  
 The main pathway by which climate change affects civil war onset is 
hypothesized to be through negative shocks to agricultural production. Such shocks 
increase food prices, depress income, and consequently decrease the opportunity cost of 
pursuing violent conflict as a means of resolving resource competition between groups.  
Droughts, extreme hot and cold temperatures, floods, storms and wildfires all affect 
agricultural production to varying degrees. Thus it is expected that they will tend to 
increase the probability of civil war onset. Moreover, events such as droughts and 
extreme hot and cold temperatures are expected to have a more discernable effect on civil 
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war onset since they tend to affect wider areas than do more localized disaster events 
such as storms, floods and wildfires.  
 In addition to estimating the aforementioned models using a simple binary logit 
estimator, I also estimate them using a simple linear probability model (with country and 
year fixed effects). This model‟s results should be interpreted with caution, of course, 
since linear probability models are often fraught with heteroskedasticity issues, likely 
making the regression coefficients inefficient. Furthermore, I estimate all of the proposed 
models using the conditional (fixed effects) logit model, employing both country and 
year fixed effects. The downside of using this estimation method is that it drops all 
countries that do not experience onset of civil war in the sample. It would do the same for 
all countries that experience onset of civil war every year in the sample. Thus when there 
is no variation in the dependent variable for a given country in the sample, this country‟s 
contribution to the log-likelihood is zero and as such they have no effect on the 
estimation. Thus the sample becomes restricted to countries that experienced civil war 
onset in some years, but not in all years, effectively reducing the sample from 154 to 64 
countries and from 6,278 country-year pairs (observations) to only 2,736. Thus the results 
should be interpreted with caution.  
 
3.4.2. Civil War-in-Progress 
Civil war incidence is different from civil war onset. The onset variable takes the 
value of 1 only in the year the conflict starts. The incidence variable takes on a value of 1 
in any year conflict is occurring. I model the determinants of civil war incidence utilizing 
a commonly used logistic specification in conflict literature, 
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itit    XDisastersin_ProgresCivil_War_:P1  Model it10it  (3) 
 
where the dependent variable Civil_War_in_Progressit is a binary variable equal to 1 if a 
civil war is under way in country i at year t, and 0 otherwise. Disasterit is the frequency 
of a given disaster type in country i in year t. Included disasters are again: droughts, 
extreme cold temperatures, extreme hot temperatures, epidemics, floods, storms and 
wildfires. I use identical Xit controls (other than “prior war” variable) in the 
Civil_War_in_Progressit model as in the previous Civil_War_Onsetit specifications. 
 As a robustness check, the specification in equation (3) is also expanded by 
introducing up to three lags for pertinent disaster frequencies. Furthermore, again I 
consider alternative specifications with time fixed effects to control for impacts common 
to all countries that vary by year. I include all the disasters as explanatory variables at the 
same time in another alternative specification.   
Thus the most general specification includes time fixed effects as well as varying 
degrees lagged effects, 
ittit
s
  

XDisastersin_ProgresCivil_War_:P8  Model
3
0
s-it0it  
 
(4) 
where t are the time fixed effects, and Disasterit-s is the frequency of a given disaster in 
country i at time t-s. Again, I also estimate these models using the linear probability 
model and conditional (fixed effects) logit model, employing both country and year fixed 
effects in both specifications.  
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3.4.3. Civil War Duration 
I model civil war duration in a discrete-time framework using several common 
parametric and non-parametric survival models. Previous researchers have not modeled 
civil war durations in discrete-time framework. Most common approach is to use non-
time varying variables, whose values are measured only at the start of the event whose 
duration is measured. In contrast, I do allow climate-change-related disasters to vary over 
the duration of a war.  
I test the impacts of various disaster events on civil war duration under different 
assumptions about the hazard function. I explore a semiparametric Cox proportional 
hazards model, as well as Exponential, Weibull and Gompertz specifications, as well as a 
discrete time proportional hazards model (Prentice-Gloeckler, 1978) and logistic 
regression models.  The Cox proportional hazards model is the most flexible with respect 
to the nature of any form of duration dependence, since the component of the hazard 
function that captures duration dependence cancels out and need not be specified 
explicitly, whatever it is. The exponential duration distribution has a constant hazard rate, 
which is often considered too restrictive of an assumption. The Weibull and Gompertz 
forms have a flexible hazard function that can that monotonically increase or decrease 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The Prentice-Gloeckler grouped duration data proportional 
hazards regression model is especially appropriate when the timing of the event of 
interest is not observed exactly but is only known to occur within some specified time 
interval.   
The dependent variable in these models is civil war duration. The main regressors of 
interest are the frequencies of annual climate-change-related disaster events. Disaster 
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events are modeled as time-varying covariates. Thus they are included in each model by 
accounting for the frequency of each type of event for every year during which a given 
civil war is in progress. While Fearon (2004) does not include any weather related 
variables, I follow his lead in terms of other types of control variables to include in the 
model. Control variables are taken from the influential work on civil war duration by 
Fearon (2004). These include: a binary variable for coups and revolution (measured at 
start time), another for Eastern Europe (non-time varying covariate), colonial wars (a 
non-time varying covariate), the presence of indigenous populations (“sons of the soil”), 
fighting migrants to their areas (a non-time varying covariate), contraband related 
financing of war(non-time varying covariate), logarithmically transformed population 
density (a time-varying covariate), lagged GDP/capita (a time-varying covariate) and 
PolityIV measure of the level of democracy (a time-varying covariate).  
 Disaster events are expected to increase the expected duration of civil wars (i.e. to 
reduce the “hazard” of a civil war coming to an end). The pathway by which these events 
are hypothesized to impact civil war duration is similar to that in the models for 
Civil_War_Onsetit and Civil_War_Progressit cases. As argued in other cases, disaster 
events decrease the opportunity costs of using violent conflict as a method to assert 
power over allocation of scarce resources. The most profound effect of a disaster on civil 
war duration is expected to come from an event that can keep such opportunity costs low 
for the duration of the war. This is more likely to be the case with persistent climate-
related problems. Long-lasting tendencies, as opposed to one-time events such as local or 
regional severe storms, are more likely to have discernable effects on civil war durations.  
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In terms of the control variables, successful coups and revolutions as the provocation 
for a civil war are expected to shorten the duration of a civil war. Coups are defined as 
attempts by individuals and groups associated with a government (for example, a faction 
within the military) to use violence against their government (for example, parliament) in 
an attempt to seize power. Coups tend to be brief, as there tends to be little underlying 
support for the goals of an average coup. Revolutions also tend to be brief, as they are 
characterized by a large groundswell of anti-government sentiment that often unites large 
portions of society in a common cause. An indicator variable for Eastern Europe controls 
for the collection of brief civil wars that took place in that region as a part of a transition 
from socialism to democracy. Similarly, an indicator for anti-colonial wars is included to 
control for a wars of independence from colonial powers.  
Controlling for colonial independence is important since a significant proportion of 
wars in the 1950s and 1960s were colonial wars. These tended to be brief, since colonial 
powers tended to be too far away from the locale of the uprising to successfully stop them. 
Furthermore, colonial powers had to deal with many such uprisings at the same time, 
spreading their resources thin. “Sons of soil” wars are expected to last longer because 
they involve an organized group within a country (often ethnic) that opposes in-migration 
by other groups. Since the insurgents are living within the country and control an area, it 
is less likely that the insurgents would be quickly dealt with.  
Other variables include the existence of significant illegal drug production and trade.  
Active drug production and trade is expected to increase civil war durations, since these 
activities provide valuable access to money for the insurgents. Incomes should have a 
negative impact on civil war durations, since higher income increases the opportunity 
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cost of pursuing violence. Similarly, a higher level of democracy achieved by a given 
country is expected to shorten the length of a civil war because such countries have 
institutions that may deal with any grievances more effectively than non-democratic 
countries. Bleaney and Dimico (2011) provide support for use of different covariates in 
civil war duration and onset models.  
 
3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Civil War Onset 
For each disaster, I estimate eight models. I start with the specification in equation 
(1), which I call model O1, and then add lags to this model until there are three lagged 
disaster terms (i.e. in model O4). Then I add time fixed effects to equation (1), and call it 
model O5. After adding up to three lagged disaster terms to this model I end up with the 
specification featured in equation (2), and call this model O8
32
. The complete sets of 
parameter estimates for all models are presented in Appendix A, Tables A1 through A8.  
Since the complete set of results is so voluminous, I will focus on just the key 
estimated coefficients in the body of this paper. A summary of estimated results from 
specifications which feature just individual disaster models are presented in Table 7, 
while the results from a model where all of the disaster effects estimated simultaneously 
are presented in Table 8. Only the significant coefficients on the disaster variables are 
summarized in these tables. The first “Significant Coefficients” column shows the ranges 
of point estimates for the coefficients for which statistical significance is attained for all 
individual disaster event models without time fixed effects. The “Models” column in 
                                                 
32
 See Appendix A, Table A0. 
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Tables 7 and 8 provides information about the types of models in which the coefficient 
on a particular type of a disaster event frequency is significant.  
In Table 7, each different row presents estimated coefficients from distinct models 
associated with just a single type of disaster. For example, Table 7 reports that the 
coefficient on the Extreme Heatt-2 variable is statistically significant at the 10% level only 
in the model O3 that includes two lags for Extreme Heat. The coefficient on Extreme 
Coldt, on the other hand, is significant in models with O1 through O4. The second 
“Significant Coefficients” column shows the estimated coefficients, for all individual 
disaster event models with time fixed effects, which are individually statistically 
significant. The second “Models” Lags column again provides information about the 
types of models with time fixed effects in which the coefficient on a particular type of a 
disaster event frequency is significant.  
 
 
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Droughtt-1 0.589* O3 -- --
Extreme Coldt 1.226** to 1.438*** O1,O2,O3,O4 1.209*** to 1.381*** O5,O6,O7,O8
Extreme Heatt-1 1.098* to 1.427** O2,O3,O4 1.273* to 1.581** O6,O8
Extreme Heatt-2 1.091* O3 -- --
Extreme Heatt-3 1.102* O4 1.135* O8
Epidemict 0.299* to 0.380** O1,O2,O3,O4 0.346* to 0.379** O5,O6,O7,O8
Stormt-2 0.235* to 0.316** O3,O4 0.353* O8
Stormt-3 -- -- -0.511* O8
Wildfiret 1.125** to 1.247*** O1,O2,O3,O4 1.133** to 1.234** O5,O6,O7,O8
Control Variables
Time Fixed Effects
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix A Tables A1 through A7. Only significant 
coefficients are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7. Determinants of Civil War Onset : Significant Coefficients from Individual Event Panel Logit Models, 1945-
1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
No Yes
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Table 8 has the same format as Table 7, but shows significant coefficient 
estimates for a model that includes all disaster events. As previously mentioned, such 
model might suffer from multicollinearity. Table 2 presents pair-wise correlation matrix 
between disaster events and Table 3 presents R
2
 for regressions where a given disaster is 
a dependent variable determined by the remaining disasters. These statistics suggest that 
multicollinearity is not severe.  
 The most striking and least ambiguous finding among the estimated results is that 
the frequency of contemporaneous extreme cold events (Table 7 and Table 8) has a 
positive and significant effect on the onset of civil war. The estimates are robust across 
specifications, being significant at the 5% level ot better in all specifications. Similar 
studies focusing only on incidence of civil war have found similar effects, so these result 
represent a reassuring confirmation of earlier results. Zhang et al. (2006) attribute the 
observed effect to a negative shock that agricultural production experiences as a 
consequence of lower temperatures. This leads to decreased incomes, and lowers the 
opportunity cost of conflict as a manifestation of competition over scarce food resources 
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.862* O7
Extreme Coldt 0.913* to 1.205*** O1,O2,O4 0.949* to 1.226*** O5,O6,O8
Extreme Heatt-1 -- -- 1.400* O8
Epidemict 0.300* O1 0.345* to 0.391* O5,O6,O7,O8
Stormt-2 0.358** O4 0.417** O8
Stormt-3 -0.478* O4 -0.624** O8
Control Variables
Time Fixed Effects
Table 8. Determinants of Civil War Onset : Significant Coefficients from All Events Panel Logit Models, 1945-1999 
(n=6278)
Yes Yes
No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix A Table A8. Only significant coefficients are 
presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(implying higher food prices). In contrast to the findings of Toll however, my estimates 
suggest that these connections have not been broken in the modern era.  
Interestingly, another type of natural disaster is also found to have an effect on the 
probability of civil war onset, in both individual disaster (Table 7) and all-disaster models 
(Table 8). This is the contemporaneous frequency of epidemic outbreaks. Although 
epidemics affect incomes, there are other pathways by which epidemics increase the 
probability of a civil war. An area affected by an epidemic is simply more vulnerable to 
attacks, since its inhabitants, weakened by the disease, are unable to fend off their 
attackers (assuming these attackers are unaffected, or at least less affected, by this 
disease).  
Contemporaneous and lagged frequencies of droughts, extreme heat events, 
floods, and storms seem to have no persistently significant effects on the probability of 
civil war onset. There are, however, a few instances that suggest some possible evidence 
of disaster impacts, though not robustly so. For example, in Tables 7 and 8, a single lag 
of extreme heat events also seems to increase the probability of civil war onset. Storms 
occurring two years earlier may have a positive impact on the probability of civil war 
onset. On the other hand, storms taking place three years earlier may have a negative 
impact on the probability of civil war onset. These results, if true, suggest that if a 
country can get past the two-year hurdle after the storm it is safer from civil war. Storms 
which inflict major damage require that the government expend significant resources on 
recovery and rebuilding. Oftentimes, the military is used for these purposes. This, in turn, 
is likely to weaken the government and invite insurgents to attack. Since it takes some 
time to rebuild and recover, the government may be vulnerable for at least two years. 
67 
 
As a robustness check, I also estimate conditional (fixed effects) logit models and 
fixed effects linear probability models. These are presented in the Appendix in sections B 
and C, respectively
33
.  The cost of using conditional (fixed effects) logit model is a loss of 
the majority of observations. The final model is restricted in that it uses only 2736 
observations associated with all countries and years in which there is a civil war. The 
coefficient estimates do lose some significance compared to the random effects logit 
model, but most of the relations persist. The coefficient estimates on extreme cold events 
and epidemic outbreaks are consistent with the original panel logit model. In this model, 
however, additional disasters come to matter. In particular, contemporary extreme heat 
events seem to be, counter intuitively, negatively related to the probability of civil war 
onset. Epidemic outbreaks, however, don‟t seem to have any effects on the probability of 
civil war onset in these specifications. The fixed effects linear probability models may 
suffer from heteroskedasticity, however
34
. 
 
3.5.2. Civil War-in-Progress 
As in the civil war onset models I estimate eight models. But now, I estimate 
equation (3), which I call model P1. P1 with an additional lag is P2, while P1 with two 
lags is P3, and finally P4 has three lags. P1 with time fixed effects is P5; P2 with time 
                                                 
33
 See Table B9 for the summary of the individual-disaster model results and B10 for the summary of the 
all-disaster models estimated using conditional (fixed effects) logit models. See Table C9 for the summary 
of the individual-disaster model results and C10 for the summary of the all-disaster models estimated using 
fixed effects linear probability models. 
 
34
I also estimate the linear probability model using robust standard errors, and find the results to be 
consistent with those of previous specifications.  I also performed additional robustness checks whereby I 
drop all new countries entering the sample, and find the results to be similar to those of the „full‟ models.   
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fixed effects is P6; P3 with time fixed effects is P7; and P4 with time fixed effects is P8
35
. 
The complete sets of parameter estimates for all models are presented in Appendix D 
Tables D1 through D8.  
A summary of estimated results from individual-disaster models is presented in 
Table 9, and the all-disasters model in Table 10. Estimated results suggest that all three 
lags of extreme heat events increase the probability of civil war in both the individual-
disaster and the all-disaster models. Extreme heat events can be characterized as another 
type of a negative shock to incomes that also decreases the opportunity cost of pursuing 
violent conflict as means of competing for scarce resources. The results tend to be 
significant at 10% level for extreme heat events occurring one year prior to any given 
year in which a civil war is in progress. Second and third lags of extreme heat events bear 
coefficients which are significant at 5% level. The results persist when all other events 
are included in the model. No other disaster events seem to have this robust an effect on 
civil war incidence.  
 Again, I estimate a conditional (fixed effects) logit model and fixed effects linear 
probability models.
36
 In the first case, I find that second and third lags of extreme heat 
events increase the chance that a civil war is occurring in a give country in a given year. 
However, the result is not present for the first lag of extreme heat events. In the linear 
probability models, I find that the coefficients on the lags of extreme heat events are not 
significant. Again, another variable seems to have an effect, in this case, the count of 
                                                 
35
 See Appendix D, Table D0. 
 
36
 See Table E9 for the summary of the individual-disaster model results and E10 for the summary of all-
disaster models estimated using a conditional (fixed effects) logit model. See Table F9 for the summary of 
the individual-disaster model results and F10 for the summary of the all-disaster models estimated using 
fixed effects linear probability model. 
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flood events and all of its lags. These variables have a positive effect on the probability 
that the civil war is in progress
37
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 I also estimate the linear probability model using robust standard errors, and find the results to be 
consistent with those of previous specifications.  I also performed additional robustness checks whereby I 
drop all new countries entering the sample, and find the results to be similar to those of the „full‟ models.   
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Extreme Coldt 0.94** to 1.159*** P1,P2,P3,P4 -- --
Extreme Heatt-1 1.008* to 1.029* P2,P3,P4 1.003* to 1.053* P6,P7,P8
Extreme Heatt-2 1.526*** to 1.543*** P3,P4 1.511*** to 1.564*** P7,P8
Extreme Heatt-3 1.265** P4 1.193*** P8
Floodt 0.152* to 0.218*** P1,P2,P3 -- --
Floodt-1 0.139* to 0.169** P2,P3 -- --
Floodt-3 0.164* P4 -- --
Stormt 0.142** P1 -- --
Control Variables
Time Fixed Effects
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix D Tables D1 through D7. Only significant 
coefficients are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9. Determinants of Civil War Incidence : Significant Coefficients from Individual Event Panel 
Logit Models, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
No Yes
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Extreme Coldt 0.797* to 0.951** P1,P2,P3,P4 -- --
Extreme Heatt-1 -- -- 1.022* to 1.06* P6,P7,P8
Extreme Heatt-2 1.489** to 1.501** P3,P4 1.601*** to 1.627*** P7,P8
Extreme Heatt-3 1.181* P4 1.258** P8
Floodt 0.152* to 0.218*** P1,P2,P3 -- --
Floodt-1 0.165** P1 -- --
Control Variables
Time Fixed Effects No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix D Table D8. Only significant coefficients 
are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10. Determinants of Civil War Incidence : Significant Coefficients from All Events Panel Logit 
Models, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
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3.5.3. Civil War Duration 
Selected results from a set of select civil war duration models are presented in 
Tables 11 and 12. The complete estimates models are presented in Appendix G, Tables 
G2 through G9. Each of these tables presents results from a progression of six different 
non-parametric and parametric survival models. The first column in each table gives the 
results from the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model; the second column 
contains estimated coefficients from the parametric exponential survival model; the third 
column, the Weibull model; the fourth column the Gompertz model; the fifth column, the 
discrete time proportional hazards model (Prentice-Gloeckler, 1978); and column six 
gives the results from a logistic regression. I estimate these various different survival 
models to see how the estimates differ under different assumptions regarding the hazard 
function and possible duration dependence. 
The estimated results suggest that civil war duration is primarily affected by 
drought events. The estimated coefficients tend to be significant at the 5% level across 
various individual-disaster specifications of these events survival models (Table 11). The 
drought effects also seem to be robust to the strategy of including all disaster events in a 
single model (Table 11).
38
 No other disaster event in any model suggests a statistically 
significant impact on civil war duration. Droughts seem to be different than all other 
disaster events used in this study. Extreme cold and heat, floods, storms and wildfires can 
all be characterized as sudden and relatively brief (i.e. acute) disaster events. Droughts, 
on the other hand, tend to be “chronic events” that last much longer. Acute disasters do 
not seem to provide enough of a shock to agriculture, and thus incomes, to start or 
                                                 
38
 Tolerance and pair-wise correlation matrices suggest no serious multicollinearity issues. 
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perpetuate a civil war. But the persistence of droughts seems to cause enough damage to 
delay the end of a civil war. Sustained drought conditions probably have this effect by not 
allowing the opportunity costs of pursuing violent conflict to increase.  
 
 
 
Models Droughtt
Cox -0.117*
Exponential -1.377**
Weibull -1.485**
Gompertz -1.415**
Discrete Time Proportional 
Hazards -1.400**
Logit -1.460**
Table 11. Determinants of Civil War Duration 
Controlling for Frequency of Drought Events, 
1945-1999 (n=1102)
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from 
Appendix G Tables G1 through G7. Only 
significant coefficients are presented. All six 
models include a full set of controls. Standard 
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.
Models Droughtt
Cox -0.128**
Exponential -1.377**
Weibull -1.488**
Gompertz -1.412**
Discrete Time Proportional 
Hazards -1.418**
Logit -1.462**
Table 12. Determinants of Civil War 
Duration Controlling for Frequency of All 
Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients 
from Appendix G Table G8. Only 
significant coefficients are presented. All 
six models include a full set of controls. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.6. Conclusion 
This study is concerned with potential climate change impacts on the potential for 
civil war strife. The relationship between climate and potential conflict has received 
increasing attention in the literature on climate change impacts and many questions 
remain unanswered. Recently, the IPCC and Al Gore received the Nobel Peace Price for 
their research on climate change, including a brief mention of climate change impacts on 
civil conflict. Previous research suggests that low temperatures increase the frequency of 
conflict frequency in Europe and China during since 1000 A.D. However, there is some 
evidence that these effects may have weakened during the industrialized era (Tol, 2010). 
Burke et al. (2009) find that higher temperatures appear to increase the probability of 
civil war incidence in Africa between 1981 and 2002. Thus the question remained unclear 
about the probable effect of on future generations.  
In this paper, I have expanded the variety of climate-related events used to explain 
civil wars, and I have expanded the range of outcomes being considered including 
impacts on civil war onset, civil wars in progress, and civil war durations. As opposed to 
continuous measures of average temperature and cumulative precipitation, I focus on the 
counts of impacts of extreme events, primarily natural disasters, all of which are expected 
to increase in frequency due to climate change. The results point to a conclusion that 
societies might avoid some of the expected, and otherwise often negative, effects of 
natural disasters related to climate change.  Although this is the case for most types of 
disasters, extreme cold events and epidemics seem to increase the chance for a civil war 
to start in countries which experience these types of shocks. I also find that the lags of 
severe heat waves increase the chance of a civil war being in progress in country i in year 
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t. Finally, I find that duration of civil wars is primarily affected by droughts. Most of 
these effects are ascribed implicitly to a decrease in agricultural production which leads 
to an increase in the probability of civil war occurring due to a competition for food 
resources. In the near future I plan on extending the analysis by incorporating available 
agricultural data and empirically testing the hypothesis that these climate-change related 
disasters affect various measures of civil war by the way of a negative shock to 
agricultural production. 
Understanding the policy implications of these results is important. They suggest 
that any proposed climate change policies should focus on mitigating the negative effects 
of climate change related extreme events and natural disasters, at least to the extent that 
this may decrease the potential for civil strife and shorten the duration of civil wars 
should they develop anyway. This can be achieved by appropriately funding international 
disaster relief programs and enabling disaster insurance programs.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: DETERMINANTS 
OF MARPOL RATIFICATION DELAY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 
Many environmental problems are global in nature and require international 
cooperation to counter them. International environmental agreements (IEAs) have 
become the primary policy instruments employed by governments concerned with these 
issues. Their adoption and implementation, however, is plagued by a host of political 
economy issues arising from public good nature of the environment, such as the incentive 
to “free-ride”. Since IEAs are the sole instruments that countries can use to address many 
global environmental issues, it is important for everyone concerned to understand why 
and how these policies can be effectively pursued. Many IEAs, such as the Kyoto 
agreement, are thwarted by lack of global cooperation in resolving the relevant 
environmental issues. In order to overcome such an impasse, it is imperative to 
understand the underlying determinants of this process. Otherwise, ineffective strategies 
could be pursued, and environmental problems affecting the globe might not be properly 
addressed, increasing the costs they impose upon society. 
  The IEA literature points to several important factors influencing governments to 
adopt IEAs. These largely consist of economic and political indicators. Generally, 
countries with higher incomes, with more-developed institutions and more open to trade 
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tend to be more likely to adopt IEAs. However, the current literature does not provide 
answers to some important questions. Are countries more severely affected by 
environmental problems and disasters more likely to adopt policies to mitigate them? 
Moreover, what is the threshold level of environmental degradation necessary for a 
country to adopt a relevant policy addressing it?  
There are several channels by which the incidence of pollution events may lead to 
adoption of mitigating policies. First, individuals directly affected by the pollution are 
likely to demand compensation for losses and cleanup of the affected areas. Moreover, 
they may demand insurance against any future losses by demanding policies that prevent 
the potential pollution. Larger events tend to affect greater number of parties and 
consequently create greater demand for such policies. If the events are particularly 
damaging to human health and the environment, they are also likely to receive attention 
beyond that of the directly affected individuals. In such cases media plays a crucial role 
in informing citizenry about the events. Ultimately, politicians answer by supplying 
policies that reflect any demand for them from the population. For example, Love Canal 
hazardous waste site affected some thousand households in the adjacent area. However, 
their plight received national media attention, galvanizing the debate on the proper 
policies on the management of hazardous waste sites in the US. The outcome of this 
debate was the passage of the Superfund Act that holds polluters liable for their damages.  
Marine oil spills affect coastal communities in several ways. They disrupt 
commercial and recreational fishing, tourism activities and shipping. They negatively 
affect marine flora and fauna, and upset the esthetic properties of coastal environments. 
Oil spills are a unique type of pollution since they primarily affect a publically owned 
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resource, the ocean. Consequently, their prevention is in the interest of the whole nation. 
Exxon Valdez, the largest vessel-borne oil spill in the US history, took place in a sparsely 
populated area of the country. It affected only a small proportion of the fishermen in the 
country and disturbed remote coastline seldom visited. However, it received national 
media attention with images of oil contaminated beaches and wildlife coated in oil. This, 
in turn, raised awareness of the effects of oil pollution on public natural resources. 
Politicians responded by passing laws regulating financial responsibility for oil spills and 
liability for damages and clean up costs. 
The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that significant pollution events act 
as catalysts for the adoption of mitigating policies in the IEA context. For this purpose, I 
conduct a case study focusing on a single multilateral IEA relating to marine oil pollution 
originating from ocean-going vessels, called MARPOL. I don‟t directly observe the level 
of media attention for each oil pollution event. I choose the number of oil pollution 
incidents and amount spilled as proxy variables for media attention. The idea is that the 
high frequency of oil spill incidents and large amount of oil spilled are likely to bring 
more media scrutiny to the issue of oil pollution. 
The paper proceeds with the description of MARPOL, a literature overview, a 
data section, the econometric specification, and results and conclusion sections.  
 
 
4.2. MARPOL 
 
In this paper, I focus on the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL 73/78), as 
amended (MARPOL PROT 1978 or MARPOL). This convention is an extension of an 
77 
 
earlier treaty, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil (OILPOL). It was made available for signature at the headquarters of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) organization from 1 June 1978 to 31 May 1979 (IMO, 
2010). After the signature deadline it has remained open for accession. States may 
become Parties to the present Protocol by: (a) signature without reservation as to 
ratification, acceptance or approval; or (b) signature, subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval, followed by ratification, acceptance or approval; or (c) accession. Ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument to that 
effect with the Secretary-General of the Organization (IMO, pp.11).  
MARPOL regulates five types of pollution originating from ships: oil discharge 
into the water (Annex I); carriage of noxious liquids (Annex II); storage and labeling of 
harmful substances (Annex III); sewage pollution (Annex IV); garbage pollution; and air 
pollution (Annex VI). Table 1 describes entry into force, number of countries ratified 
and % of the gross tonnage of the world‟s merchant fleet regulated under each of the 
Annexes.  
 
I choose MARPOL Annex I as a case study to test the hypothesis that significant 
pollution events act as catalysts for the adoption of mitigating policies in the IEA context 
for several reasons. Oil pollution from vessels is different from most pollution sources in 
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that it enters the oceans in a series of unrelated and sometimes catastrophic events.  Its 
effects on the environment and the economy are generally immediately observable. As 
such, they often garner significant media interest and consequently public and political 
attention (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999). This makes MARPOL a particularly fitting case to 
study the catalytic effect of pollution on mitigating policy adoption. Many other types of 
pollution, such as fertilizer runoff pollution, cannot directly be connected to a specific 
source. Furthermore, by March 2011, MARPOL has been ratified by 150 out 194 
countries in the world. The countries that ratified it have the combined merchant fleets of 
99 percent of the world gross tonnage. An overwhelming majority of countries that are 
the most at risk of being affected by oil spills have ratified MARPOL over the span of 32 
years. So much variation allows me to identify the impact of hundreds of pollution events 
on MARPOL ratification delay.     
 
4.3. Literature Overview 
International agreements exist in a global policy context on a variety of economic 
and social issues. Some common examples include international trade agreements, such 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), that regulates trade between 
countries (Hoekman, & Kostecki, 1999); international labor agreements that regulate 
labor standards, such as the prevention of child labor (Boockmann, 2001); establishment 
of international institutions, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
In this paper I focus on IEAs, which are defined as “intergovernmental documents 
intended as legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing 
human impacts on natural resources, legally binding intergovernmental efforts directed at 
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reducing human impacts on the environment” (Mitchell, 2003, p.432). Mitchell (2003) 
provides an extensive literature review on IEAs. Currently IEAs address many 
transboundary environmental issues. For example, atmospheric pollution is regulated on 
an international level with Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, and by the Framework Convention on Climate Change, amongst others; living 
organisms are protected by the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES); some hazardous substances are limited by the 
Basel and Rotterdam conventions; nuclear safety is addressed by the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety;  and marine environments are protected by MARPOL, amongst others 
(Chambers, 2008; Degarmo,2005; Mitchell, 2003). 
Given the recent proliferation of IEAs and their importance in mitigating many 
global environmental problems, there has been surprisingly little research done to explain 
the determinants of their adoption in a quantitative framework.  Fredriksson et al. (2000) 
is amongst the first studies to analyze the duration until ratification of an IEA, 
specifically the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). 
They find that the conditional probability of ratification is positively related to total CO2 
emissions and the presence of civil liberties. Neumayer (2002) focuses on the impact of 
trade openness on ratification delay for the Montreal Protocol, the Biodiversity 
Convention and CITES. The results suggest that trade openness decreases ratification 
delay, but not under all measures of openness. Von Stein (2008) analyzes the duration of 
ratification of two international climate change treaties: the FCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. He finds that states which are more central in international trade networks have 
ratified FCCC more quickly. This is also the case for countries where there is higher per 
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capita Greenpeace membership and stronger democracies. For the Kyoto Protocol 
ratification, in addition to the above stated effects, empirical results suggest that among 
the Annex I countries, higher emissions are linked to slower ratification of the Protocol. 
Murdoch et al (2003) analyze treaty participation as a two-stage game where countries 
ﬁrst decide whether to participate and then they choose their level of participation. They 
empirically test their model on the adoption of the Helsinki Protocol, applying a binary 
probit analysis. They find that imported emissions, environmental assets possessed, and 
the marginal cost of emission reduction positively affect the ratiﬁcation decision.  
Determinants of MARPOL ratification have not been systematically addressed in 
the quantitative literature, but have been described qualitatively. Mitchell (1994) uses 
MARPOL as a case study to explain how regime design for IEAs affects compliance. The 
author finds that political and economic factors fail to fully explain differences in 
compliance. These differences are further explained by the differences in the subregime's 
compliance system, such as equipment standards. Churchill (1976) also discusses some 
common determinants of pre-MARPOL marine convention adoption.    
The quantitative literature on the effects of oil spills on the environment is 
extensive. To name a few recent and influential works: Grigalunas et al. (1986) estimate 
the economic costs from the Amoco Cadiz oil spill; Cohen (1995) assesses the natural 
resource damage from the Exxon Valdez oil spill; Carson et al. (2003) measure the lost 
passive use from the Exxon Valdez oil spill; Garza-Gil et al. (2006) and Loureiro et al. 
(2009) estimate the economic and environmental damages from the Prestige oil spill in 
Spain.  
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A few studies focus on the effectiveness of MARPOL in decreasing various types 
of pollution. Knapp and Franses (2009), for example, analyze the effects of various 
measures of international convention effectiveness on several measures of casualty type, 
casualty seriousness, and loss of life and pollution. The authors specifically analyze the 
effects of MARPOL variables on tonnage of oil and chemical pollution: (a) entry into 
force of legal instruments and amendments, (b) indicators for interim periods between 
adoption and entry into force, and (c) number of IMO member states which have ratified 
a legal instrument or protocol. To construct measures of oil and chemical pollution, they 
make use of three different databases: Lloyd‟s Register Fairplay (LRF), ITOPF, and the 
Energy Related Safety Accident Database  (ENSAD). The main result suggests that time 
to entry into force of the phase out of the single-hulled tankers decreased the quantity of 
accidental oil pollution. In terms of chemical pollution, authors find that entry into force 
of Annex II negatively affects the quantity of chemical pollution, while the number of 
countries which have ratified the convention affects it positively.  
Peet (1992) provides a descriptive analysis of MARPOL effectiveness with 
respect to ship-based oil pollution. The author observes that by 1991 some 52% of 
developing countries have ratified the first two Annexes of the treaty. In contrast, some 
85% of developed countries have done so by the same date. This difference is 
hypothesized to arise from differential capacities of the two country-income groups to 
fully implement technical requirements required by MARPOL. Author also finds that 31% 
of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries have ratified the 
treaty by 1991, as opposed to 59% of non-OPEC countries. Furthermore, Peet (1992) 
reviews available evidence on MARPOL effectiveness in decreasing oil pollution, and 
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argues that although several reports purport to have identified an effect, it is likely to be 
biased. The bias arises from the observation that the compliance and enforcement of the 
treaty are particularly hard to achieve. Vessel-originate oil pollution released into 
international waters is unlikely to be reported since it is not likely to be noticed by 
anyone. Moreover, once reported, the vessels are seldom brought to justice (in their flag 
countries). In these rare cases when they are, the penalties tend not to be commensurate 
with the severity of the crime.  
 
4.4. Data 
The data on MARPOL ratification duration come from IMO (2010). The treaty 
was made available for ratification on June 1
st
, 1978. Legislative delay is calculated as 
the span of time between June 1
st
, 1978 and the date when MARPOL entered into force 
in a given country and. Some countries have still not ratified MARPOL, so the data are 
right-censored. This necessitates use of survival models that take into account such 
censoring issues. As of March 31
st
, 2011, 150 countries had ratified MARPOL Annexes I 
and II.  For those countries that came into existence after June 1978, I compute the delay 
time from the date of that country‟s declared independence, so not all durations 
commence at the same absolute point in time.  
The average MARPOL ratification delay for the countries that have ratified the 
treaty is 5705 days, meaning that more than 15 years had passed by the time half of the 
countries ratified. Figure 1 plots non-parametric estimates of the survival distribution, 
which specifies the probability that the delay time will exceed a certain number of days. 
Figure 2 plots non-parametric estimates of the hazard function. Hazard rate is defined as 
83 
 
a frequency at which countries ratify the MARPOL at any particular point in time, 
conditional on them not having it ratified until that date. The peak of the hazard function 
is at 135 countries (around year 2003), after which it is characterized by a decreasing 
hazard or negative duration dependence. This implies that the longer a country takes to 
ratify MARPOL, the less likely it is that it will do so in the future. Negative duration 
dependence also briefly occurs right after the first 45 countries ratified the treaty. Trend 
is reversed in 1989 and the hazard function is characterized by positive duration 
dependence until 2003. Interestingly, change in the slope of the hazard function occurs 
right after two major, and highly publicized, oil spills: Odyssey in Canada in November, 
1988 and Exxon Valdez in the US in March 1989. However, descriptive graphs alone 
cannot fully answer the question of the impacts of oil spills on MARPOL ratification 
delay. For this, one needs to utilize probabilistic survival models. 
Figure 1. Survival function estimates 
 
 
84 
 
Figure 2. Hazard function estimates 
 
The data on accidental oil spill incidence and quantity of oil spilled are collected 
from ITOPF
39
. ITOPF manages a database of oil spills originating from seaborne vessels. 
Data is collected from published sources (the shipping press and other specialist 
publications), vessel owners and vessel insurers. Since 1970, the first year for which data 
were gathered, some 5.7 million tons of oil have been accidentally spilled into world 
oceans and seas in some 2539 detected incidents. The quantity of oil spilled has been 
decreasing over time (Figure 3) and the number of oil spill incidents has been generally 
decreasing since about 1980 (Figure 4). This dataset only identifies the locations of the 
spills and does not contain any information on vessels involved in the spills. So, no 
information on the flag states is available
40
.  
                                                 
39
 ITOPF data on oil spills has been kindly provided by Susannah Musk of ITOPF. The observation level is 
country-year. 
 
40
 The flag state of a vessel is the state under whose laws the vessel is registered or licensed. 
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Figure 3. Annual quantity of oil spilled (in tons) 
 
Figure 4. Annual incidence of oil spills 
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In addition to oil spills, I link the ratification delay data to additional country 
characteristics. Using the International Environmental Agreements Database Project data 
(IEADP, 2002), provided by Professor Ronald Mitchell, I construct a variable for the 
average amount of time it takes for a country to ratify other IEAs. This variable is a proxy 
for constitutional delays associated with ratifying treaties in general. I also construct a 
variable measuring the number of non-MARPOL IEAs each country had previously 
ratified in order to capture each country‟s propensity for international cooperation on 
trans-boundary environmental issues. From the World Bank‟s World Development 
indicators, I collected data on country land area (in square kilometers) and population. 
Land area is a proxy for the country‟s resource base. I obtained data on real GDP 
(constant 1990 dollars) from the United Nations Statistical Division National Accounts 
database. Richer countries are likely to have greater demand from their populace for 
cleaner environment. Data on length of coastline is gathered from the CIA World 
Factbook. Landlocked countries are not directly impacted by marine pollution, and are 
thus less likely to participate in a treaty preventing it.  Data on trade openness, measured 
as total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP in constant 2005 dollars 
prices, is collected from Penn World Tables. Governments may ratify an IEA for fear of 
exclusion from future trade agreements.  Also, since much trade is facilitated by the 
maritime transportation industry, countries that experience large numbers of ships 
entering their territorial waters are more likely to be attuned to any potential 
environmental damages from such activities. Consequently, countries with greater trade 
links have more to lose by not ratifying an IEA. I use the absolute value of the latitude of 
the capital city, divided by 90, as another measure of economic development (La Porta et 
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al, 1999). Polity score measures level of democratization, where a score of-10 indicates 
the most oppressive regime and 10 the most democratic one (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). 
Democratic societies may be more open to international cooperation and may have 
greater institutional stability, making them more likely to successfully implement treaties.   
Oil production statistics are obtained from the US Energy Information 
Administration. Oil producing countries may be more likely ratify MARPOL, since they 
are more exposed to potential spills (if operating oil handling ports). Finally, I collect 
data on the number of oil tankers operated by a country from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). For MARPOL to enter into force, it 
needed to be ratified by fifteen countries that constitute at least 50 percent of the world‟s 
merchant fleet.  This is why the survival curve does not start at time zero.  
 
4.5. Econometric Specification 
I employ econometric survival models to analyze the determinants of MARPOL 
legislative delay. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cannot be applied to duration data, since 
the errors are unlikely to be normally distributed, due to censoring. Thus, OLS estimates 
are likely to be biased. I explore a variety of duration models, including: semiparametric 
Cox proportional hazards model, Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, LogNormal, 
Loglogistic, a discrete time proportional hazards model (Prentice-Gloeckler, 1978) and 
logistic regression models. The Cox proportional hazards model is the most flexible 
survival model, since the hazard function is not specified. The exponential duration 
distribution has a constant hazard rate, which is often considered too restrictive an 
assumption. Weibull and Gompertz models have flexible explicit hazard function that can 
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monotonically increase or decrease (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  In these models, a 
variable with a positive coefficient estimate is interpreted to have a positive effect on the 
hazard, implying that this variable is associated with a shorter delay in ratification of 
MARPOL. For Lognormal model, the natural logarithm of time follows a normal 
distribution, while for the Loglogistic model, the natural logarithm of time follows a 
logistic distribution. These two models are estimated using the accelerated failure time 
model, where the natural logarithm of the survival time, log t, is expressed as a linear 
function of the covariates. Consequently, the signs on the reported coefficients for both 
the Lognormal and the Loglogistic model are the opposite of the sign on the coefficients 
on variables in all other survival models I employ in this analysis. The Prentice-Gloeckler 
“grouped duration data” proportional hazards regression model isles commonly 
employed, but is especially appropriate when the timing of the event of interest is not 
observed exactly but is only known to occur within some specified time interval.  
I approach modeling the determinants of MARPOL ratification delay from two 
perspectives. First I measure ratification delay in continuous time, as the number of days 
it takes a government to ratify MARPOL. Then I measure delay in discrete time, as the 
integer number of years it takes a country to ratify it. In the first case all the covariates 
have values that don‟t vary with time. Variables characterize the circumstances of the 
country at the start of the data in 1978 or at the year of independence for all newly (post-
1978) formed countries . In the second case, majority of covariates vary with time. There 
are advantages and disadvantages to each approach. In the continuous case, endogeneity 
is not an issue, but the number of observations is low. In the discrete case, time varying 
covariates are more easily implemented. Allowing for temporal variation in covariates 
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allows me to analyze the impact of changing conditions, such as occurrence of new oil 
spills, on ratification delay. Endogeneity may be an issue, but unfortunately it cannot yet 
be easily addressed in a duration model framework. In addition to the usual difficulty of 
finding proper instruments, there are no available survival models that can easily 
implement endogeneity.
41
 
As discussed in the data section, the proposed determinants of MARPOL 
legislative delay are: population in 100,000s of people, PolityIV score for level of 
democratization, trade openness, GDP in billions of 1990$, oil production in thousands of 
barrels, oil tanker fleet capacity in 100,000s of tons, average time to ratify IEA in days, 
total number of prior IEAs ratified, land area in thousands of square kilometers, coastline 
length in 100s of kilometers and absolute latitude.  When modeling delay as a continuous 
variable, covariates values are measured only at the start of the event whose duration is 
measured. In this case it is year 1978 when MARPOL became available for ratification, 
except for new countries where date of independence is used in the calculation. The 
summary statistics for these covariates are available in Table 2. In the discrete case, all 
covariates, other than average time to ratify IEA in days, total number of IEAs ratified, 
land area, coastline length and latitude, are time-varying (Table 3). 
  I use two measures of oil spills, the number of incidents and the quantity spilled 
in tons. Specific to the continuous-time delay models, I create variables measuring total 
quantity and total incidents of oil spillages in tanker accidents between 1970 and 1978 for 
each country. Since these events occur prior to MARPOL they are exogenous to (or at 
                                                 
41
 Even in the case of a single endogenous regressor, it would be necessary to work with the joint 
distribution of two dependent variables. Perhaps the framework of a lognormal duration model could be 
adopted to a bivariate normal error distribution to accommodate a normally distributed endogenous 
regressor.  
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least pre-determined, relative to) legislative delay. In the discrete case, I generate time-
varying variables for number of incidents and quantities spilled for each country. These 
variables start in 1978, with advent of MARPOL, and continue until a country ratifies the 
treaty. If a country doesn‟t ratify MARPOL then values for spill incidence and quantity 
start in 1978 and continue until 2009. The unit of observation in these models is country-
year. In both cases I start by estimating a model of the impact of quantity of oil spilled on 
country‟s MARPOL ratification delay. I include all proposed covariates, other than the 
number of incidents of oil spills. I then explore a specification where I include a measure 
of the number of oil spill incidents, but exclude amount spilled. Finally, I estimate a 
model where I include both the number of incidents and the amount spilled. In the 
continuous and discrete cases of the specifications I also include a quadratic term in the 
measures of oil spills to control for non-linearity. The number of incidents and the 
amount-spilled variables allow me to test the hypothesis that environmental disasters act 
as catalysts in a country‟s decision to ratify MARPOL.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for models without time-varying covariates 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pre 1978 oil spill quantity (tons) 7253.452 27958.16 0 296871 
Pre 1978 oil spill incidents 1.645833 6.645046 0 73 
Population (in 100,000s) 250.099 931.6277 0.24428 9561.65 
PolityIV -2.13971 7.413874 -10 10 
Trade openness 70.58915 46.73913 8.783233 324.5395 
GDP (in billions of 1990$) 94.66281 383.1778 0.009396 4065.46 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 2.661129 11.12752 0 102.74 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 17.56985 87.36815 0 1049.211 
Average time to ratify IEA (days) 3537.473 1185.579 261 7220.429 
Total number of IEAs ratified 20.73143 15.7645 1 83 
Land area (thousands of sq.km) 781.8773 2053.362 0.002 17098.24 
Coastline length (100s of km) 40.90087 164.2889 0 2020.8 
Latitude 0.257365 0.180323 0 0.722222 
91 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for models with time-varying covariates 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Oil spill quantity (tons) 604.7078 9348.273 0 301001 
Oil spill incidents 0.254626 2.118015 0 75 
Population (in 100,000s) 179.1644 607.3719 0.24428 10233.1 
PolityIV -0.88632 7.02027 -10 10 
Trade openness 78.31955 48.09096 1.086023 398.9536 
GDP (in billions of 1990$) 43.77506 227.6552 0.006632 4395.47 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 2.26773 9.436066 0 111.1443 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 6.579656 46.67458 0 1049.211 
Average time to ratify IEA (days) 3649.547 1159.229 261 7220.429 
Total number of IEAs ratified 16.37949 11.43079 1 83 
Land area (thousands of sq.km) 587.5135 1430.564 0.002 17098.24 
Coastline length (100s of km) 27.97714 140.8444 0 2020.8 
Latitude 0.233324 0.159493 0 0.722222 
 
 
 
4.6. Empirical Results 
4.6.1. Continuous Models without Time-Varying Covariates 
I estimate three types of specifications: (a) the total quantity of oil spilled, (b) the 
number of spill incidents, and (c) the combined model, each using six different 
assumptions about the hazard function. Specifically, I employ Exponential, Weibull, 
Gompertz, lognormal, loglogistic ande semiparametric Cox proportional hazards model.
42
  
LogNormal and Loglogistic specifications are reported in accelerated failure time (AFT) 
formats. After calculating the maximum log likelihoods, Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), and Bayesian information criterion, for each specification, I found that the 
Weibull specification is the most appropriate one (Tables 4, A1, A2 and A3). For the 
dependent variable, I use the MARPOL Annex I ratification delay measured in days. The 
                                                 
42
 Prentice-Gloeckler discrete time proportional hazards model can only be used in models with time 
varying covariates. 
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amount spilled variable is a sum of all the prior oil spills in a given country between 1970 
and 1978, while the number of oil spill incidents variable is the frequency of spills over 
the same prior time period.  
 
4.6.1.1. Models Employing the Amount of Oil 
Spilled Prior to 1978 
The coefficient on amount spilled is significant at 1% level, having a positive 
impact on the hazard, implying that, holding all else constant, an increase in the prior 
amount of oil spilled decreases the number of days it takes a given country to ratify 
MARPOL (Table 4).
43
  The square of the prior amount of oil spilled is significant as well 
pointing to non-linearities in the effect of oil spills on ratification delay. It has a negative 
impact on the hazard, suggesting eventual diminishing in the effect of the amount of oil 
spilled. These results add credence to the hypothesis that increased experience of 
environmental disasters leads to greater demand for policies mitigating their impacts.   
Other covariates found to have a consistent impact on legislative delay across 
specifications are: population size, trade openness, tanker fleet size and total number of 
IEAs ratified (Table 4). Results suggest that countries with larger populations will take 
less time to ratify MARPOL. This confirms the hypothesis that the greater the number of 
people affected, the greater the demand for a policy response. Trade openness is also 
found to be positively related to the hazard, suggesting that countries more open to trade 
have more to lose from not ratifying an IEA, in terms of potential future cooperation, and 
are thus likely to take less time to ratify MARPOL. Countries with larger tanker fleets are 
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 This is the case in all six specifications (Table A1, A2 and A3) 
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also more likely to take less time to ratify MARPOL. This result largely captures the 
requirement for MARPOL to enter into force of at least 15 countries joining with 
combined merchant fleet of no less than 50 percent of the gross tonnage of the world's 
commercial shipping. Countries that have ratified a greater number of prior non-
MARPOL IEAs are also likely to take less time to ratify MARPOL.  
 
4.6.1.2. Models Employing the Number of Oil 
Spills Prior to 1978 
The impact of the number of prior oil spills during 1970-78 is found to be 
statistically significant, and positive, in Weibull specification (Table 4).
44
    There appears 
to be no firm evidence of non-linear impacts of the prior frequency of oil spills on 
ratification delay. Correlation between the number of oil spills and the quantity of oil 
spilled prior to 1978 is 0.69. Again, I find that population size, trade openness, tanker 
fleet size and total number of prior IEAs ratified, each have the same impact on the 
hazard of ratification. 
 
4.6.1.3. Models Employing both the Spill 
Quantities and the Number of Spills Prior to 1978 
When I include both the total amount of prior oil spilled and the number of prior 
oil spills (1970-1978) as covariates in a regression, the estimated results are not 
qualitatively different from those in models where the two variables enter separately 
(Table 4).  In other words, the amount spilled is found to decrease time to ratify, and the 
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 It is also only significant in the Cox specification. 
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impact is non-linear. The number of oil spill incidents is found to have no robustly 
significant effect on ratification delay. Population size, trade openness, tanker fleet size 
and total number of prior IEAs ratified, have similar impacts on the hazard of 
ratification.
45
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay - Weibull specifications for oil spills between 1970 and 1978 
(period 1978-2009, n=129) 
  I II III 
Pre 1978 oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) 0.2607*** -- 0.3481*** 
 
(0.0885) 
 
(0.1001) 
Square of pre 1978 oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) -0.0086* -- -0.0154** 
 
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0075) 
Pre 1978 oil spill incidents (in tens) -- 0.6068* 0.1949 
  
(0.3452) (0.6372) 
Square of pre 1978 oil spill incidents (in tens) -- -0.0439 0.1158 
  
(0.0765) (0.1767) 
Population (in millions) 0.0028*** 0.0032*** 0.0026*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
PolityIV 0.0283 0.0300 0.0266 
 
(0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0209) 
Trade openness 0.0082*** 0.0068*** 0.0082*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) 0.0200 -0.0294 -0.0834 
 
(0.0652) (0.0681) (0.0601) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) -0.0012 -0.0300 -0.0083 
 
(0.0555) (0.0588) (0.0653) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0042*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs (days/365) 0.0548 0.0506 0.0584 
 
(0.0396) (0.0389) (0.0406) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0687*** 0.0689*** 0.0749*** 
 
(0.0135) (0.0138) (0.0162) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) 0.0084 0.0093 0.0116 
 
(0.0120) (0.0135) (0.0115) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) -0.0051 -0.0021 -0.0067 
 
(0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0072) 
Latitude -0.8934 -1.1128 -1.2225 
 
(1.0546) (1.0068) (1.0866) 
Constant -25.2662*** -24.4638*** -25.8383*** 
  (2.0214) (1.9721) (2.1294) 
Shape parameter 0.925*** 0.8996*** 0.9448*** 
Log-likelihood -95.1 -98.76 -93.1 
AIC 220.1 227.53 220.3 
BIC 263.0 270.42 268.9 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 I have also explored specifications that include an interaction term between the number of oil spills and 
the amount spilled pre-1978. The coefficient on the interaction suggests no effect on the hazard of ratifying 
MARPOL. 
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4.6.2. Continuous Models with Time-varying 
Covariates 
I estimate eight different specifications involving different assumptions about the 
hazard function, each for models that employ the total amount of concurrent spills, the 
number of concurrent spill incidents and the combined model,. Specifically, I employ 
Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, lognormal and loglogistic models, adiscrete time 
proportional hazards model (Prentice-Gloeckler, 1978), a semiparametric Cox 
proportional hazards model and a Logit model.  Lognormal and loglogistic specifications 
are estimated as accelerated failure time specification. Again, I found that the Weibull 
specification is the most appropriate one (Tables 5, B1, B2 and B3). For the dependent 
variable I use the MARPOL Annex I ratification delay measured in integer years. The 
amount spilled covariate now measures the total quantity of oil spilled during each year 
between 1978 and the year in which the country in question ratified the treaty. The 
number of oil spill incidents variable is now the annual frequency of spills over the same 
time period.
46
 Unlike the case in the last section, most covariates are now time-varying. It 
is important to note that both of the oil spill variables are likely to be endogenous. 
Specifically, oil spills are likely to be impacted by passage of MARPOL (Knapp and 
Franses (2009). It is non-trivial to correct for endogeneity in a survival model framework, 
as there are no appropriate stylized models currently available. So the following models 
assume oil spills covariates are exogenous. 
47
 
                                                 
46
 I have estimated specifications where I also included oil spill incidents and total amount of oil spilled 
prior to 1978, and the results do not substantively differ from those in the models without these variables. 
 
47
 I have attempted to use standard regression techniques to address the endogeneity issue. Specifically, I 
have identified oil prices as a suitable instrument that affects the number of oil spill incidents and the 
quantity spilled. Higher oil prices put pressures on distribution networks to supply more oil. Tankers are 
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4.6.2.1. Models Employing the Concurrent 
Amount of Oil Spilled 
I found the coefficient on amount of oil spilled, as well as its squared term, to be 
significant at 5% level (Table 5). Other covariates with coefficients significant across 
specifications are population, trade openness, total number of IEAs and tanker fleet 
capacity. In some specifications, average time to ratify prior IEAs is found to have a 
positive impact on the hazard (Tables B1, B2 and B3). A similar result is found with oil 
production covariate, implying which countries that are oil producers are likely to take 
less time to ratify MARPOL. Such countries are more likely to be affected by spills in 
their own waters, due to frequent handling of the good. PolityIV score is also significant 
in four specifications, suggesting that more democratic countries take less time to ratify 
MARPOL (Tables B1, B2 and B3).    
 
4.6.2.2. Models Employing Concurrent Number 
of Oil Spills 
Neither the number of oil spill incidents nor the squared term of this variable are 
found to have any effect on a country‟s MARPOL ratification delay (Table 5).  All other 
covariates have similar impacts as in the specifications using the amount of oil spilled. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
more likely to travel faster and take more risks in inclement weather to deliver the oil under higher prices. 
This has been identified as an important determinant in the oil spills literature. It also unlikely that oil price 
would affect MARPOL ratification delay. However, I found no effect for oil spill covariates when using 
2SLS estimator. This is likely to be the case because 2SLS does not properly handle censoring.  
97 
 
4.6.2.3. Models Employing both Concurrent Spill 
Quantities and Number of Spills 
In the final model, with both types of concurrent oil spills covariates included 
(and their respective square terms), I find evidence of an impact of the amount of oil 
spilled (and its squared term) on MARPOL ratification delay (Table 5). Again, the results 
suggest that an increase in the amount of oil spilled in any given year shortens the amount 
of time (or increases the hazard rate for ratifying MARPOL) necessary to ratify 
MARPOL. The number of oil spill incidents is found to be significant in three out of 
eight models, with impact in these cases being negative on the hazard of ratifying 
MARPOL.  Correlation between the number of oil spills and the quantity of oil spilled 
variables is 0.13. All other covariates have similar impact as in sections (i) and (ii).
48
 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
In this study, I focus on the impact of relevant environmental pollution events, 
specifically oil spills originating from ocean-going vessels, on ratification delay for a 
major marine pollution international environmental agreement (IEA) known as 
MARPOL Annex I. These findings suggest that a greater quantity of oil spilled in 
countries‟ marine environments corresponds to a shorter time to ratify MARPOL. These 
results contribute to the existing literature on IEAs by providing some of the first 
evidence that unexpected environmental disasters act as catalysts for the adoption of 
international environmental policies. This is the first study to analyze MARPOL 
ratification delay in a quantitative fashion. I find that a country‟s population size, trade 
                                                 
48
 I have also explored specifications that include an interaction term between the number of oil spills and 
the amount spilled. The coefficient on the interaction seems to have a significant, and positive, effect on the 
hazard of ratifying MARPOL.  
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openness, tanker fleet size and number of other IEAs previously ratified, are all 
negatively related to the duration of country‟s MARPOL ratification delay. In the future I 
plan to expand this approach to model ratification delays for other IEAs to see whether 
other types of environmental disasters relevant to those IEAs have a similar effect.  
Table 5. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay - Weibull specifications for concurrent 
oil spills (1978-2009, n=2499) 
  I II III 
Oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) 4.5994** -- 5.4206** 
 
(2.1131) 
 
(2.3846) 
Square of oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of 
tons) -4.77228* -- 
-5.2840** 
 
(2.43720) 
 
(2.5332) 
Oil spill incidents (in tens) -- -0.0790 -0.7690 
  
(0.5627) (0.8729) 
Square of oil spill incidence (in tens) -- -0.0467 0.0005 
 
 
(0.1513) (0.0020) 
Population (in millions) 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
PolityIV 0.0134 0.0169 0.0162 
 
(0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0184) 
Trade openness 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) -0.0010 0.0298 0.0364 
 
(0.0307) (0.0544) (0.0476) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.0559 0.0830 0.0678 
 
(0.0534) (0.0557) (0.0508) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs 
(days/365) 0.0626 0.0634 
0.0640 
 
(0.0409) (0.0407) (0.0406) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0880*** 0.0829*** 0.0849*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0120) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) 0.0032 0.0043 0.0038 
 
(0.0134) (0.0140) (0.0126) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0013 -0.0008 0.0006 
 
(0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0064) 
Latitude -0.9963 -0.7573 -0.8715 
 
(1.0108) (1.0204) (0.9924) 
Constant -11.7905*** -11.6709*** -11.6450*** 
  (0.9989) (1.0076) (0.9912) 
Shape parameter 1.0397*** 1.0291*** 1.0240*** 
Log-likelihood -81.7 -84.1 -81.3 
AIC 193.4 198.3 196.5 
BIC 280.7 285.6 295.5 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Possible extensions include nuclear safety treaties and the impact of worldwide nuclear 
accidents on their ratification delay. A second planned application concerns hazardous 
substances treaties and related accidents. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on voluntary approaches to 
environmental policy and political economy of environmental disasters. In Chapter II 
analyze the effects of eco-labeling in service industries, expanding the scope of the 
existing literature focusing primarily on goods industries. The study concerns eco-
labeling in the tourism industry, specifically the impact of the Blue Flag label for marinas 
and beaches on prices of marina slip rental prices, weekly sailboat charter prices and 
hotel accommodation  prices. The principal findings include that Blue Flag certified 
marinas appear to enjoy an average premium between 6.6% and 22% for their daily slip 
rental prices; between 40% and 49% for their monthly slip rental prices; and 23% for 
their yearly slip rental prices.  Within the sailboat charter sector, vessels whose home 
marina is awarded the Blue Flag on average carry a price premium between 14% and 20% 
on a weekly sailboat rental. When it comes to hotel accommodation, hotels managing a 
Blue Flag certified beach enjoy a price premium between 45% and 270%. In the future I 
plan on expanding my research on eco-labeling by focusing on the impact of Blue Flag 
on water quality. I also plan on exploring the impact of sustainable forestry labels on the 
exit of wood mills from the wood product market. 
In Chapter III I examine the effect of climate change on violent conflict. The 
contribution lays in the application of climate change measures that are new to the civil 
wars literature. I employ a dataset on global frequency of climate-change related natural 
disasters to explain the probability of the start and occurrence, in a given year, of civil 
war, and duration, during the last half of the 20th century. The results point to a 
conclusion that societies might avoid some of the expected, and otherwise often negative, 
effects of natural disasters related to climate change. Extreme cold events and epidemic 
outbreaks are found to have a measurable positive effect on the probability of civil war 
starting in the affected countries; previous years extreme heat events are found to have a 
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positive effect on the probability of a civil war occurring in a given year; and droughts 
are found to have a positive effect on civil war duration. These findings may be used by 
policy makers as they contemplate climate change adaptation and mitigation policies. In 
the future I plan on focusing on the impacts of climate-change-related disasters on 
various measures of civil strife on subnational levels. 
In the fourth chapter I examine the impact of unexpected pollution events on the 
adoption  of a major marine pollution IEA, MARPOL. Specifically, I focus on the 
impacts of oil spills originating from ocean-going vessels on the ratification delay of 
MARPOL Annex I. My findings suggest that a greater quantity of oil spilled in countries‟ 
marine environments corresponds to a shorter time to ratify MARPOL.  The results 
contribute to the existing literature on IEAs by providing some of the first evidence that 
unexpected environmental disasters act as catalysts for the adoption of international 
environmental policies.  In the future I plan to expand this approach to model ratification 
delays for other IEAs to see whether other types of environmental disasters relevant to 
those IEAs have a similar effect. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER II 
 
A. Hotel Sampling Information And First Stage 
Estimates For Simultaneous Equations 
Specifications 
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County Stars All With Blue Flag All With Blue Flag
Dubrovacko-neretvanska 2 12 0 3 0
3 39 2 9 0
4 8 1 1 0
5 8 1 4 1
Istarska 2 14 2 3 0
3 51 14 12 4
4 19 6 4 1
5 1 1 0 0
Licko-Senjska 2 5 0 2 0
3 6 0 2 0
4 2 0 1 0
5 0 0 0 0
Primorsko-goranska 2 21 2 4 1
3 50 1 9 0
4 27 1 4 0
5 3 0 1 0
Splitsko-dalmatinska 2 23 0 4 0
3 61 0 11 0
4 27 1 9 1
5 2 1 1 0
Sibensko-kninska 2 4 0 1 0
3 16 1 3 0
4 6 4 1 1
5 0 0 0 0
Zadarska 2 4 0 1 0
3 20 2 4 0
4 11 1 3 0
5 0 0 0 0
All Counties 98 440 41 97 9
Population Sample
Table A1. Hotel population and sample counts with and without Blue Flag beach certification (by 
county and stars )
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(1) (2)
Variables 2SLS RE 2SLS
1(ACI Marina) 5.77*** 5.78***
(0.062) (0.062)
1(Second category marina) -0.162*** -0.157***
(0.0070) (0.0070)
1(Third category marina) -0.579*** -0.577***
(0.0077) (0.0078)
1(Uncategorized marina) -0.665*** -0.659***
(0.015) (0.015)
log(Slips) (number of available spots) 0.293*** 0.292***
(0.0066) (0.0066)
Dry dock (number of available spots) -0.000267*** -0.000255***
(0.000045) (0.000046)
1(Travel lift) -0.261*** -0.263***
(0.0093) (0.0093)
1(Grocery store) 0.136**** 0.145***
(0.011) (0.0073)
1(Restaurant) -0.389*** -0.393***
(0.016) (0.016)
1(Laundry facilities) 0.142*** 0.138***
(0.0072) (0.011)
log(Airport distance, km) -0.0559*** -0.0555***
(0.0043) (0.0043)
Marine fuel station distance (km) -0.00957*** -0.00948***
(0.00067) (0.00067)
1(Island location) 0.289*** 0.290***
(0.0078) (0.0078)
Population (of the associated urban area, in thousands) -0.000595*** -0.000596***
(0.000075) (0.000076)
1(Urban location) -0.202*** -0.201***
(0.011) (0.010)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals, in thousands) -0.0092*** -0.0000790
(0.0013) (0.00012)
1(Crane) -0.102*** -0.104***
(0.0085) (0.0085)
1(Parking) 0.181*** 0.181***
(0.014) (0.014)
1(Slipway) -0.140*** -0.141***
(0.0047) (0.0047)
CountyBFMarinas 0.0764*** 0.0810***
(0.0027) (0.0026)
FirmBFMarinas -0.783*** -0.784***
(0.0080) (0.0080)
Constant -0.376*** -0.489***
(0.044) (0.042)
R
2
0.86
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) 
represent estimates of the first stage specification from equation (2) on pp.13. for daily-slip-
rentals, obtained by using 2SLS and RE 2SLS methods, respectively. 
Table A2. Determinants of Marina Blue Flag Certification Status Using Daily Slip-rental Data  
(n=9369) 
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(1) (2)
Variables 2SLS RE 2SLS
1(ACI Marina) 6.14*** 6.15***
(0.058) (0.058)
1(Second category marina) -0.432*** -0.432***
(0.0063) (0.0063)
1(Third category marina) -0.491*** -0.491***
(0.0083) (0.0083)
1(Uncategorized marina) -- --
-- --
log(Slips) (number of available spots) -0.0331*** -0.0350***
(0.011) (0.011)
Dry dock (number of available spots) 0.00284*** 0.00286***
(0.000092) (0.000091)
1(Travel lift) -0.145*** -0.145***
(0.012) (0.012)
1(Grocery store) 0.199*** 0.199***
(0.0085) (0.0086)
1(Restaurant) -0.0508*** -0.0523***
(0.017) (0.017)
1(Laundry facilities) -0.0303*** -0.0305***
(0.0076) (0.0076)
log(Airport distance, km) -0.0464*** -0.0459***
(0.0042) (0.0041)
Marine fuel station distance (km) -0.0131*** -0.0129***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
1(Island location) 0.368*** 0.366***
(0.010) (0.010)
Population (of the associated urban area, in thousands) 0.00158*** 0.00159***
(0.000068) (0.000068)
1(Urban location) 0.379*** 0.381***
(0.016) (0.014)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals, thousands) -0.00170 -0.00000781
(0.0011) (0.000077)
1(Crane) 0.0333*** 0.0339***
(0.0094) (0.0094106)
1(Parking) -- --
-- --
1(Slipway) -0.232*** -0.232***
(0.0041) (0.0041)
CountyBFMarinas 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.0028) (0.0027)
FirmBFMarinas -0.805*** -0.806***
(0.0073) (0.0073)
Constant 0.211*** 0.195***
(0.056) (0.055)
R
2
0.94
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) 
are estimates of the first stage specification from equation (2) on pp.13. for monthly slip-
rentals, obtained by using 2SLS and RE 2SLS methods, respectively. 
Table A3. Determinants of Marina Blue Flag Certification Status Using Monthly Slip-rental 
Data (n=5315) 
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(1)
Variables 2SLS
1(ACI Marina) 5.47***
(0.23)
1(Second category marina) -0.287***
(0.029)
1(Third category marina) -0.637***
(0.029)
1(Uncategorized marina) -0.842***
(0.081)
log(Slips) (number of available spots) 0.357***
(0.025)
Dry dock (number of available spots) -0.000787***
(0.00018)
1(Travel lift) -0.288***
(0.037)
1(Grocery store) 0.136***
(0.0409***)
1(Restaurant) --
--
1(Laundry facilities) 0.100***
(0.027)
log(Airport distance, km) -0.102***
(0.016)
Marine fuel station distance (km) -0.0114***
(0.0024)
1(Island location) 0.413***
(0.032)
Population (of the associated urban area, in thousands) -0.000476*
(0.00028)
1(Urban location) -0.416***
(0.051)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals, in thousands) -0.189***
(0.023)
1(Crane) -0.128***
(0.036)
1(Parking) --
--
1(Slipway) -0.119***
(0.018)
CountyBFMarinas -0.0431**
(0.020)
FirmBFMarinas -0.748***
(0.029)
Constant 1.55***
(0.299477)
R
2
0.86
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Column 
(1) represents estimates of the first stage specification from equation (2) on 
pp.13. for yearly slip-rentals, obtained by using 2SLS method. 
Table A4. Determinants of Marina Blue Flag Certification Status Using Yearly 
Slip-rental Data (n=616)
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(1) (2)
Variables 2SLS RE 2SLS
log (Marina yearly slip rental price) 1.47*** 1.45***
(0.019) (0.019)
log(Ship length) (meters) -1.62*** -1.65***
(0.033) (0.034)
Number of beds 0.0152*** 0.0147***
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Vessel age (years) 0.0106*** 0.0114***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Vessel age
2
 (years)/10
5
-0.539*** -0.57***
(0.055) (0.054)
Vessel weight (tons) /10
2
0.585*** 0.621***
(0.060) (0.061)
Fuel capacity (tons) -0.330*** -0.266***
(0.043) (0.044)
1(Nautical charts and guides) 0.131*** 0.133***
(0.0096) (0.0098)
1(Global positioning system) 0.351*** 0.358***
(0.0094) (0.0095)
1(Marine VHF radio) 0.523*** 0.536***
(0.014) (0.014)
1(Electric refrigerator) -0.0409*** -0.0451***
(0.0070) (0.0070)
Gas cooker with oven (1 if available,  0 otherwise) -0.0815*** -0.0793***
(0.0068) (0.0069)
1 (Electric anchor available) 0.0125 0.0104
(0.022) (0.022)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals, in 
thousands) -0.0124*** -0.000137
(0.0014) (0.00015)
CountyBFMarinas 0.0644*** 0.0806***
(0.0031) (0.0031)
FirmBFMarinas -0.00485*** -0.005726***
(0.00082) (0.00083)
Constant -8.31*** -8.35***
(0.13) (0.13)
R
2
0.55
Table A5. Determinants of Home Marina Blue Flag Certification Status (n=16651)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Columns (1) 
and (2) are estimates of the first stage specification from equation (4) on pp.14., 
obtained by using 2SLS and RE 2SLS methods, respectively. 
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(1) (2)
Variables 2SLS RE 2SLS
log(Airport distance, km) 0.658*** 1.02***
(0.061) (0.064)
1(3-star hotel) -0.0376** -0.0771***
(0.017) (0.019)
1(4-star hotel) 0.108*** 0.0897***
(0.022) (0.025)
1(5-star hotel) 0.118*** 0.159***
(0.028) (0.031)
log(Number of rooms) 0.0185** 0.0384***
(0.0085) (0.0097)
1(Air-conditioning) -0.0942*** -0.133***
(0.017) (0.018)
1(Sports facilities) 0.296*** 0.327***
(0.022) (0.0242)
1(Island location) -1.95*** 2.88***
(0.12) (0.19)
log(Population, in associated urban area, in thousands) 0.102*** 0.236***
(0.022) (0.017)
log(Average county monthly tourist arrivals, in thousands) -0.00313 -0.0000247
(0.0036) (0.00043)
CountyBFBeaches 0.172*** -0.0539***
(0.014) (0.00355)
FirmBFBeaches -0.128*** -0.124***
(0.013) (0.014)
Constant -4.14*** -5.00***
(0.47) (0.33)
R
2
0.77
Table A6. Determinants of Hotel Beach Blue Flag Certification Status (n=969)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Columns (1) and 
(2) represent estimates of the first stage specification from equation (6) on pp.16., 
obtained by using 2SLS and RE 2SLS methods, respectively.  
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B. Blue Flag Marina Criteria 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AND INFORMATION 
 Environmental information about natural sensitive nearby land and marine areas 
is supplied to marina users (i). 
 Code of environmental conduct is posted in the marina (i). 
 Information about the Blue Flag Marina Programme and/or the Blue Flag Marina 
Criteria are posted in the marina (i). 
 The marina should be able to demonstrate that at least three environmental 
education activities are offered to the users and staff of the marina (i)  
 The Individual Blue Flag for boat owners is offered through the marina (i). 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
 Production of an environmental policy and plan at the marina. The plan should 
include references to water, waste and energy consumption, health and safety 
issues, and the use of environmentally sound products when available (i).  
 Adequate and properly identified and segregated containers for the storage of 
hazardous wastes (paints, solvents, boat scrapings, antifouling agents, batteries, 
waste oil, flares). The wastes should be handled by a licensed contractor and 
disposed of at a licensed facility for hazardous waste (i). 
 Adequate and well managed litterbins and/or garbage containers. The wastes 
should be handled by a licensed contractor and disposed of by a licensed facility 
(i). 
 The marina has facilities for receiving recyclable waste materials, such as bottles, 
cans, paper, plastic, organic material, etc. (i). 
 Bilge water pumping facilities are present in the marina (g). 
 Toilet pumping facilities are present in the marina (g). 
 All buildings and equipment must be properly maintained and in compliance with 
national legislation. The marina must be in a good integration with the 
surrounding natural and built environment (i). 
 110 
 
 Adequate, clean and well sign-posted sanitary facilities, including washing 
facilities and drinking water. Controlled sewage disposal to a licensed sewage 
treatment (i). 
 If the marina has boat repairing and washing areas, no pollution must enter the 
sewage system, marina land and water or the natural surroundings (i). 
 Promotion of sustainable transportation (g). 
 No parking/driving in the marina, unless in specific designated areas (i). 
SAFETY AND SERVICES 
 Adequate, clean and well sign-posted lifesaving, first-aid equipment and fire-
fighting equipment. Equipment must be approved by national authorities. 
 Emergency plan in case of pollution, fire or other accidents must be produced (i). 
 Safety precautions and information must be posted at the marina (i). 
 Electricity and water is available at the berths, installations must be approved 
according to national legislation (i). 
 Facilities for disabled people (g). 
 Map indicating the location of the different facilities is posted at the marina (i). 
WATER QUALITY 
 Visually clean water (no oil, litter, sewage or other evidence of pollution) (i).  
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C. Blue Flag Beach Criteria 
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AND INFORMATION  
 Information relating to coastal zone ecosystems and natural, sensitive areas in the 
coastal zone must be displayed  
 Information about bathing water quality must be displayed 
 Information about the Blue Flag Programme must be displayed 
 Code of conduct for the beach area must be displayed and the laws governing 
beach use must be easily available to the public upon request 
 A minimum of 5 environmental education activities must be offered 
WATER QUALITY  
 Compliance with the requirements and standards for excellent bathing water 
quality 
 No industrial or sewage related discharges may affect the beach area 
 Monitoring on the health of coral reefs located in the vicinity of the beach  
 Compliance of the community with requirements for sewage treatment and 
effluent quality 
 Algae or other vegetation should be left to decay on the beach unless it constitutes 
a nuisance 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT  
 A beach management committee must be established to be in charge of instituting 
environmental management systems and conduct regular environmental audits of 
the beach facility  
 The beach must comply with all regulations affecting the location and operation 
of the beach (coastal zone planning and environmental legislation) 
 The beach must be clean 
 Waste disposal bins/receptacles must be available on/by the beach in adequate 
numbers, regularly maintained and emptied 
 Facilities for receiving recyclable waste materials must be available on/by the 
beach  
 Adequate and clean sanitary facilities with controlled sewage disposal   
 On the beach there will be no unauthorized camping or driving and no dumping   
 Regulation concerning dogs and other domestic animals on the beach must be 
strictly enforced 
 All buildings and equipment of the beach must be properly maintained 
 Sustainable means of transportation must be promoted in the beach area 
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 SAFETY AND SERVICES   
 An adequate number of lifeguards and/or lifesaving equipment must be available 
at the beach 
 First aid equipment must be available on the beach 
 There must be management of different users and uses of the beach so as to 
prevent conflicts and accidents 
 An emergency plans to cope with pollution safety risks must be in place  
 There must be safe access to the beach  
 The beach area must be patrolled  
 A supply of potable drinking water must be available on the beach 
 A minimum of one Blue Flag beach in each municipality must have access and 
toilet facilities provided for disabled persons 
 Map of the beach indicating different facilities must be displayed  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR 
CHAPTER III  
 
A. Civil War Onset Estimated With Panel Logit 
Model 
 
 
In appendix A I estimate equations (1) and (2) using the panel logit econometric method. 
I also expand equations (1) by adding up to three lags of a given climate change related 
disaster event, as well as time fixed effects. Table A0 below relates estimated models to 
econometric specifications in the paper. Tables A1 through A7 provide estimates of 
models O1 through O8 for each disaster event. Table A8 provides estimates of models 
O1 through O8 for all disaster events jointly. Table A1 provides estimates for drought 
events; A2 for extreme cold temperature events; A3 for extreme heat events; A4 for 
epidemic outbreaks; A5 for flood events; A6 for storm events; and A7 for wildfire events.  
Table A0. Description of Appendix A Tables 
Model Lags on a disaster variable Equivalence to equations in the paper 
O1 0 Equation (1) 
O2 1 Equation (1)+Disastert-1 
O3 2 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2 
O4 3 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2+ Disastert-3 
O5 0 Equation (2)-Disastert-1-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
O6 1 Equation (2)-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
O7 2 Equation (2)-Disastert-3 
O8 3 Equation (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Droughtt 0.137 -0.0200 0.0283 0.00277 -0.197 -0.268 -0.243 -0.256
(0.340) (0.373) (0.372) (0.374) (0.361) (0.389) (0.387) (0.389)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.386 0.598* 0.586 -- 0.188 0.414 0.406
(0.346) (0.364) (0.365) (0.361) (0.379) (0.380)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.676 -0.790 -- -- -0.741 -0.812
(0.467) (0.497) (0.481) (0.506)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.281 -- -- -- 0.195
(0.393) (0.406)
Prior war -0.828** -0.854** -0.828** -0.841** -1.104*** -1.108*** -1.091*** -1.091***
(0.370) (0.371) (0.371) (0.372) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.341*** -0.337*** -0.343*** -0.341*** -0.434*** -0.431*** -0.443*** -0.440***
(0.0734) (0.0732) (0.0738) (0.0737) (0.0841) (0.0841) (0.0855) (0.0855)
log(Population Density) 0.0880 0.0897 0.0889 0.0889 0.0484 0.0502 0.0484 0.0492
(0.0862) (0.0862) (0.0863) (0.0862) (0.0931) (0.0931) (0.0935) (0.0934)
log(% mountains) 0.229*** 0.233*** 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.249*** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.250***
(0.0847) (0.0847) (0.0849) (0.0848) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0905) (0.0903)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.697** 0.702** 0.691** 0.696** 0.867*** 0.864*** 0.870*** 0.870***
(0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.313) (0.312) (0.313) (0.313)
1(Oil producer) 0.918*** 0.920*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.836*** 0.841*** 0.835*** 0.839***
(0.293) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293) (0.324) (0.324) (0.324) (0.324)
1(New State) 1.533*** 1.556*** 1.538*** 1.551*** 1.424*** 1.432*** 1.422*** 1.429***
(0.337) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.379) (0.380) (0.381) (0.381)
1(Instability) 0.534** 0.533** 0.542** 0.543** 0.465* 0.464* 0.468* 0.469*
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257)
1(PolityIV) 0.0131 0.0128 0.0131 0.0129 0.0232 0.0231 0.0238 0.0238
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0194)
1(Anocracy) 0.384* 0.394* 0.390* 0.395* 0.483** 0.483** 0.486** 0.485**
(0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.224) (0.237) (0.236) (0.237) (0.237)
Constant -4.072*** -4.114*** -4.069*** -4.092*** -3.774*** -3.775*** -3.764*** -3.766***
(0.443) (0.445) (0.445) (0.447) (1.150) (1.150) (1.151) (1.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A1. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Extreme Coldt 1.438*** 1.226*** 1.178** 1.192** 1.381*** 1.232*** 1.209*** 1.232***
(0.394) (0.463) (0.468) (0.465) (0.429) (0.456) (0.459) (0.455)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.625 0.513 0.506 -- 0.675 0.570 0.551
(0.578) (0.596) (0.602) (0.553) (0.590) (0.600)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.487 0.582 -- -- 0.339 0.521
(0.615) (0.652) (0.620) (0.674)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.397 -- -- -- -0.604
(0.965) (0.991)
Prior war -0.875** -0.900** -0.922** -0.913** -1.152*** -1.177*** -1.198*** -1.196***
(0.370) (0.371) (0.374) (0.375) (0.385) (0.386) (0.389) (0.389)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.359*** -0.359*** -0.361*** -0.362*** -0.438*** -0.439*** -0.438*** -0.438***
(0.0742) (0.0745) (0.0747) (0.0748) (0.0835) (0.0836) (0.0836) (0.0835)
log(Population Density) 0.0730 0.0693 0.0672 0.0689 0.0392 0.0348 0.0312 0.0322
(0.0846) (0.0845) (0.0845) (0.0847) (0.0912) (0.0910) (0.0913) (0.0915)
log(% mountains) 0.229*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.252*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.256***
(0.0829) (0.0829) (0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0883) (0.0880) (0.0882) (0.0883)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.678** 0.674** 0.675** 0.675** 0.821*** 0.812*** 0.811*** 0.816***
(0.275) (0.276) (0.277) (0.276) (0.309) (0.309) (0.309) (0.310)
1(Oil producer) 0.900*** 0.892*** 0.889*** 0.891*** 0.834*** 0.826*** 0.827*** 0.830***
(0.289) (0.290) (0.291) (0.291) (0.320) (0.320) (0.321) (0.321)
1(New State) 1.554*** 1.561*** 1.563*** 1.562*** 1.467*** 1.483*** 1.489*** 1.489***
(0.334) (0.334) (0.335) (0.335) (0.377) (0.378) (0.378) (0.378)
1(Instability) 0.547** 0.557** 0.560** 0.558** 0.492* 0.505** 0.510** 0.509**
(0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256)
1(PolityIV) 0.00987 0.00935 0.00895 0.00936 0.0205 0.0197 0.0194 0.0199
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0194)
1(Anocracy) 0.374* 0.371* 0.371* 0.367* 0.470** 0.468** 0.472** 0.467**
(0.220) (0.220) (0.221) (0.221) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235)
Constant -4.092*** -4.115*** -4.127*** -4.115*** -3.755*** -3.765*** -3.789*** -3.787***
(0.428) (0.427) (0.427) (0.429) (1.141) (1.140) (1.141) (1.142)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A2. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Extreme Heatt -16.41 -16.24 -16.34 -16.16 -18.78 -18.95 -18.71 -19.13
(3,788) (2,734) (2,742) (2,646) (12,268) (12,782) (11,329) (13,815)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 1.427** 1.098* 1.120* -- 1.581** 1.225 1.273*
(0.611) (0.665) (0.664) (0.678) (0.780) (0.758)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 1.091* 0.752 -- -- 0.849 0.545
(0.648) (0.684) (0.768) (0.790)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 1.102* -- -- -- 1.135*
(0.653) (0.681)
Prior war -0.798** -0.834** -0.874** -0.907** -1.100*** -1.142*** -1.165*** -1.196***
(0.365) (0.371) (0.374) (0.374) (0.385) (0.388) (0.390) (0.391)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.344*** -0.343*** -0.340*** -0.338*** -0.431*** -0.432*** -0.428*** -0.427***
(0.0737) (0.0731) (0.0728) (0.0728) (0.0835) (0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0830)
log(Population Density) 0.0915 0.0836 0.0776 0.0738 0.0560 0.0458 0.0416 0.0373
(0.0865) (0.0866) (0.0867) (0.0873) (0.0930) (0.0930) (0.0932) (0.0935)
log(% mountains) 0.229*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.253*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.250***
(0.0848) (0.0849) (0.0848) (0.0852) (0.0901) (0.0899) (0.0899) (0.0901)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.695** 0.687** 0.671** 0.655** 0.865*** 0.846*** 0.830*** 0.803**
(0.278) (0.279) (0.281) (0.284) (0.313) (0.313) (0.315) (0.317)
1(Oil producer) 0.922*** 0.913*** 0.907*** 0.911*** 0.844*** 0.851*** 0.849*** 0.854***
(0.294) (0.294) (0.293) (0.295) (0.324) (0.323) (0.323) (0.323)
1(New State) 1.511*** 1.532*** 1.545*** 1.554*** 1.429*** 1.441*** 1.444*** 1.459***
(0.336) (0.336) (0.336) (0.336) (0.379) (0.379) (0.379) (0.379)
1(Instability) 0.527** 0.533** 0.555** 0.557** 0.466* 0.483* 0.501* 0.509**
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.258) (0.257) (0.258) (0.258)
1(PolityIV) 0.0144 0.0119 0.0105 0.00892 0.0245 0.0215 0.0207 0.0191
(0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0198)
1(Anocracy) 0.377* 0.386* 0.397* 0.411* 0.479** 0.491** 0.492** 0.502**
(0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.224) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237)
Constant -4.033*** -4.070*** -4.110*** -4.141*** -3.762*** -3.778*** -3.792*** -3.801***
(0.441) (0.440) (0.441) (0.443) (1.150) (1.149) (1.149) (1.149)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A3. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Epidemict 0.380** 0.305* 0.299* 0.299* 0.379** 0.351* 0.346* 0.348*
(0.151) (0.171) (0.173) (0.174) (0.181) (0.191) (0.192) (0.193)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.218 0.200 0.200 -- 0.112 0.0940 0.0971
(0.216) (0.229) (0.229) (0.238) (0.244) (0.244)
Epidemict-2 -- -- 0.0619 0.0611 -- -- 0.0932 0.101
(0.263) (0.268) (0.275) (0.280)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- 0.00523 -- -- -- -0.0492
(0.308) (0.318)
Prior war -0.913** -0.947** -0.955** -0.956** -1.165*** -1.178*** -1.185*** -1.183***
(0.376) (0.380) (0.382) (0.383) (0.394) (0.397) (0.398) (0.398)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.331*** -0.329*** -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.411*** -0.408*** -0.407*** -0.408***
(0.0732) (0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0732) (0.0826) (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0830)
log(Population Density) 0.0714 0.0687 0.0680 0.0679 0.0419 0.0402 0.0392 0.0399
(0.0866) (0.0869) (0.0869) (0.0871) (0.0921) (0.0922) (0.0923) (0.0925)
log(% mountains) 0.242*** 0.245*** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.261*** 0.261***
(0.0852) (0.0856) (0.0856) (0.0857) (0.0895) (0.0896) (0.0899) (0.0899)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.725*** 0.734*** 0.735*** 0.735*** 0.860*** 0.859*** 0.857*** 0.858***
(0.280) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310)
1(Oil producer) 0.873*** 0.874*** 0.875*** 0.875*** 0.824*** 0.825*** 0.825*** 0.827***
(0.294) (0.294) (0.294) (0.295) (0.320) (0.319) (0.319) (0.320)
1(New State) 1.579*** 1.595*** 1.598*** 1.598*** 1.478*** 1.485*** 1.489*** 1.487***
(0.337) (0.337) (0.338) (0.338) (0.378) (0.378) (0.378) (0.379)
1(Instability) 0.521** 0.525** 0.526** 0.527** 0.470* 0.473* 0.476* 0.475*
(0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.256) (0.256) (0.257) (0.257)
1(PolityIV) 0.0112 0.0108 0.0107 0.0107 0.0224 0.0223 0.0223 0.0224
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194)
1(Anocracy) 0.370* 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.486** 0.484** 0.484** 0.483**
(0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.236) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237)
Constant -4.212*** -4.250*** -4.257*** -4.258*** -3.846*** -3.858*** -3.869*** -3.866***
(0.448) (0.450) (0.452) (0.454) (1.148) (1.149) (1.149) (1.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency Epidemic Outbreaks, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Floodt 0.181 0.113 0.0847 0.0512 0.154 0.113 0.0915 0.0634
(0.118) (0.137) (0.143) (0.146) (0.130) (0.146) (0.150) (0.152)
Floodt-1 -- 0.146 0.0987 0.0710 -- 0.0945 0.0501 0.0285
(0.141) (0.152) (0.157) (0.146) (0.157) (0.161)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.127 0.0744 -- -- 0.121 0.0772
(0.149) (0.157) (0.157) (0.162)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.164 -- -- -- 0.148
(0.150) (0.151)
Prior war -0.879** -0.905** -0.930** -0.958** -1.138*** -1.151*** -1.172*** -1.189***
(0.377) (0.383) (0.387) (0.391) (0.389) (0.391) (0.393) (0.395)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.346*** -0.346*** -0.426*** -0.425*** -0.425*** -0.423***
(0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0735) (0.0737) (0.0828) (0.0827) (0.0827) (0.0827)
log(Population Density) 0.0687 0.0608 0.0553 0.0505 0.0398 0.0335 0.0285 0.0233
(0.0859) (0.0859) (0.0861) (0.0863) (0.0917) (0.0919) (0.0920) (0.0921)
log(% mountains) 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.213** 0.212** 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.234*** 0.233***
(0.0835) (0.0831) (0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0886) (0.0883) (0.0881) (0.0880)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.690** 0.684** 0.682** 0.678** 0.836*** 0.825*** 0.817*** 0.808***
(0.274) (0.273) (0.273) (0.274) (0.307) (0.307) (0.306) (0.306)
1(Oil producer) 0.886*** 0.876*** 0.872*** 0.866*** 0.833*** 0.832*** 0.829*** 0.826***
(0.288) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.317) (0.315) (0.314) (0.314)
1(New State) 1.554*** 1.573*** 1.584*** 1.594*** 1.448*** 1.457*** 1.463*** 1.480***
(0.335) (0.335) (0.335) (0.336) (0.376) (0.376) (0.376) (0.376)
1(Instability) 0.531** 0.529** 0.537** 0.541** 0.470* 0.472* 0.477* 0.479*
(0.245) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.256) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
1(PolityIV) 0.0110 0.0104 0.0101 0.00981 0.0213 0.0211 0.0209 0.0208
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193)
1(Anocracy) 0.404* 0.420* 0.430* 0.440** 0.501** 0.511** 0.518** 0.525**
(0.222) (0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236)
Constant -4.134*** -4.168*** -4.192*** -4.216*** -3.767*** -3.777*** -3.784*** -3.801***
(0.438) (0.438) (0.439) (0.441) (1.144) (1.143) (1.142) (1.142)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A5. Determinant of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Stormt 0.0958 0.00514 -0.0763 0.00134 0.0596 -0.0143 -0.109 0.0146
(0.114) (0.155) (0.171) (0.181) (0.123) (0.157) (0.177) (0.185)
Stormt-1 -- 0.138 0.0225 0.0710 -- 0.120 0.00334 0.0672
(0.143) (0.163) (0.163) (0.146) (0.166) (0.166)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.235* 0.316** -- -- 0.249 0.353**
(0.139) (0.154) (0.154) (0.169)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.300 -- -- -- -0.416
(0.234) (0.255)
Prior war -0.847** -0.876** -0.916** -0.896** -1.129*** -1.148*** -1.180*** -1.178***
(0.370) (0.372) (0.373) (0.372) (0.387) (0.388) (0.391) (0.391)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.345*** -0.347*** -0.352*** -0.351*** -0.429*** -0.429*** -0.430*** -0.435***
(0.0731) (0.0730) (0.0724) (0.0722) (0.0829) (0.0826) (0.0821) (0.0823)
log(Population Density) 0.0756 0.0701 0.0645 0.0669 0.0444 0.0383 0.0309 0.0344
(0.0869) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0936) (0.0937) (0.0936) (0.0941)
log(% mountains) 0.226*** 0.225*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.249*** 0.251***
(0.0843) (0.0844) (0.0846) (0.0845) (0.0895) (0.0894) (0.0894) (0.0899)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.671** 0.660** 0.646** 0.657** 0.845*** 0.832*** 0.810** 0.835***
(0.279) (0.280) (0.282) (0.281) (0.314) (0.314) (0.315) (0.317)
1(Oil producer) 0.929*** 0.937*** 0.946*** 0.943*** 0.851*** 0.858*** 0.864*** 0.862***
(0.292) (0.292) (0.293) (0.293) (0.322) (0.322) (0.322) (0.323)
1(New State) 1.533*** 1.541*** 1.546*** 1.550*** 1.439*** 1.451*** 1.458*** 1.463***
(0.335) (0.335) (0.335) (0.335) (0.378) (0.378) (0.378) (0.379)
1(Instability) 0.538** 0.543** 0.550** 0.541** 0.470* 0.471* 0.480* 0.471*
(0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.246) (0.257) (0.256) (0.256) (0.258)
1(PolityIV) 0.0123 0.0120 0.0118 0.0116 0.0224 0.0223 0.0217 0.0227
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0195)
1(Anocracy) 0.391* 0.397* 0.407* 0.396* 0.492** 0.496** 0.505** 0.489**
(0.223) (0.223) (0.224) (0.224) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.238)
Constant -4.102*** -4.126*** -4.151*** -4.139*** -3.788*** -3.800*** -3.821*** -3.815***
(0.442) (0.442) (0.440) (0.440) (1.149) (1.149) (1.150) (1.151)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A6. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Wildfiret 1.247*** 1.235** 1.125** 1.153** 1.234** 1.218** 1.133** 1.133**
(0.448) (0.482) (0.512) (0.513) (0.499) (0.514) (0.529) (0.534)
Wildfiret-1 -- 0.0518 -0.146 -0.135 -- 0.109 -0.0849 -0.0847
(0.766) (0.822) (0.813) (0.772) (0.817) (0.817)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.671 0.737 -- -- 0.789 0.790
(0.659) (0.678) (0.671) (0.684)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -0.408 -- -- -- -0.00807
(1.222) (1.154)
Prior war -0.821** -0.821** -0.805** -0.807** -1.090*** -1.086*** -1.066*** -1.066***
(0.371) (0.371) (0.372) (0.371) (0.388) (0.389) (0.388) (0.388)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.365*** -0.366*** -0.371*** -0.370*** -0.447*** -0.447*** -0.452*** -0.452***
(0.0748) (0.0751) (0.0752) (0.0752) (0.0839) (0.0840) (0.0837) (0.0838)
log(Population Density) 0.0921 0.0923 0.0944 0.0943 0.0572 0.0581 0.0627 0.0627
(0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0917) (0.0918) (0.0912) (0.0912)
log(% mountains) 0.220*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.236*** 0.236***
(0.0839) (0.0839) (0.0835) (0.0836) (0.0887) (0.0887) (0.0881) (0.0881)
1(Noncontiguous state) 0.678** 0.677** 0.669** 0.672** 0.837*** 0.834*** 0.823*** 0.823***
(0.276) (0.277) (0.276) (0.276) (0.308) (0.309) (0.307) (0.307)
1(Oil producer) 0.907*** 0.907*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.842*** 0.842*** 0.846*** 0.845***
(0.290) (0.290) (0.289) (0.289) (0.319) (0.319) (0.317) (0.317)
1(New State) 1.552*** 1.552*** 1.559*** 1.558*** 1.467*** 1.468*** 1.471*** 1.471***
(0.335) (0.335) (0.335) (0.335) (0.377) (0.377) (0.376) (0.376)
1(Instability) 0.536** 0.536** 0.541** 0.540** 0.471* 0.472* 0.475* 0.475*
(0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.257) (0.257) (0.256) (0.256)
1(PolityIV) 0.0107 0.0107 0.0106 0.0107 0.0212 0.0212 0.0210 0.0210
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193)
1(Anocracy) 0.378* 0.377* 0.369* 0.368* 0.481** 0.480** 0.473** 0.473**
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236)
Constant -4.001*** -3.999*** -3.979*** -3.981*** -3.664*** -3.656*** -3.604*** -3.604***
(0.436) (0.437) (0.436) (0.436) (1.144) (1.145) (1.143) (1.143)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A7. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Droughtt -0.00316 -0.0480 -0.0143 -0.0798 -0.258 -0.248 -0.207 -0.258
(0.344) (0.373) (0.374) (0.387) (0.361) (0.388) (0.387) (0.398)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.198 0.453 0.460 -- 0.0893 0.334 0.309
(0.357) (0.376) (0.378) (0.367) (0.390) (0.391)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.787 -0.786 -- -- -0.862* -0.810
(0.482) (0.502) (0.503) (0.524)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.105 -- -- -- 0.0830
(0.411) (0.426)
Extreme Coldt 1.205*** 0.928* 0.762 0.913* 1.226*** 0.949* 0.797 1.028*
(0.461) (0.511) (0.552) (0.546) (0.468) (0.542) (0.578) (0.567)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.495 0.354 0.213 -- 0.521 0.462 0.351
(0.609) (0.668) (0.740) (0.611) (0.674) (0.754)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.333 0.163 -- -- 0.184 -0.120
(0.714) (0.875) (0.734) (0.957)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.475 -- -- -- -0.421
(1.131) (1.179)
Extreme Heatt -19.42 -18.50 -17.63 -17.95 -18.13 -19.33 -19.29 -19.99
(12,271) (6,318) (3,762) (3,727) (7,498) (13,656) (12,977) (18,211)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.955 0.763 0.998 -- 1.181 0.971 1.400*
(0.678) (0.707) (0.690) (0.793) (0.822) (0.788)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.791 0.751 -- -- 0.709 0.576
(0.751) (0.803) (0.809) (0.858)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 0.699 -- -- -- 1.084
(0.804) (0.855)
Epidemict 0.300* 0.259 0.291 0.277 0.345* 0.357* 0.388* 0.391*
(0.169) (0.186) (0.188) (0.192) (0.193) (0.207) (0.211) (0.219)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.148 0.176 0.247 -- -0.0255 -0.00419 0.0640
(0.228) (0.241) (0.242) (0.267) (0.273) (0.274)
Epidemict-2 -- -- -0.0989 -0.155 -- -- -0.0590 -0.0861
(0.300) (0.315) (0.313) (0.330)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.173 -- -- -- -0.294
(0.350) (0.382)
Floodt 0.0923 0.0368 0.0408 -0.0157 0.0940 0.0481 0.0521 -0.0112
(0.135) (0.153) (0.156) (0.160) (0.140) (0.160) (0.165) (0.171)
Floodt-1 -- 0.00842 -0.0550 0.0142 -- -0.00929 -0.0769 0.0259
(0.163) (0.172) (0.178) (0.168) (0.178) (0.187)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.0579 0.0298 -- -- 0.0548 0.0246
(0.169) (0.174) (0.180) (0.182)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.119 -- -- -- 0.140
(0.175) (0.180)
Stormt 0.00830 -0.0979 -0.175 -0.0244 0.00525 -0.0792 -0.166 0.0147
(0.135) (0.177) (0.195) (0.197) (0.138) (0.179) (0.199) (0.196)
Stormt-1 -- 0.118 0.00321 0.0138 -- 0.0969 -0.0225 -0.0144
(0.154) (0.175) (0.179) (0.159) (0.178) (0.185)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.218 0.358** -- -- 0.238 0.417**
(0.147) (0.165) (0.154) (0.175)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.478* -- -- -- -0.624**
(0.248) (0.281)
Wildfiret 0.657 0.726 0.641 0.819 0.812 0.834 0.756 0.898
(0.526) (0.553) (0.576) (0.590) (0.540) (0.562) (0.580) (0.603)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.353 -0.456 -0.397 -- -0.133 -0.279 -0.119
(0.871) (0.949) (0.963) (0.853) (0.921) (0.933)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.297 0.447 -- -- 0.507 0.529
(0.764) (0.795) (0.762) (0.795)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -1.101 -- -- -- -0.656
(1.659) (1.523)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A8. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of All Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models that include the full set of control variables (same as in Tables ). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Control variable estimates are not displayed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B. Civil War Onset Estimated With Conditional 
(Fixed Effects) Logit Model 
 
In appendix B I estimate equations (1) and (2) using the conditional (fixed effects) logit 
econometric method. I also expand equations (1) by adding up to three lags of a given 
climate change related disaster event, as well as time fixed effects. Table B0 below 
relates estimated models to econometric specifications in the paper. Tables B1 through 
B7 provide estimates of models O1 through O8 for each disaster event. Table B8 
provides estimates of models O1 through O8 for all disaster events jointly. Table B1 
provides estimates for drought events; B2 for extreme cold temperature events; B3 for 
extreme heat events; B4 for epidemic outbreaks; B5 for flood events; B6 for storm events; 
and B7 for wildfire events.  
Table B0. Description of Appendix B Tables 
Model Lags on a disaster variable Equivalence to equations in the paper 
O1 0 Equation (1) 
O2 1 Equation (1)+Disastert-1 
O3 2 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2 
O4 3 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2+ Disastert-3 
O5 0 Equation (2)-Disastert-1-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
O6 1 Equation (2)-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
O7 2 Equation (2)-Disastert-3 
O8 3 Equation (2) 
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Droughtt -0.115 -0.169 -0.141 -0.148 -0.261 -0.299 -0.277 -0.284
(0.365) (0.378) (0.377) (0.378) (0.391) (0.405) (0.402) (0.404)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.204 0.418 0.418 -- 0.143 0.334 0.334
(0.353) (0.362) (0.363) (0.373) (0.385) (0.385)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.829* -0.861* -- -- -0.754 -0.793
(0.476) (0.500) (0.487) (0.510)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.0877 -- -- -- 0.115
(0.412) (0.428)
Prior war -2.344*** -2.355*** -2.330*** -2.333*** -2.354*** -2.359*** -2.336*** -2.336***
(0.390) (0.391) (0.391) (0.391) (0.403) (0.403) (0.403) (0.403)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.123 -0.121 -0.127 -0.127 -0.237 -0.231 -0.247 -0.244
(0.155) (0.155) (0.156) (0.156) (0.195) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197)
log(Population Density) 1.235*** 1.211*** 1.287*** 1.275*** 0.286 0.315 0.287 0.295
(0.424) (0.427) (0.427) (0.431) (1.092) (1.095) (1.093) (1.094)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.653 -1.655 -1.657 -1.658 -0.985 -1.016 -0.935 -0.953
(1.273) (1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.510) (1.513) (1.513) (1.514)
1(Oil producer) 0.719 0.706 0.679 0.681 0.629 0.631 0.599 0.603
(0.727) (0.727) (0.730) (0.731) (0.784) (0.783) (0.783) (0.785)
1(New State) 1.637*** 1.645*** 1.643*** 1.644*** 1.485*** 1.485*** 1.491*** 1.490***
(0.423) (0.424) (0.424) (0.424) (0.513) (0.513) (0.514) (0.514)
1(Instability) 0.582** 0.584** 0.585** 0.586** 0.572** 0.573** 0.578** 0.580**
(0.280) (0.281) (0.280) (0.280) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
1(PolityIV) -0.00210 -0.00166 -0.00368 -0.00350 0.00487 0.00506 0.00493 0.00512
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296)
1(Anocracy) 0.664** 0.665** 0.672** 0.672** 0.673** 0.671** 0.675** 0.675**
(0.278) (0.278) (0.277) (0.277) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table B1. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Extreme Coldt 1.127** 1.016** 1.019** 1.027** 1.183** 1.128** 1.133** 1.140**
(0.465) (0.505) (0.509) (0.506) (0.510) (0.519) (0.522) (0.518)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.386 0.303 0.261 -- 0.481 0.430 0.367
(0.610) (0.618) (0.625) (0.597) (0.618) (0.627)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.447 0.592 -- -- 0.202 0.411
(0.626) (0.663) (0.632) (0.675)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.618 -- -- -- -0.778
(0.984) (0.984)
Prior war -2.416*** -2.426*** -2.442*** -2.438*** -2.381*** -2.391*** -2.397*** -2.399***
(0.397) (0.398) (0.400) (0.399) (0.405) (0.406) (0.407) (0.407)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.122 -0.122 -0.121 -0.121 -0.179 -0.168 -0.165 -0.174
(0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.157) (0.193) (0.194) (0.194) (0.195)
log(Population Density) 1.200*** 1.195*** 1.187*** 1.195*** 0.834 0.968 0.983 0.878
(0.424) (0.425) (0.425) (0.425) (1.120) (1.139) (1.141) (1.145)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.534 -1.515 -1.500 -1.510 -1.361 -1.393 -1.394 -1.341
(1.279) (1.279) (1.279) (1.280) (1.516) (1.520) (1.520) (1.522)
1(Oil producer) 0.560 0.535 0.519 0.530 0.533 0.506 0.501 0.517
(0.750) (0.754) (0.758) (0.757) (0.804) (0.808) (0.808) (0.807)
1(New State) 1.653*** 1.658*** 1.661*** 1.658*** 1.444*** 1.437*** 1.441*** 1.449***
(0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.515) (0.516) (0.517) (0.516)
1(Instability) 0.600** 0.608** 0.617** 0.613** 0.590** 0.598** 0.602** 0.599**
(0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.279) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.289)
1(PolityIV) -0.00686 -0.00731 -0.00810 -0.00726 0.00507 0.00525 0.00530 0.00566
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298)
1(Anocracy) 0.642** 0.633** 0.632** 0.629** 0.655** 0.649** 0.651** 0.647**
(0.277) (0.277) (0.278) (0.278) (0.285) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B2. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Extreme Heatt -12.84 -12.89 -12.98 -14.09 -16.90 -16.52 -16.44 -15.99
(491.0) (444.2) (491.3) (908.1) (3,558) (3,202) (3,268) (2,703)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 1.118* 0.955 1.216* -- 1.159 0.932 1.166
(0.672) (0.700) (0.721) (0.751) (0.813) (0.830)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.787 0.492 -- -- 0.639 0.455
(0.708) (0.750) (0.800) (0.830)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 1.095 -- -- -- 0.976
(0.725) (0.783)
Prior war -2.329*** -2.361*** -2.379*** -2.401*** -2.355*** -2.368*** -2.376*** -2.382***
(0.387) (0.391) (0.393) (0.397) (0.402) (0.402) (0.403) (0.404)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.119 -0.124 -0.123 -0.126 -0.219 -0.231 -0.224 -0.211
(0.156) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194)
log(Population Density) 1.231*** 1.230*** 1.209*** 1.207*** 0.319 0.374 0.412 0.591
(0.422) (0.422) (0.423) (0.424) (1.091) (1.092) (1.093) (1.106)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.788 -1.632 -1.588 -1.546 -1.286 -1.152 -1.121 -1.196
(1.276) (1.283) (1.281) (1.282) (1.515) (1.524) (1.517) (1.517)
1(Oil producer) 0.716 0.717 0.717 0.690 0.619 0.664 0.672 0.659
(0.727) (0.728) (0.729) (0.732) (0.786) (0.790) (0.793) (0.794)
1(New State) 1.651*** 1.650*** 1.642*** 1.643*** 1.491*** 1.492*** 1.480*** 1.464***
(0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.512) (0.512) (0.512) (0.512)
1(Instability) 0.586** 0.593** 0.603** 0.614** 0.590** 0.610** 0.616** 0.626**
(0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.279) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288)
1(PolityIV) -0.00147 -0.00225 -0.00261 -0.00295 0.00494 0.00316 0.00357 0.00390
(0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0298)
1(Anocracy) 0.657** 0.661** 0.663** 0.657** 0.663** 0.665** 0.669** 0.662**
(0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.287) (0.286) (0.287) (0.287)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table B3. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Epidemict 0.267 0.232 0.229 0.235 0.302 0.287 0.285 0.287
(0.172) (0.178) (0.178) (0.180) (0.193) (0.195) (0.195) (0.196)
Epidemict-1 0.166 0.153 0.158 0.120 0.105 0.110
(0.220) (0.226) (0.227) (0.246) (0.248) (0.248)
Epidemict-2 0.0648 0.0793 0.121 0.135
(0.273) (0.276) (0.293) (0.296)
Epidemict-3 -0.110 -0.136
(0.326) (0.329)
Prior war -2.408*** -2.436*** -2.445*** -2.439*** -2.436*** -2.454*** -2.466*** -2.462***
(0.395) (0.400) (0.402) (0.402) (0.411) (0.414) (0.417) (0.416)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.104 -0.0994 -0.0987 -0.101 -0.214 -0.210 -0.208 -0.213
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.195) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196)
log(Population Density) 1.073** 1.023** 1.013** 1.032** 0.303 0.303 0.305 0.303
(0.434) (0.440) (0.442) (0.445) (1.097) (1.098) (1.099) (1.099)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.655 -1.654 -1.657 -1.654 -1.101 -1.120 -1.147 -1.120
(1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.508) (1.509) (1.510) (1.511)
1(Oil producer) 0.731 0.757 0.763 0.766 0.629 0.658 0.681 0.684
(0.729) (0.728) (0.728) (0.729) (0.787) (0.785) (0.785) (0.786)
1(New State) 1.655*** 1.659*** 1.661*** 1.661*** 1.484*** 1.484*** 1.481*** 1.484***
(0.422) (0.422) (0.422) (0.422) (0.513) (0.514) (0.514) (0.514)
1(Instability) 0.592** 0.605** 0.607** 0.606** 0.583** 0.588** 0.595** 0.595**
(0.280) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.289) (0.289) (0.290) (0.290)
1(PolityIV) -0.00412 -0.00477 -0.00479 -0.00497 0.00467 0.00483 0.00548 0.00507
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297)
1(Anocracy) 0.655** 0.650** 0.648** 0.650** 0.686** 0.682** 0.679** 0.678**
(0.278) (0.279) (0.279) (0.279) (0.288) (0.288) (0.289) (0.288)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B4. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency Epidemic Outbreaks, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Floodt -0.0408 -0.0431 -0.0454 -0.0661 -0.0475 -0.0425 -0.0455 -0.0615
(0.136) (0.145) (0.147) (0.151) (0.146) (0.153) (0.155) (0.157)
Floodt-1 -- 0.00685 0.00263 -0.00977 -- -0.0158 -0.0258 -0.0343
(0.148) (0.154) (0.157) (0.153) (0.161) (0.164)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.0152 -0.0146 -- -- 0.0318 0.00685
(0.154) (0.159) (0.165) (0.169)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.106 -- -- -- 0.0973
(0.151) (0.151)
Prior war -2.339*** -2.340*** -2.343*** -2.362*** -2.361*** -2.359*** -2.364*** -2.374***
(0.391) (0.392) (0.393) (0.396) (0.403) (0.404) (0.404) (0.406)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.123 -0.123 -0.123 -0.125 -0.232 -0.233 -0.233 -0.230
(0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196)
log(Population Density) 1.253*** 1.250*** 1.243*** 1.205*** 0.278 0.266 0.277 0.289
(0.436) (0.442) (0.446) (0.449) (1.104) (1.110) (1.111) (1.112)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.673 -1.672 -1.669 -1.656 -1.025 -1.017 -1.025 -1.053
(1.275) (1.276) (1.276) (1.276) (1.510) (1.516) (1.516) (1.517)
1(Oil producer) 0.727 0.727 0.730 0.762 0.622 0.617 0.628 0.660
(0.730) (0.730) (0.731) (0.725) (0.785) (0.787) (0.788) (0.781)
1(New State) 1.651*** 1.650*** 1.649*** 1.643*** 1.501*** 1.503*** 1.499*** 1.490***
(0.424) (0.424) (0.424) (0.423) (0.515) (0.516) (0.516) (0.516)
1(Instability) 0.587** 0.587** 0.588** 0.589** 0.583** 0.583** 0.583** 0.581**
(0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
1(PolityIV) -0.00163 -0.00165 -0.00161 -0.00134 0.00401 0.00391 0.00419 0.00508
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296)
1(Anocracy) 0.661** 0.662** 0.663** 0.667** 0.673** 0.671** 0.674** 0.680**
(0.278) (0.279) (0.279) (0.278) (0.287) (0.287) (0.288) (0.288)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table B5. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Stormt -0.0432 -0.0841 -0.147 -0.0382 -0.0646 -0.0999 -0.175 -0.0140
(0.145) (0.164) (0.179) (0.194) (0.153) (0.170) (0.189) (0.198)
Stormt-1 -- 0.0823 0.00322 0.0420 -- 0.0729 -0.00864 0.0439
(0.148) (0.160) (0.160) (0.146) (0.160) (0.161)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.217 0.276* -- -- 0.212 0.317*
(0.157) (0.165) (0.166) (0.179)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.332 -- -- -- -0.511*
(0.246) (0.278)
Prior war -2.342*** -2.355*** -2.381*** -2.359*** -2.361*** -2.370*** -2.387*** -2.392***
(0.390) (0.392) (0.394) (0.392) (0.403) (0.404) (0.406) (0.406)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.122 -0.124 -0.127 -0.126 -0.227 -0.226 -0.230 -0.242
(0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.194) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195)
log(Population Density) 1.236*** 1.218*** 1.183*** 1.220*** 0.297 0.311 0.292 0.218
(0.425) (0.426) (0.427) (0.429) (1.094) (1.095) (1.095) (1.101)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.662 -1.660 -1.654 -1.613 -1.017 -1.040 -1.040 -0.961
(1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.510) (1.512) (1.513) (1.510)
1(Oil producer) 0.720 0.727 0.737 0.729 0.610 0.618 0.631 0.612
(0.727) (0.728) (0.729) (0.726) (0.782) (0.783) (0.784) (0.781)
1(New State) 1.647*** 1.649*** 1.646*** 1.661*** 1.490*** 1.493*** 1.494*** 1.528***
(0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.423) (0.513) (0.512) (0.512) (0.513)
1(Instability) 0.587** 0.588** 0.589** 0.584** 0.585** 0.583** 0.581** 0.571**
(0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
1(PolityIV) -0.00205 -0.00206 -0.00245 -0.00128 0.00419 0.00466 0.00420 0.00645
(0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0298)
1(Anocracy) 0.660** 0.662** 0.674** 0.652** 0.671** 0.673** 0.682** 0.648**
(0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.289)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B6. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Wildfiret 1.001** 1.023** 0.949* 0.989* 1.062* 1.068* 1.034* 1.029*
(0.496) (0.517) (0.545) (0.545) (0.569) (0.574) (0.584) (0.591)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.110 -0.244 -0.237 -- -0.0593 -0.180 -0.180
(0.771) (0.828) (0.812) (0.806) (0.842) (0.843)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.425 0.509 -- -- 0.591 0.582
(0.698) (0.705) (0.731) (0.745)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -0.550 -- -- -- 0.0786
(1.233) (1.185)
Prior war -2.385*** -2.384*** -2.384*** -2.381*** -2.375*** -2.375*** -2.366*** -2.366***
(0.392) (0.392) (0.392) (0.392) (0.404) (0.404) (0.405) (0.405)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.139 -0.139 -0.139 -0.138 -0.205 -0.207 -0.189 -0.189
(0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.194) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197)
log(Population Density) 1.187*** 1.187*** 1.186*** 1.186*** 0.756 0.734 0.929 0.934
(0.423) (0.423) (0.424) (0.423) (1.132) (1.170) (1.206) (1.209)
1(Noncontiguous state) -1.655 -1.655 -1.650 -1.650 -1.366 -1.346 -1.486 -1.492
(1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.274) (1.525) (1.538) (1.552) (1.553)
1(Oil producer) 0.704 0.706 0.687 0.685 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.629
(0.719) (0.720) (0.722) (0.722) (0.772) (0.773) (0.771) (0.772)
1(New State) 1.658*** 1.657*** 1.661*** 1.659*** 1.438*** 1.441*** 1.418*** 1.417***
(0.422) (0.422) (0.422) (0.422) (0.514) (0.515) (0.516) (0.517)
1(Instability) 0.609** 0.608** 0.613** 0.608** 0.592** 0.592** 0.597** 0.597**
(0.279) (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.290)
1(PolityIV) -0.00887 -0.00857 -0.00907 -0.00873 0.00255 0.00261 0.00254 0.00255
(0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298)
1(Anocracy) 0.656** 0.657** 0.646** 0.646** 0.678** 0.678** 0.672** 0.672**
(0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.279) (0.287) (0.287) (0.288) (0.288)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B7. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Droughtt -0.0932 -0.0561 -0.0536 -0.114 -0.226 -0.194 -0.148 -0.242
(0.368) (0.383) (0.385) (0.397) (0.396) (0.414) (0.413) (0.426)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.134 0.389 0.425 -- 0.112 0.336 0.323
(0.367) (0.382) (0.382) (0.388) (0.408) (0.413)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.919* -0.874* -- -- -0.908* -0.876
(0.502) (0.520) (0.527) (0.555)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.0182 -- -- -- 0.113
(0.438) (0.458)
Extreme Coldt 0.975* 0.727 0.559 0.852 1.045* 0.843 0.696 1.011
(0.521) (0.577) (0.627) (0.636) (0.553) (0.618) (0.652) (0.654)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.674 0.503 0.386 -- 0.670 0.636 0.662
(0.665) (0.724) (0.852) (0.654) (0.713) (0.841)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.442 0.241 -- -- 0.134 -0.413
(0.772) (0.985) (0.776) (1.057)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.135 -- -- -- -0.0567
(1.143) (1.164)
Extreme Heatt -14.75 -14.59 -13.88 -15.04 -16.65 -17.10 -16.73 -16.03
(1,156) (813.2) (595.4) (891.8) (3,166) (3,891) (3,438) (2,732)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 1.061 0.982 1.416* -- 1.025 0.934 1.582*
(0.750) (0.750) (0.744) (0.884) (0.889) (0.869)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.847 0.824 -- -- 0.711 0.615
(0.827) (0.903) (0.866) (0.939)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 0.972 -- -- -- 1.291
(0.934) (0.996)
Epidemict 0.258 0.250 0.234 0.228 0.301 0.292 0.301 0.318
(0.187) (0.191) (0.195) (0.202) (0.205) (0.212) (0.218) (0.227)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.128 0.176 0.270 -- 0.0590 0.104 0.171
(0.233) (0.243) (0.250) (0.276) (0.285) (0.287)
Epidemict-2 -- -- -0.0900 -0.154 -- -- -0.0231 -0.0606
(0.321) (0.344) (0.337) (0.365)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.344 -- -- -- -0.374
(0.383) (0.415)
Floodt -0.0682 -0.0726 -0.0626 -0.113 -0.0473 -0.0613 -0.0454 -0.114
(0.145) (0.160) (0.163) (0.165) (0.150) (0.166) (0.172) (0.180)
Floodt-1 -- -0.0966 -0.146 -0.0451 -- -0.0837 -0.136 0.00322
(0.169) (0.175) (0.185) (0.176) (0.183) (0.198)
Floodt-2 -- -- -0.0332 -0.0583 -- -- 0.00895 -0.0291
(0.176) (0.180) (0.191) (0.194)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.0878 -- -- -- 0.144
(0.182) (0.190)
Stormt -0.0830 -0.164 -0.222 -0.0257 -0.0666 -0.130 -0.219 0.00885
(0.160) (0.190) (0.209) (0.223) (0.164) (0.193) (0.217) (0.222)
Stormt-1 -- 0.103 0.0214 0.00576 -- 0.0959 -9.44e-05 -0.0178
(0.159) (0.169) (0.181) (0.159) (0.173) (0.190)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.265 0.369** -- -- 0.273 0.434**
(0.167) (0.181) (0.174) (0.198)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.517* -- -- -- -0.732**
(0.273) (0.320)
Wildfiret 0.686 0.784 0.897 0.985 0.757 0.872 0.980 1.026
(0.568) (0.591) (0.604) (0.616) (0.598) (0.617) (0.634) (0.655)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.379 -0.447 -0.458 -- -0.250 -0.337 -0.189
(0.894) (0.971) (1.013) (0.895) (0.946) (0.986)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.248 0.240 -- -- 0.426 0.189
(0.829) (0.860) (0.851) (0.911)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -1.098 -- -- -- -0.325
(1.841) (1.688)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table B8. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of All Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models that include the full set of control variables (same as in Tables ). Standard errors 
in parentheses. Control variable estimates are not displayed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Droughtt-2 -0.829* to -0.861* O3,O4 -- --
Extreme Coldt 1.016** to 1.127** O1,O2,O3,O4 1.128** to 1.183** O5,O6,O7,O8
Extreme Heatt-1 1.118* to 1.216* O2,O4 -- --
Stormt-2 0.276* O4 0.317* O8
Stormt-3 -- -- -0.511* O8
Wildfiret 0.949* to 1.023** O1,O2,O3,O4 1.029* to 1.068* O5,O6,O7,O8
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix B Tables B1 through B7. Only significant coefficients 
are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B9. Determinants of Civil War Onset : Significant Coefficients from Individual Event Conditional (Fixed 
Effects) Logit Models, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Droughtt-2 -0.874* to -0.919* O3,O4 -0.908* O7
Extreme Coldt 0.975* O1 1.045* O5
Extreme Heatt-1 1.416* O4 1.582* O8
Stormt-2 0.369** O4 0.434** O8
Stormt-3 -0.517* O4 -0.732** O8
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix B Table B8. Only significant coefficients are 
presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table B10. Determinants of Civil War Onset : Significant Coefficients from All Events Conditional 
(Fixed Effects) Logit Models, 1945-1999 (n=2736)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
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C. Civil War Onset Estimated With Fixed Effects 
Linear Probability Model 
 
In appendix C I estimate equations (1) and (2) using the fixed effects linear probability 
econometric method. I also expand equations (1) by adding up to three lags of a given 
climate change related disaster event, as well as time fixed effects. Table C0 below 
relates estimated models to econometric specifications in the paper. Tables C1 through 
C7 provide estimates of models O1 through O8 for each disaster event. Table C8 
provides estimates of models O1 through O8 for all disaster events jointly. Table C1 
provides estimates for drought events; C2 for extreme cold temperature events; C3 for 
extreme heat events; C4 for epidemic outbreaks; C5 for flood events; C6 for storm events; 
and C7 for wildfire events.  
Table C0. Description of Appendix C Tables 
Model Lags on a disaster variable Equivalence to equations in the paper 
O1 0 Equation (1) 
O2 1 Equation (1)+Disastert-1 
O3 2 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2 
O4 3 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2+ Disastert-3 
O5 0 Equation (2)-Disastert-1-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
O6 1 Equation (2)-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
O7 2 Equation (2)-Disastert-3 
O8 3 Equation (2) 
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Droughtt -0.00355 -0.00447 -0.00393 -0.00395 -0.00584 -0.00628 -0.00576 -0.00580
(0.00593) (0.00622) (0.00622) (0.00622) (0.00604) (0.00632) (0.00633) (0.00633)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.00311 0.00694 0.00692 -- 0.00152 0.00481 0.00476
(0.00634) (0.00663) (0.00663) (0.00646) (0.00673) (0.00674)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.0129** -0.0131* -- -- -0.0114* -0.0118*
(0.00647) (0.00676) (0.00659) (0.00687)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.000776 -- -- -- 0.00129
(0.00660) (0.00673)
Prior war -0.0725*** -0.0725*** -0.0722*** -0.0722*** -0.0731*** -0.0732*** -0.0730*** -0.0730***
(0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000526 -0.000531 -0.000509 -0.000510 -0.00131 -0.00131 -0.00134 -0.00134
(0.000829) (0.000829) (0.000829) (0.000829) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114)
log(Population Density) 0.0183*** 0.0181*** 0.0191*** 0.0190*** 0.00466 0.00466 0.00468 0.00467
(0.00601) (0.00603) (0.00605) (0.00607) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
log(% mountains) 0.00942 0.00942 0.00958 0.00957 0.0113 0.0112 0.0115 0.0115
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0778** -0.0779** -0.0775** -0.0775** -0.0650* -0.0651* -0.0641* -0.0642*
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359)
1(Oil producer) 0.0129 0.0129 0.0129 0.0129 0.0106 0.0106 0.0104 0.0105
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0634*** 0.0635*** 0.0631*** 0.0631*** 0.0617*** 0.0618*** 0.0616*** 0.0616***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0131*** 0.0131** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121**
(0.00509) (0.00510) (0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000292 0.000292 0.000301 0.000300 0.000328 0.000328 0.000340 0.000339
(0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000447) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448)
1(Anocracy) 0.0171*** 0.0172*** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0167*** 0.0167*** 0.0166*** 0.0166***
(0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00493) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497)
Constant 0.122** 0.121** 0.124** 0.124** 0.0729 0.0731 0.0716 0.0717
(0.0484) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.071
Table C1. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Extreme Coldt 0.0408*** 0.0379*** 0.0374*** 0.0378*** 0.0401*** 0.0377*** 0.0372*** 0.0375***
(0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.0160 0.0144 0.0147 -- 0.0137 0.0124 0.0126
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0136)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.0102 0.0118 -- -- 0.00906 0.0105
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.0125 -- -- -- -0.0115
(0.0149) (0.0150)
Prior war -0.0732*** -0.0734*** -0.0735*** -0.0735*** -0.0737*** -0.0738*** -0.0739*** -0.0739***
(0.00674) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000656 -0.000692 -0.000715 -0.000691 -0.00117 -0.00114 -0.00113 -0.00113
(0.000829) (0.000829) (0.000830) (0.000831) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114)
log(Population Density) 0.0171*** 0.0168*** 0.0167*** 0.0169*** 0.00754 0.00823 0.00851 0.00831
(0.00597) (0.00598) (0.00598) (0.00598) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130)
log(% mountains) 0.00794 0.00747 0.00717 0.00756 0.00904 0.00847 0.00813 0.00856
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0766** -0.0762** -0.0760** -0.0763** -0.0668* -0.0671* -0.0672* -0.0672*
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358)
1(Oil producer) 0.0128 0.0127 0.0127 0.0126 0.0105 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0637*** 0.0637*** 0.0637*** 0.0637*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0134*** 0.0135*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 0.0123** 0.0124** 0.0125** 0.0124**
(0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00512) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000202 0.000175 0.000165 0.000178 0.000273 0.000262 0.000260 0.000265
(0.000423) (0.000424) (0.000424) (0.000424) (0.000447) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448)
1(Anocracy) 0.0170*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166***
(0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496)
Constant 0.118** 0.117** 0.117** 0.117** 0.0889 0.0926 0.0942 0.0930
(0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0766) (0.0767) (0.0767) (0.0767)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C2. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Extreme Heatt -0.0263* -0.0292* -0.0281* -0.0290* -0.0246 -0.0277* -0.0266* -0.0273*
(0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.0266* 0.0239 0.0254 -- 0.0284* 0.0256 0.0271*
(0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.0249 0.0210 -- -- 0.0249 0.0212
(0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 0.0292* -- -- -- 0.0278
(0.0169) (0.0170)
Prior war -0.0724*** -0.0725*** -0.0727*** -0.0729*** -0.0731*** -0.0732*** -0.0735*** -0.0736***
(0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000471 -0.000536 -0.000588 -0.000658 -0.00129 -0.00130 -0.00131 -0.00133
(0.000830) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000832) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114)
log(Population Density) 0.0181*** 0.0179*** 0.0178*** 0.0175*** 0.00393 0.00462 0.00509 0.00563
(0.00597) (0.00597) (0.00597) (0.00597) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
log(% mountains) 0.0117 0.00982 0.00809 0.00616 0.0134 0.0113 0.00941 0.00743
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0111)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0823** -0.0792** -0.0760** -0.0736** -0.0691* -0.0664* -0.0636* -0.0618*
(0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360)
1(Oil producer) 0.0132 0.0131 0.0132 0.0136 0.0109 0.0109 0.0110 0.0112
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0636*** 0.0635*** 0.0635*** 0.0634*** 0.0623*** 0.0621*** 0.0619*** 0.0618***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0134*** 0.0134*** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0123** 0.0123**
(0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000306 0.000293 0.000278 0.000269 0.000325 0.000323 0.000315 0.000317
(0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000423) (0.000422) (0.000447) (0.000447) (0.000447) (0.000447)
1(Anocracy) 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0169*** 0.0169***
(0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00491) (0.00497) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496)
Constant 0.124** 0.122** 0.119** 0.116** 0.0728 0.0742 0.0745 0.0760
(0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.072
Table C3. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Epidemict 0.00757* 0.00708 0.00720 0.00730 0.00806* 0.00785* 0.00793* 0.00804*
(0.00443) (0.00456) (0.00458) (0.00459) (0.00461) (0.00471) (0.00472) (0.00473)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.00222 0.00250 0.00266 -- 0.00110 0.00128 0.00144
(0.00502) (0.00511) (0.00512) (0.00515) (0.00523) (0.00524)
Epidemict-2 -- -- -0.00159 -0.00108 -- -- -0.00116 -0.000729
(0.00557) (0.00562) (0.00570) (0.00575)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.00383 -- -- -- -0.00380
(0.00603) (0.00616)
Prior war -0.0729*** -0.0730*** -0.0729*** -0.0728*** -0.0737*** -0.0737*** -0.0737*** -0.0736***
(0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00681) (0.00681) (0.00681)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000489 -0.000479 -0.000483 -0.000494 -0.00120 -0.00119 -0.00120 -0.00123
(0.000829) (0.000830) (0.000830) (0.000830) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115)
log(Population Density) 0.0157** 0.0152** 0.0155** 0.0160** 0.00303 0.00286 0.00296 0.00322
(0.00611) (0.00619) (0.00625) (0.00630) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130)
log(% mountains) 0.00872 0.00859 0.00866 0.00883 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0105
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0777** -0.0777** -0.0777** -0.0776** -0.0658* -0.0658* -0.0657* -0.0654*
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0359)
1(Oil producer) 0.0132 0.0133 0.0132 0.0131 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0106
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0622*** 0.0623*** 0.0623*** 0.0623***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0120** 0.0120** 0.0120** 0.0119**
(0.00509) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000269 0.000265 0.000265 0.000265 0.000340 0.000340 0.000338 0.000332
(0.000423) (0.000423) (0.000423) (0.000423) (0.000447) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448)
1(Anocracy) 0.0168*** 0.0167*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0166***
(0.00492) (0.00493) (0.00493) (0.00493) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497)
Constant 0.113** 0.112** 0.112** 0.114** 0.0683 0.0678 0.0680 0.0685
(0.0485) (0.0486) (0.0487) (0.0488) (0.0765) (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0766)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C4. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency Epidemic Outbreaks, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Floodt -0.00202 -0.00175 -0.00161 -0.00173 -0.00199 -0.00163 -0.00153 -0.00164
(0.00254) (0.00261) (0.00264) (0.00267) (0.00258) (0.00264) (0.00267) (0.00270)
Floodt-1 -- -0.00114 -0.000936 -0.00106 -- -0.00167 -0.00152 -0.00164
(0.00271) (0.00277) (0.00280) (0.00274) (0.00280) (0.00283)
Floodt-2 -- -- -0.000952 -0.00112 -- -- -0.000689 -0.000845
(0.00284) (0.00289) (0.00287) (0.00292)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.000901 -- -- -- 0.000901
(0.00295) (0.00298)
Prior war -0.0722*** -0.0721*** -0.0720*** -0.0720*** -0.0730*** -0.0728*** -0.0727*** -0.0728***
(0.00676) (0.00677) (0.00678) (0.00678) (0.00681) (0.00682) (0.00682) (0.00683)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000493 -0.000470 -0.000458 -0.000465 -0.00132 -0.00132 -0.00133 -0.00132
(0.000831) (0.000833) (0.000834) (0.000834) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00115)
log(Population Density) 0.0190*** 0.0194*** 0.0197*** 0.0195*** 0.00462 0.00458 0.00457 0.00457
(0.00612) (0.00620) (0.00626) (0.00630) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
log(% mountains) 0.0105 0.0110 0.0112 0.0110 0.0124 0.0132 0.0134 0.0132
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0787** -0.0791** -0.0793** -0.0791** -0.0657* -0.0658* -0.0658* -0.0658*
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359)
1(Oil producer) 0.0129 0.0128 0.0127 0.0127 0.0107 0.0106 0.0105 0.0106
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0637*** 0.0637*** 0.0637*** 0.0637*** 0.0623*** 0.0624*** 0.0624*** 0.0624***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0131** 0.0131*** 0.0131** 0.0131** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121**
(0.00509) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000306 0.000309 0.000312 0.000311 0.000323 0.000319 0.000318 0.000320
(0.000423) (0.000423) (0.000423) (0.000423) (0.000447) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448)
1(Anocracy) 0.0171*** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0167*** 0.0166*** 0.0165*** 0.0166***
(0.00492) (0.00493) (0.00493) (0.00493) (0.00497) (0.00498) (0.00498) (0.00498)
Constant 0.124** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.126** 0.0725 0.0718 0.0715 0.0718
(0.0486) (0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070
Table C5. Determinant of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Stormt -0.000902 -0.00127 -0.00185 -0.000987 -0.00103 -0.00124 -0.00181 -0.000932
(0.00189) (0.00225) (0.00231) (0.00239) (0.00191) (0.00226) (0.00233) (0.00240)
Stormt-1 -- 0.000699 -0.000350 0.000102 -- 0.000407 -0.000637 -0.000181
(0.00229) (0.00248) (0.00250) (0.00230) (0.00250) (0.00252)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.00261 0.00378 -- -- 0.00259 0.00380
(0.00240) (0.00254) (0.00242) (0.00256)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.00367 -- -- -- -0.00376
(0.00255) (0.00257)
Prior war -0.0725*** -0.0725*** -0.0726*** -0.0725*** -0.0732*** -0.0732*** -0.0733*** -0.0732***
(0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00681) (0.00681) (0.00681)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000474 -0.000496 -0.000554 -0.000490 -0.00124 -0.00125 -0.00129 -0.00126
(0.000840) (0.000844) (0.000845) (0.000846) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115)
log(GDP/capita, lagged) 0.0182*** 0.0181*** 0.0178*** 0.0182*** 0.00452 0.00452 0.00459 0.00446
(0.00600) (0.00601) (0.00602) (0.00602) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
log(Population Density) 0.0110 0.0105 0.00917 0.0103 0.0130 0.0127 0.0113 0.0126
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0780** -0.0780** -0.0780** -0.0776** -0.0654* -0.0654* -0.0656* -0.0650*
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359)
1(Oil producer) 0.0128 0.0129 0.0129 0.0128 0.0106 0.0106 0.0107 0.0105
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0636*** 0.0636*** 0.0636*** 0.0636*** 0.0621*** 0.0621*** 0.0621*** 0.0623***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121**
(0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000292 0.000291 0.000288 0.000286 0.000319 0.000319 0.000324 0.000308
(0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000422) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448)
1(Anocracy) 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0173*** 0.0172*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0169*** 0.0168***
(0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497)
Constant 0.121** 0.121** 0.120** 0.121** 0.0726 0.0727 0.0735 0.0720
(0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.071
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C6. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Wildfiret 0.0143 0.0147 0.0135 0.0139 0.0147 0.0148 0.0137 0.0140
(0.00909) (0.00929) (0.00946) (0.00953) (0.00921) (0.00940) (0.00956) (0.00963)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.00208 -0.00282 -0.00239 -- -0.000938 -0.00170 -0.00135
(0.00983) (0.00990) (0.00997) (0.00992) (0.00999) (0.0101)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.00698 0.00725 -- -- 0.00735 0.00756
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0109)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -0.00398 -- -- -- -0.00323
(0.0114) (0.0115)
Prior war -0.0726*** -0.0726*** -0.0726*** -0.0726*** -0.0732*** -0.0732*** -0.0732*** -0.0732***
(0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00680)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.000711 -0.000694 -0.000738 -0.000717 -0.00139 -0.00138 -0.00141 -0.00140
(0.000836) (0.000840) (0.000842) (0.000845) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115)
log(GDP/capita, lagged) 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0173*** 0.0174*** 0.00540 0.00537 0.00557 0.00551
(0.00598) (0.00599) (0.00599) (0.00599) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
log(Population Density) 0.00797 0.00812 0.00781 0.00795 0.00943 0.00950 0.00912 0.00925
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.0780** -0.0779** -0.0780** -0.0779** -0.0665* -0.0665* -0.0667* -0.0666*
(0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359)
1(Oil producer) 0.0132 0.0131 0.0132 0.0132 0.0109 0.0109 0.0110 0.0109
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
1(New State) 0.0635*** 0.0635*** 0.0635*** 0.0635*** 0.0618*** 0.0618*** 0.0618*** 0.0618***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
1(Instability) 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0133*** 0.0132*** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121** 0.0121**
(0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00513)
1(PolityIV) 0.000249 0.000253 0.000244 0.000250 0.000302 0.000303 0.000298 0.000301
(0.000423) (0.000424) (0.000424) (0.000424) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448) (0.000448)
1(Anocracy) 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0169*** 0.0169***
(0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00492) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497) (0.00497)
Constant 0.120** 0.120** 0.120** 0.120** 0.0793 0.0791 0.0806 0.0801
(0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0767)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C7. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
Droughtt -0.00388 -0.00451 -0.00414 -0.00407 -0.00609 -0.00625 -0.00592 -0.00576
(0.00594) (0.00623) (0.00625) (0.00626) (0.00606) (0.00634) (0.00635) (0.00636)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.00250 0.00662 0.00672 -- 0.000749 0.00432 0.00446
(0.00636) (0.00665) (0.00667) (0.00648) (0.00676) (0.00677)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.0132** -0.0131* -- -- -0.0120* -0.0120*
(0.00651) (0.00680) (0.00663) (0.00691)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- -0.000899 -- -- -- -0.000714
(0.00666) (0.00679)
Extreme Coldt 0.0415*** 0.0392*** 0.0373*** 0.0366*** 0.0409*** 0.0391*** 0.0371*** 0.0364***
(0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0133)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.0149 0.0123 0.0115 -- 0.0125 0.00995 0.00919
(0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0138)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.0140 0.0169 -- -- 0.0128 0.0156
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.00820 -- -- -- -0.00757
(0.0152) (0.0153)
Extreme Heatt -0.0297* -0.0315** -0.0285* -0.0280* -0.0277* -0.0296* -0.0271* -0.0269*
(0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.0244 0.0215 0.0243 -- 0.0269* 0.0239 0.0266
(0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0167)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.0236 0.0227 -- -- 0.0244 0.0236
(0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0174)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 0.0252 -- -- -- 0.0249
(0.0174) (0.0175)
Epidemict 0.00729 0.00686 0.00695 0.00698 0.00789* 0.00781* 0.00806* 0.00817*
(0.00446) (0.00460) (0.00461) (0.00462) (0.00463) (0.00473) (0.00475) (0.00476)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.00206 0.00293 0.00291 -- 0.000983 0.00185 0.00196
(0.00505) (0.00514) (0.00515) (0.00518) (0.00526) (0.00526)
Epidemict-2 -- -- -0.00369 -0.00291 -- -- -0.00328 -0.00258
(0.00562) (0.00567) (0.00575) (0.00580)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.00534 -- -- -- -0.00548
(0.00612) (0.00625)
Floodt -0.00248 -0.00262 -0.00277 -0.00234 -0.00221 -0.00217 -0.00234 -0.00194
(0.00265) (0.00272) (0.00275) (0.00278) (0.00268) (0.00275) (0.00277) (0.00280)
Floodt-1 -- -0.00256 -0.00298 -0.00259 -- -0.00284 -0.00326 -0.00289
(0.00285) (0.00291) (0.00292) (0.00288) (0.00293) (0.00295)
Floodt-2 -- -- -0.00131 -0.000719 -- -- -0.000867 -0.000311
(0.00298) (0.00302) (0.00300) (0.00304)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- -0.000464 -- -- -- -0.000223
(0.00306) (0.00308)
Stormt -0.00121 -0.00125 -0.00201 -0.000973 -0.00134 -0.00120 -0.00203 -0.000961
(0.00202) (0.00233) (0.00242) (0.00249) (0.00203) (0.00235) (0.00244) (0.00250)
Stormt-1 -- 0.000408 -0.000270 -0.000413 -- 7.22e-05 -0.000645 -0.000799
(0.00239) (0.00256) (0.00262) (0.00240) (0.00258) (0.00264)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.00264 0.00408 -- -- 0.00260 0.00404
(0.00249) (0.00262) (0.00250) (0.00264)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.00427 -- -- -- -0.00439*
(0.00261) (0.00263)
Wildfiret 0.0152 0.0152 0.0144 0.0157 0.0161* 0.0163* 0.0153 0.0166*
(0.00938) (0.00971) (0.00983) (0.00993) (0.00947) (0.00979) (0.00991) (0.0100)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.000555 -0.00153 -0.000731 -- 0.00123 3.62e-05 0.000741
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.00546 0.00733 -- -- 0.00580 0.00755
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -0.00489 -- -- -- -0.00441
(0.0116) (0.0117)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.068 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.076
Table C8. Determinants of Civil War Onset Controling for Frequency of All Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models that include the full set of control variables (same as in Tables ). Standard errors in 
parentheses. Control variable estimates are not displayed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Droughtt-2 -0.0129** to -0.0131* O3,O4 -0.0114** to -0.0118* O7,O8
Extreme Coldt 0.0374*** to 0.0408*** O1,O2,O3,O4 0.0372*** to 0.0401*** O5,O6,O7,O8
Extreme Heatt -0.0263* to -0.0292* O1,O2,O3,O4 -0.0266* to -0.0277* O6,O7,O8
Extreme Heatt-1 0.0266* O2 0.0284* O6
Extreme Heatt-3 0.0292* O4 -- --
Epidemict 0.00757* O1 0.00785* to 0.00806* O5,O6,O7,O8
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix C Tables C1 through C7. Only significant coefficients 
are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C9. Determinants of Civil War Onset : Significant Coefficients from Individual Event Fixed Effects Linear 
Probabilty Models, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Droughtt-2 -0.0131** to -0.0132* O3,O4 -0.0120* O7,O8
Extreme Coldt 0.0366*** to 0.0415*** O1,O2,O3,O4 0.0364*** to 0.0409*** O5,O6,O7,O8
Extreme Heatt -0.0280* to -0.0315* O1,O2,O3,O4 -0.0269* to -0.0296* O5,O6,O7,O8
Extreme Heatt-1 -- -- 0.0269* O6
Epidemict -- -- 0.00781* to 0.00817* O5,O6,O7,O8
Stormt-3 -- -- -0.00439* O8
Wildfiret -- -- 0.0161* to 0.0166* O5,O6,O8
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix C Table C8. Only significant coefficients are presented. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C10. Determinants of Civil War Onset : Significant Coefficients from All Events Fixed Effects Linear 
Probabilty Models, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
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D. Civil War Incidence Estimated With Panel Logit 
Model 
 
 
In appendix D I estimate equations (3) and (4) using the panel logit econometric method. 
I also expand equation (3) by adding up to three lags of a given climate change related 
disaster event, as well as time fixed effects. Table D0 below relates estimated models to 
econometric specifications in the paper. Tables D1 through D7 provide estimates of 
models P1 through P8 for each disaster event. Table 8 provides estimates of models P1 
through P8 for all disaster events jointly. Table D1 provides estimates for drought events; 
D2 for extreme cold temperature events; D3 for extreme heat events; D4 for epidemic 
outbreaks; D5 for flood events; D6 for storm events; and D7 for wildfire events.  
Table D0. Description of Appendix D Tables 
Model Lags on a disaster variable Equivalence to equations in the paper 
P1 0 Equation (1) 
P2 1 Equation (1)+Disastert-1 
P3 2 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2 
P4 3 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2+ Disastert-3 
P5 0 Equation (2)-Disastert-1-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
P6 1 Equation (2)-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
P7 2 Equation (2)-Disastert-3 
P8 3 Equation (2) 
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Droughtt 0.160 0.0984 0.0976 0.0944 -0.0460 -0.0369 -0.0294 -0.0279
(0.172) (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.180) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Droughtt-1 0.202 0.194 0.190 -0.0322 0.0140 0.0160
(0.185) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.202) (0.202)
Droughtt-2 0.0328 -0.00280 -0.161 -0.141
(0.189) (0.198) (0.197) (0.206)
Droughtt-3 0.119 -0.0658
(0.192) (0.200)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0306 0.0310 0.0313 0.0316 -0.353*** -0.353*** -0.357*** -0.358***
(0.0561) (0.0565) (0.0565) (0.0563) (0.0696) (0.0698) (0.0701) (0.0702)
log(Population Density) 2.797*** 2.790*** 2.775*** 2.753*** -0.00822 -0.00932 -0.0132 -0.0148
(0.213) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231)
log(% mountains) 1.488*** 1.568*** 1.532*** 1.511*** 0.927*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926***
(0.319) (0.326) (0.332) (0.330) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.237*** -3.278*** -3.254*** -3.237*** -0.137 -0.133 -0.117 -0.110
(0.735) (0.764) (0.747) (0.740) (0.655) (0.655) (0.656) (0.656)
1(Oil producer) -0.717 -0.738 -0.733 -0.729 -1.194** -1.194** -1.199** -1.201**
(0.453) (0.460) (0.455) (0.453) (0.489) (0.489) (0.490) (0.490)
1(New State) 0.235 0.249 0.246 0.248 0.610 0.609 0.608 0.607
(0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.412) (0.412) (0.412) (0.412)
1(Instability) 1.161*** 1.162*** 1.161*** 1.162*** 1.176*** 1.176*** 1.177*** 1.176***
(0.143) (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0201 0.0207 0.0208 0.0211 0.0143 0.0142 0.0138 0.0137
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
1(Anocracy) 0.990*** 0.998*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 1.092*** 1.091*** 1.089*** 1.088***
(0.151) (0.152) (0.151) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.159) (0.159)
Constant -1.922** -2.582*** -2.325** -2.219** -10.51*** -10.51*** -10.53*** -10.53***
(0.970) (0.988) (1.000) (0.997) (1.999) (2.000) (2.000) (2.000)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table D1. Determinant of Civil War Incidence Controling Frequency for Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Extreme Coldt 1.159*** 1.007** 0.950** 0.940** 0.625 0.564 0.529 0.528
(0.434) (0.447) (0.451) (0.450) (0.420) (0.429) (0.430) (0.431)
Extreme Coldt-1 0.775* 0.674 0.655 0.398 0.332 0.329
(0.470) (0.475) (0.476) (0.451) (0.459) (0.462)
Extreme Coldt-2 0.765 0.741 0.525 0.522
(0.504) (0.506) (0.490) (0.493)
Extreme Coldt-3 0.280 0.0314
(0.581) (0.583)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0187 0.0119 0.00567 0.00510 -0.354*** -0.356*** -0.360*** -0.360***
(0.0573) (0.0578) (0.0581) (0.0580) (0.0697) (0.0699) (0.0701) (0.0701)
log(Population Density) 2.825*** 2.814*** 2.791*** 2.780*** 0.0224 0.0326 0.0434 0.0437
(0.214) (0.215) (0.214) (0.213) (0.231) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
log(% mountains) 1.551*** 1.558*** 1.515*** 1.486*** 0.922*** 0.919*** 0.916*** 0.916***
(0.326) (0.327) (0.330) (0.327) (0.244) (0.243) (0.243) (0.243)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.252*** -3.233*** -3.180*** -3.154*** -0.150 -0.148 -0.142 -0.142
(0.759) (0.766) (0.748) (0.739) (0.655) (0.655) (0.655) (0.655)
1(Oil producer) -0.878* -0.922* -0.945** -0.954** -1.249** -1.264** -1.278** -1.280**
(0.475) (0.482) (0.480) (0.480) (0.498) (0.501) (0.503) (0.503)
1(New State) 0.255 0.268 0.270 0.269 0.623 0.630 0.633 0.633
(0.384) (0.384) (0.383) (0.383) (0.411) (0.410) (0.410) (0.410)
1(Instability) 1.167*** 1.174*** 1.179*** 1.181*** 1.179*** 1.184*** 1.189*** 1.189***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0154 0.0135 0.0122 0.0118 0.0131 0.0127 0.0123 0.0122
(0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
1(Anocracy) 0.976*** 0.970*** 0.962*** 0.960*** 1.086*** 1.082*** 1.080*** 1.080***
(0.152) (0.152) (0.151) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Constant -2.311** -2.423** -2.131** -1.930* -10.35*** -10.28*** -10.21*** -10.21***
(0.983) (0.985) (0.992) (0.986) (1.994) (1.992) (1.989) (1.989)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table D2. Determinant of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Extreme Heatt 0.707 0.707 0.693 0.625 0.742 0.716 0.672 0.583
(0.567) (0.566) (0.565) (0.579) (0.578) (0.577) (0.575) (0.593)
Extreme Heatt-1 1.029* 1.008* 1.025* 1.053* 1.003* 1.027*
(0.555) (0.558) (0.556) (0.564) (0.564) (0.565)
Extreme Heatt-2 1.543*** 1.526*** 1.564*** 1.511***
(0.563) (0.568) (0.567) (0.566)
Extreme Heatt-3 1.265** 1.193**
(0.595) (0.607)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0264 0.0210 0.0145 0.00857 -0.355*** -0.361*** -0.368*** -0.373***
(0.0564) (0.0566) (0.0568) (0.0573) (0.0695) (0.0695) (0.0697) (0.0698)
log(Population Density) 2.834*** 2.833*** 2.839*** 2.859*** -0.00141 0.0109 0.0294 0.0447
(0.213) (0.213) (0.214) (0.218) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
log(% mountains) 1.527*** 1.498*** 1.489*** 1.535*** 0.917*** 0.905*** 0.893*** 0.888***
(0.320) (0.326) (0.326) (0.326) (0.244) (0.243) (0.244) (0.245)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.158*** -3.013*** -2.874*** -2.822*** -0.0338 0.0864 0.213 0.272
(0.756) (0.751) (0.755) (0.774) (0.657) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658)
1(Oil producer) -0.735 -0.744 -0.767* -0.788* -1.193** -1.201** -1.208** -1.212**
(0.459) (0.456) (0.459) (0.465) (0.489) (0.491) (0.494) (0.497)
1(New State) 0.229 0.235 0.249 0.259 0.613 0.617 0.618 0.626
(0.385) (0.385) (0.386) (0.386) (0.411) (0.411) (0.412) (0.413)
1(Instability) 1.159*** 1.164*** 1.184*** 1.191*** 1.176*** 1.181*** 1.201*** 1.208***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0183 0.0165 0.0133 0.0120 0.0131 0.0115 0.00888 0.00791
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0153)
1(Anocracy) 0.992*** 0.997*** 1.011*** 1.023*** 1.101*** 1.109*** 1.122*** 1.130***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.158) (0.158) (0.159) (0.159)
Constant -2.116** -1.979** -1.956** -2.262** -10.47*** -10.40*** -10.34*** -10.28***
(0.970) (0.980) (0.981) (0.983) (1.998) (1.998) (2.000) (1.999)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table D3. Determinant of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Epidemict 0.127 0.103 0.105 0.102 0.0782 0.0706 0.0719 0.0733
(0.126) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) (0.132) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134)
Epidemict-1 0.144 0.115 0.117 0.0634 0.0490 0.0486
(0.146) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151) (0.151)
Epidemict-2 0.238 0.232 0.128 0.131
(0.164) (0.166) (0.169) (0.170)
Epidemict-3 0.0576 -0.0243
(0.172) (0.180)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0327 0.0345 0.0356 0.0359 -0.347*** -0.344*** -0.341*** -0.341***
(0.0564) (0.0563) (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0696) (0.0698) (0.0698) (0.0699)
log(Population Density) 2.785*** 2.742*** 2.686*** 2.673*** -0.00955 -0.0114 -0.0125 -0.0117
(0.220) (0.222) (0.224) (0.226) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.231)
log(% mountains) 1.555*** 1.546*** 1.539*** 1.534*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.925***
(0.325) (0.324) (0.324) (0.323) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.246)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.265*** -3.249*** -3.246*** -3.243*** -0.152 -0.158 -0.176 -0.179
(0.757) (0.756) (0.755) (0.754) (0.654) (0.654) (0.654) (0.655)
1(Oil producer) -0.734 -0.727 -0.715 -0.714 -1.195** -1.193** -1.188** -1.189**
(0.461) (0.463) (0.466) (0.466) (0.490) (0.491) (0.492) (0.492)
1(New State) 0.239 0.249 0.263 0.264 0.615 0.617 0.618 0.619
(0.385) (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.411) (0.411) (0.410) (0.411)
1(Instability) 1.165*** 1.172*** 1.180*** 1.182*** 1.177*** 1.179*** 1.182*** 1.181***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0193 0.0187 0.0186 0.0186 0.0147 0.0147 0.0148 0.0147
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
1(Anocracy) 0.981*** 0.977*** 0.968*** 0.966*** 1.091*** 1.089*** 1.085*** 1.086***
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Constant -2.459** -2.536** -2.654*** -2.650*** -10.51*** -10.51*** -10.52*** -10.54***
(0.988) (0.990) (0.992) (0.993) (2.000) (2.001) (2.001) (2.004)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table D4. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Epidemic Outbreaks, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Floodt 0.218*** 0.169** 0.152* 0.131 0.108 0.0868 0.0764 0.0607
(0.0747) (0.0788) (0.0798) (0.0814) (0.0780) (0.0810) (0.0819) (0.0832)
Floodt-1 0.169** 0.139* 0.122 0.0832 0.0655 0.0528
(0.0804) (0.0834) (0.0839) (0.0834) (0.0860) (0.0866)
Floodt-2 0.130 0.0909 0.0782 0.0479
(0.0843) (0.0876) (0.0870) (0.0901)
Floodt-3 0.164* 0.131
(0.0898) (0.0936)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0207 0.0160 0.0133 0.0121 -0.348*** -0.346*** -0.345*** -0.342***
(0.0563) (0.0560) (0.0559) (0.0558) (0.0692) (0.0690) (0.0688) (0.0688)
log(Population Density) 2.638*** 2.555*** 2.489*** 2.434*** 0.00154 0.00618 0.00920 0.0109
(0.218) (0.218) (0.219) (0.221) (0.230) (0.229) (0.228) (0.227)
log(% mountains) 1.448*** 1.425*** 1.384*** 1.375*** 0.909*** 0.900*** 0.899*** 0.890***
(0.322) (0.306) (0.304) (0.300) (0.245) (0.244) (0.243) (0.241)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.069*** -2.997*** -2.922*** -2.887*** -0.136 -0.132 -0.131 -0.127
(0.731) (0.737) (0.728) (0.730) (0.651) (0.649) (0.647) (0.646)
1(Oil producer) -0.733 -0.744 -0.721 -0.703 -1.194** -1.190** -1.178** -1.165**
(0.460) (0.467) (0.467) (0.472) (0.492) (0.492) (0.493) (0.494)
1(New State) 0.218 0.225 0.229 0.233 0.595 0.590 0.589 0.591
(0.383) (0.381) (0.379) (0.378) (0.411) (0.410) (0.409) (0.408)
1(Instability) 1.157*** 1.149*** 1.151*** 1.155*** 1.174*** 1.168*** 1.168*** 1.170***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
PolityIV 0.0179 0.0173 0.0171 0.0168 0.0146 0.0149 0.0152 0.0156
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
1(Anocracy) 0.982*** 0.989*** 0.988*** 0.990*** 1.096*** 1.100*** 1.102*** 1.105***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Constant -2.168** -2.336** -2.276** -2.429*** -10.40*** -10.33*** -10.31*** -10.22***
(0.976) (0.945) (0.940) (0.933) (1.993) (1.989) (1.982) (1.979)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table D5. Determinant of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Stormt 0.142** 0.0859 0.0648 0.0517 0.0916 0.0475 0.0316 0.0193
(0.0695) (0.0836) (0.0863) (0.0918) (0.0729) (0.0859) (0.0888) (0.0945)
Stormt-1 0.111 0.0796 0.0744 0.0870 0.0632 0.0581
(0.0864) (0.0932) (0.0937) (0.0893) (0.0961) (0.0969)
Stormt-2 0.0817 0.0704 0.0624 0.0515
(0.0893) (0.0934) (0.0925) (0.0968)
Stormt-3 0.0405 0.0377
(0.0960) (0.100)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0143 0.00935 0.00745 0.00682 -0.358*** -0.361*** -0.362*** -0.362***
(0.0572) (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0694)
log(Population Density) 2.766*** 2.731*** 2.717*** 2.708*** -0.00400 -0.00358 -0.00434 -0.00434
(0.216) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.229)
log(% mountains) 1.548*** 1.501*** 1.495*** 1.476*** 0.918*** 0.914*** 0.913*** 0.913***
(0.327) (0.331) (0.329) (0.330) (0.244) (0.244) (0.243) (0.243)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.262*** -3.232*** -3.227*** -3.217*** -0.157 -0.167 -0.173 -0.178
(0.764) (0.748) (0.748) (0.741) (0.652) (0.652) (0.652) (0.652)
1(Oil producer) -0.710 -0.695 -0.691 -0.686 -1.167** -1.160** -1.159** -1.158**
(0.460) (0.455) (0.454) (0.452) (0.488) (0.488) (0.488) (0.487)
1(New State) 0.234 0.239 0.238 0.235 0.612 0.623 0.622 0.619
(0.384) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) (0.409) (0.409) (0.408) (0.408)
1(Instability) 1.158*** 1.158*** 1.158*** 1.158*** 1.173*** 1.174*** 1.173*** 1.173***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
PolityIV 0.0195 0.0194 0.0195 0.0196 0.0151 0.0153 0.0155 0.0157
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
1(Anocracy) 0.999*** 0.997*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.102*** 1.103*** 1.107*** 1.108***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Constant -2.531*** -2.289** -2.300** -2.176** -10.45*** -10.43*** -10.42*** -10.42***
(0.982) (0.988) (0.985) (0.985) (1.996) (1.996) (1.996) (1.996)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table D6. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Wildfiret 0.454 0.426 0.412 0.402 0.103 0.127 0.141 0.141
(0.349) (0.355) (0.357) (0.357) (0.367) (0.371) (0.372) (0.373)
Wildfiret-1 0.164 0.146 0.144 -0.188 -0.169 -0.169
(0.401) (0.404) (0.403) (0.412) (0.415) (0.415)
Wildfiret-2 0.156 0.127 -0.200 -0.199
(0.438) (0.440) (0.455) (0.457)
Wildfiret-3 0.259 -0.0135
(0.481) (0.506)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0264 0.0255 0.0248 0.0228 -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.351***
(0.0563) (0.0563) (0.0565) (0.0567) (0.0693) (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0695)
log(Population Density) 2.818*** 2.813*** 2.805*** 2.812*** -0.000678 -0.00687 -0.0124 -0.0126
(0.213) (0.213) (0.212) (0.214) (0.231) (0.231) (0.232) (0.232)
log(% mountains) 1.524*** 1.520*** 1.498*** 1.546*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.929***
(0.320) (0.319) (0.326) (0.325) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.274*** -3.273*** -3.261*** -3.290*** -0.151 -0.142 -0.134 -0.134
(0.751) (0.750) (0.741) (0.759) (0.655) (0.655) (0.655) (0.656)
1(Oil producer) -0.766* -0.773* -0.775* -0.784* -1.204** -1.194** -1.189** -1.189**
(0.463) (0.464) (0.462) (0.468) (0.492) (0.491) (0.490) (0.490)
1(New State) 0.231 0.231 0.230 0.235 0.611 0.614 0.617 0.617
(0.385) (0.385) (0.385) (0.385) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411)
1(Instability) 1.165*** 1.164*** 1.164*** 1.167*** 1.177*** 1.179*** 1.178*** 1.178***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
PolityIV 0.0174 0.0169 0.0167 0.0161 0.0140 0.0143 0.0146 0.0146
(0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
1(Anocracy) 0.985*** 0.985*** 0.983*** 0.987*** 1.093*** 1.094*** 1.095*** 1.095***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Constant -2.133** -2.123** -2.007** -2.348** -10.48*** -10.51*** -10.54*** -10.54***
(0.969) (0.968) (0.978) (0.980) (1.999) (2.002) (2.004) (2.005)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table D7. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Droughtt 0.0844 0.0485 0.0331 0.0212 -0.0888 -0.0597 -0.0823 -0.0990
(0.177) (0.187) (0.189) (0.190) (0.183) (0.193) (0.194) (0.195)
Droughtt-1 0.114 0.139 0.151 -0.0980 -0.00793 0.00511
(0.192) (0.203) (0.204) (0.199) (0.209) (0.210)
Droughtt-2 -0.0544 -0.0644 -0.248 -0.203
(0.197) (0.207) (0.205) (0.214)
Droughtt-3 0.0278 -0.159
(0.201) (0.209)
Extreme Coldt 0.951** 0.855* 0.876* 0.797* 0.549 0.599 0.649 0.559
(0.445) (0.470) (0.478) (0.482) (0.431) (0.455) (0.458) (0.467)
Extreme Coldt-1 0.469 0.490 0.500 0.214 0.304 0.330
(0.492) (0.509) (0.507) (0.476) (0.499) (0.490)
Extreme Coldt-2 0.403 0.428 0.318 0.382
(0.552) (0.560) (0.541) (0.553)
Extreme Coldt-3 -0.0350 -0.0946
(0.612) (0.623)
Extreme Heatt 0.535 0.489 0.483 0.522 0.689 0.670 0.690 0.700
(0.596) (0.615) (0.620) (0.637) (0.593) (0.607) (0.602) (0.629)
Extreme Heatt-1 0.929 0.879 0.860 1.060* 1.022* 1.043*
(0.583) (0.600) (0.600) (0.577) (0.594) (0.595)
Extreme Heatt-2 1.501** 1.489** 1.627*** 1.601***
(0.585) (0.602) (0.577) (0.593)
Extreme Heatt-3 1.181* 1.258**
(0.611) (0.610)
Epidemict 0.0740 0.0512 0.0554 0.0519 0.0698 0.0739 0.0885 0.101
(0.127) (0.131) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.137) (0.138)
Epidemict-1 0.116 0.101 0.105 0.0646 0.0776 0.0802
(0.147) (0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.155) (0.155)
Epidemict-2 0.193 0.193 0.125 0.140
(0.169) (0.172) (0.173) (0.176)
Epidemict-3 -0.00607 -0.0500
(0.182) (0.186)
Floodt 0.165** 0.123 0.122 0.106 0.0789 0.0620 0.0660 0.0515
(0.0799) (0.0830) (0.0839) (0.0850) (0.0821) (0.0848) (0.0856) (0.0866)
Floodt-1 0.108 0.0862 0.0900 0.0413 0.0330 0.0386
(0.0859) (0.0874) (0.0879) (0.0884) (0.0900) (0.0905)
Floodt-2 0.0878 0.0639 0.0431 0.0277
(0.0893) (0.0913) (0.0924) (0.0946)
Floodt-3 0.130 0.101
(0.0950) (0.0991)
Stormt 0.0690 0.0184 -0.0125 -0.0111 0.0608 0.0253 -0.00521 -0.00781
(0.0731) (0.0855) (0.0888) (0.0937) (0.0762) (0.0884) (0.0920) (0.0968)
Stormt-1 0.0362 0.0127 -0.00769 0.0484 0.0282 0.0150
(0.0891) (0.0959) (0.0970) (0.0927) (0.0995) (0.101)
Stormt-2 0.00990 0.00366 0.0215 0.0132
(0.0923) (0.0973) (0.0958) (0.101)
Stormt-3 -0.0160 0.000718
(0.0989) (0.104)
Wildfiret 0.238 0.167 0.0143 0.0128 0.0264 0.0238 -0.0819 -0.0540
(0.364) (0.378) (0.401) (0.409) (0.377) (0.387) (0.412) (0.420)
Wildfiret-1 -0.147 -0.179 -0.269 -0.342 -0.326 -0.406
(0.420) (0.436) (0.453) (0.424) (0.438) (0.455)
Wildfiret-2 -0.367 -0.393 -0.509 -0.515
(0.494) (0.500) (0.494) (0.504)
Wildfiret-3 -0.208 -0.396
(0.538) (0.541)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table D8. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of All Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models that include the full set of control variables (same as in Tables ). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Control variable estimates are not displayed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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E.  Civil War Incidence Estimated With 
Conditional (Fixed Effects) Logit Model 
 
 
In appendix E I estimate equations (3) and (4) using the conditional (fixed effects) logit 
econometric method. I also expand equation (3) by adding up to three lags of a given 
climate change related disaster event, as well as time fixed effects. Table E0 below 
relates estimated models to econometric specifications in the paper. Tables E1 through 
E7 provide estimates of models P1 through P8 for each disaster event. Table E8 provides 
estimates of models P1 through P8 for all disaster events jointly. Table E1 provides 
estimates for drought events; E2 for extreme cold temperature events; E3 for extreme 
heat events; E4 for epidemic outbreaks; E5 for flood events; E6 for storm events; and E7 
for wildfire events.  
 
Table E0. Description of Appendix E Tables 
Model Lags on a disaster variable Equivalence to equations in the paper 
P1 0 Equation (1) 
P2 1 Equation (1)+Disastert-1 
P3 2 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2 
P4 3 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2+ Disastert-3 
P5 0 Equation (2)-Disastert-1-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
P6 1 Equation (2)-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
P7 2 Equation (2)-Disastert-3 
P8 3 Equation (2) 
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Droughtt 0.0937 0.0486 0.0497 0.0478 -0.0334 -0.0311 -0.0246 -0.0234
(0.173) (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.181) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.154 0.161 0.159 -- -0.00826 0.0330 0.0346
(0.185) (0.193) (0.193) (0.195) (0.202) (0.202)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.0209 -0.0391 -- -- -0.146 -0.130
(0.188) (0.197) (0.197) (0.205)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.0596 -- -- -- -0.0552
(0.191) (0.200)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0813 0.0823 0.0822 0.0824 -0.231** -0.232** -0.237** -0.238**
(0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0958) (0.0962) (0.0966) (0.0968)
log(Population Density) 3.137*** 3.117*** 3.120*** 3.112*** 0.111 0.110 0.0886 0.0815
(0.234) (0.236) (0.237) (0.238) (0.627) (0.628) (0.629) (0.629)
1(Noncontiguous state) -4.090*** -4.091*** -4.091*** -4.090*** -2.083* -2.081* -2.052* -2.040*
(1.118) (1.117) (1.117) (1.117) (1.202) (1.203) (1.204) (1.205)
1(Oil producer) -1.074** -1.082** -1.082** -1.082** -1.680*** -1.680*** -1.687*** -1.690***
(0.480) (0.480) (0.480) (0.480) (0.552) (0.552) (0.553) (0.553)
1(New State) 0.340 0.345 0.345 0.346 0.606 0.606 0.607 0.607
(0.383) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) (0.421) (0.421) (0.422) (0.422)
1(Instability) 1.132*** 1.131*** 1.132*** 1.132*** 1.157*** 1.157*** 1.158*** 1.157***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0191 0.0197 0.0196 0.0198 0.0136 0.0136 0.0131 0.0130
(0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158)
1(Anocracy) 1.050*** 1.053*** 1.053*** 1.053*** 1.116*** 1.116*** 1.113*** 1.113***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.162)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E1. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling Frequency for Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Extreme Coldt 1.097** 0.955** 0.903** 0.895** 0.626 0.576 0.550 0.550
(0.442) (0.455) (0.457) (0.456) (0.439) (0.446) (0.446) (0.447)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.665 0.569 0.554 -- 0.330 0.271 0.269
(0.478) (0.481) (0.482) (0.463) (0.468) (0.471)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.672 0.652 -- -- 0.469 0.467
(0.516) (0.518) (0.501) (0.504)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- 0.217 -- -- -- 0.0249
(0.587) (0.598)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0706 0.0646 0.0587 0.0581 -0.217** -0.215** -0.214** -0.214**
(0.0655) (0.0659) (0.0663) (0.0664) (0.0962) (0.0964) (0.0966) (0.0967)
log(Population Density) 3.138*** 3.126*** 3.118*** 3.116*** 0.314 0.373 0.443 0.445
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.642) (0.648) (0.654) (0.656)
1(Noncontiguous state) -4.067*** -4.051*** -4.028*** -4.021*** -2.214* -2.249* -2.284* -2.285*
(1.118) (1.119) (1.119) (1.119) (1.205) (1.207) (1.208) (1.208)
1(Oil producer) -1.243** -1.285** -1.317*** -1.331*** -1.758*** -1.775*** -1.794*** -1.795***
(0.498) (0.503) (0.507) (0.509) (0.561) (0.563) (0.565) (0.566)
1(New State) 0.360 0.370 0.377 0.379 0.607 0.611 0.610 0.610
(0.383) (0.382) (0.382) (0.382) (0.420) (0.420) (0.420) (0.420)
1(Instability) 1.135*** 1.141*** 1.146*** 1.149*** 1.158*** 1.162*** 1.166*** 1.166***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0148 0.0132 0.0120 0.0116 0.0131 0.0129 0.0127 0.0126
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158)
1(Anocracy) 1.034*** 1.027*** 1.023*** 1.023*** 1.115*** 1.112*** 1.112*** 1.112***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E2. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Extreme Heatt 0.590 0.596 0.593 0.532 0.527 0.520 0.502 0.415
(0.571) (0.570) (0.569) (0.582) (0.587) (0.587) (0.584) (0.602)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.941* 0.926* 0.947* -- 0.891 0.872 0.908
(0.554) (0.557) (0.554) (0.568) (0.573) (0.572)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 1.470*** 1.459** -- -- 1.450** 1.421**
(0.566) (0.570) (0.579) (0.581)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 1.216** -- -- -- 1.121*
(0.593) (0.616)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0777 0.0724 0.0655 0.0596 -0.232** -0.232** -0.233** -0.231**
(0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0651) (0.0654) (0.0954) (0.0953) (0.0954) (0.0954)
log(Population Density) 3.153*** 3.159*** 3.167*** 3.179*** 0.136 0.195 0.282 0.363
(0.232) (0.233) (0.233) (0.234) (0.626) (0.628) (0.631) (0.634)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.974*** -3.816*** -3.648*** -3.547*** -1.990* -1.864 -1.709 -1.647
(1.124) (1.127) (1.127) (1.125) (1.206) (1.209) (1.211) (1.211)
1(Oil producer) -1.084** -1.097** -1.123** -1.143** -1.680*** -1.689*** -1.703*** -1.719***
(0.482) (0.482) (0.484) (0.486) (0.553) (0.555) (0.558) (0.560)
1(New State) 0.335 0.343 0.357 0.364 0.606 0.606 0.601 0.604
(0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.421) (0.421) (0.422) (0.422)
1(Instability) 1.129*** 1.133*** 1.153*** 1.160*** 1.156*** 1.160*** 1.179*** 1.187***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.145) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0177 0.0161 0.0131 0.0120 0.0129 0.0117 0.00946 0.00880
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160)
1(Anocracy) 1.051*** 1.057*** 1.070*** 1.080*** 1.123*** 1.130*** 1.144*** 1.153***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.155) (0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.162)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E3. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Epidemict 0.0541 0.0419 0.0441 0.0453 0.0767 0.0702 0.0730 0.0746
(0.127) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) (0.133) (0.134) (0.135) (0.135)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.0768 0.0578 0.0573 -- 0.0598 0.0462 0.0457
(0.146) (0.148) (0.148) (0.151) (0.153) (0.153)
Epidemict-2 -- -- 0.164 0.166 -- -- 0.130 0.133
(0.166) (0.167) (0.171) (0.172)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.0175 -- -- -- -0.0242
(0.172) (0.181)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0826 0.0839 0.0853 0.0851 -0.225** -0.222** -0.218** -0.218**
(0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0649) (0.0649) (0.0956) (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0959)
log(Population Density) 3.129*** 3.106*** 3.066*** 3.070*** 0.112 0.107 0.106 0.108
(0.239) (0.243) (0.246) (0.248) (0.625) (0.625) (0.624) (0.625)
1(Noncontiguous state) -4.089*** -4.086*** -4.101*** -4.100*** -2.101* -2.106* -2.137* -2.133*
(1.117) (1.117) (1.119) (1.119) (1.201) (1.201) (1.202) (1.203)
1(Oil producer) -1.079** -1.078** -1.075** -1.074** -1.688*** -1.688*** -1.686*** -1.685***
(0.481) (0.482) (0.485) (0.485) (0.554) (0.555) (0.556) (0.556)
1(New State) 0.338 0.343 0.352 0.351 0.608 0.610 0.611 0.610
(0.384) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) (0.421) (0.420) (0.420) (0.420)
1(Instability) 1.133*** 1.137*** 1.142*** 1.142*** 1.157*** 1.160*** 1.163*** 1.162***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0187 0.0185 0.0184 0.0183 0.0142 0.0142 0.0143 0.0143
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159)
1(Anocracy) 1.044*** 1.042*** 1.036*** 1.037*** 1.114*** 1.113*** 1.108*** 1.109***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table E4. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Epidemic Outbreaks, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Floodt 0.150** 0.115 0.103 0.0866 0.0804 0.0653 0.0578 0.0442
(0.0745) (0.0783) (0.0792) (0.0806) (0.0780) (0.0807) (0.0815) (0.0828)
Floodt-1 -- 0.121 0.101 0.0881 -- 0.0621 0.0492 0.0376
(0.0799) (0.0826) (0.0831) (0.0832) (0.0856) (0.0861)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.0841 0.0536 -- -- 0.0582 0.0303
(0.0837) (0.0868) (0.0866) (0.0897)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.125 -- -- -- 0.120
(0.0897) (0.0938)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0765 0.0744 0.0732 0.0734 -0.219** -0.213** -0.210** -0.202**
(0.0650) (0.0651) (0.0652) (0.0653) (0.0959) (0.0962) (0.0963) (0.0966)
log(Population Density) 3.026*** 2.964*** 2.926*** 2.882*** 0.191 0.233 0.258 0.301
(0.239) (0.242) (0.245) (0.247) (0.629) (0.632) (0.633) (0.634)
1(Noncontiguous state) -3.974*** -3.920*** -3.883*** -3.859*** -2.118* -2.134* -2.139* -2.169*
(1.117) (1.116) (1.116) (1.116) (1.201) (1.200) (1.199) (1.200)
1(Oil producer) -1.100** -1.115** -1.106** -1.098** -1.684*** -1.681*** -1.670*** -1.660***
(0.485) (0.487) (0.488) (0.490) (0.554) (0.554) (0.555) (0.555)
1(New State) 0.331 0.336 0.341 0.344 0.586 0.578 0.575 0.573
(0.382) (0.381) (0.380) (0.379) (0.421) (0.421) (0.420) (0.419)
1(Instability) 1.128*** 1.121*** 1.123*** 1.127*** 1.154*** 1.149*** 1.149*** 1.152***
(0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
PolityIV 0.0178 0.0174 0.0173 0.0171 0.0143 0.0148 0.0151 0.0157
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158)
1(Anocracy) 1.046*** 1.051*** 1.050*** 1.051*** 1.120*** 1.124*** 1.125*** 1.130***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E5. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Stormt 0.108 0.0625 0.0452 0.0357 0.0731 0.0340 0.0194 0.00696
(0.0723) (0.0851) (0.0879) (0.0939) (0.0750) (0.0877) (0.0905) (0.0967)
Stormt-1 -- 0.0886 0.0642 0.0604 -- 0.0783 0.0570 0.0521
(0.0890) (0.0953) (0.0959) (0.0923) (0.0990) (0.0996)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.0651 0.0573 -- -- 0.0565 0.0460
(0.0914) (0.0953) (0.0947) (0.0991)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- 0.0279 -- -- -- 0.0370
(0.0979) (0.103)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0700 0.0663 0.0649 0.0644 -0.230** -0.231** -0.230** -0.230**
(0.0653) (0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0954) (0.0955) (0.0955) (0.0955)
log(Population Density) 3.092*** 3.071*** 3.060*** 3.058*** 0.167 0.187 0.194 0.198
(0.235) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.626) (0.626) (0.626) (0.626)
1(Noncontiguous state) -4.068*** -4.059*** -4.054*** -4.055*** -2.131* -2.147* -2.154* -2.161*
(1.118) (1.118) (1.117) (1.117) (1.201) (1.201) (1.201) (1.201)
1(Oil producer) -1.063** -1.056** -1.052** -1.051** -1.658*** -1.650*** -1.650*** -1.649***
(0.480) (0.479) (0.479) (0.479) (0.551) (0.550) (0.550) (0.550)
1(New State) 0.337 0.344 0.343 0.342 0.602 0.611 0.608 0.605
(0.382) (0.382) (0.382) (0.382) (0.419) (0.419) (0.418) (0.418)
1(Instability) 1.128*** 1.129*** 1.128*** 1.128*** 1.155*** 1.155*** 1.154*** 1.154***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
PolityIV 0.0189 0.0188 0.0189 0.0190 0.0146 0.0149 0.0151 0.0154
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159)
1(Anocracy) 1.053*** 1.053*** 1.055*** 1.056*** 1.125*** 1.127*** 1.130*** 1.132***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table E6. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Wildfiret 0.374 0.360 0.351 0.345 0.138 0.156 0.166 0.166
(0.352) (0.356) (0.358) (0.358) (0.369) (0.372) (0.373) (0.373)
Wildfiret-1 -- 0.0917 0.0796 0.0805 -- -0.169 -0.155 -0.156
(0.403) (0.405) (0.405) (0.408) (0.411) (0.411)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.110 0.0901 -- -- -0.172 -0.171
(0.441) (0.442) (0.454) (0.456)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- 0.190 -- -- -- -0.0150
(0.484) (0.503)
GDP/capita, lagged 0.0787 0.0784 0.0780 0.0769 -0.226** -0.229** -0.231** -0.231**
(0.0648) (0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0650) (0.0959) (0.0963) (0.0966) (0.0966)
log(Population Density) 3.138*** 3.135*** 3.133*** 3.130*** 0.164 0.130 0.102 0.100
(0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.636) (0.642) (0.646) (0.648)
1(Noncontiguous state) -4.096*** -4.096*** -4.096*** -4.097*** -2.128* -2.100* -2.079* -2.077*
(1.118) (1.117) (1.117) (1.117) (1.205) (1.206) (1.208) (1.209)
1(Oil producer) -1.116** -1.121** -1.126** -1.130** -1.699*** -1.686*** -1.679*** -1.679***
(0.485) (0.486) (0.487) (0.488) (0.556) (0.555) (0.555) (0.555)
1(New State) 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.602 0.608 0.612 0.613
(0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.383) (0.421) (0.421) (0.422) (0.422)
1(Instability) 1.134*** 1.134*** 1.134*** 1.136*** 1.158*** 1.160*** 1.159*** 1.159***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
PolityIV 0.0169 0.0166 0.0164 0.0160 0.0134 0.0136 0.0137 0.0138
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159)
1(Anocracy) 1.046*** 1.046*** 1.045*** 1.046*** 1.118*** 1.117*** 1.118*** 1.118***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E7. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Note: All regressions are conditional (fixed effects) logit models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Droughtt 0.0345 0.0127 -0.00364 -0.0155 -0.0627 -0.0426 -0.0699 -0.0853
(0.177) (0.186) (0.189) (0.189) (0.184) (0.193) (0.195) (0.196)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.0753 0.119 0.127 -- -0.0634 0.0166 0.0263
(0.191) (0.201) (0.203) (0.199) (0.209) (0.211)
Droughtt-2 -- -- -0.0945 -0.0875 -- -- -0.216 -0.177
(0.196) (0.206) (0.205) (0.214)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- -0.0181 -- -- -- -0.136
(0.199) (0.209)
Extreme Coldt 0.948** 0.877* 0.922* 0.846* 0.563 0.619 0.695 0.591
(0.453) (0.481) (0.492) (0.495) (0.447) (0.474) (0.483) (0.491)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.436 0.484 0.503 -- 0.175 0.261 0.314
(0.498) (0.520) (0.521) (0.486) (0.511) (0.509)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.372 0.410 -- -- 0.250 0.310
(0.560) (0.571) (0.552) (0.568)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.0491 -- -- -- -0.120
(0.616) (0.642)
Extreme Heatt 0.454 0.418 0.442 0.503 0.481 0.476 0.523 0.543
(0.599) (0.617) (0.620) (0.641) (0.603) (0.618) (0.614) (0.647)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.889 0.852 0.856 -- 0.914 0.895 0.931
(0.577) (0.591) (0.590) (0.580) (0.599) (0.599)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 1.475** 1.480** -- -- 1.534*** 1.518**
(0.585) (0.603) (0.591) (0.610)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 1.170* -- -- -- 1.189*
(0.607) (0.622)
Epidemict 0.00549 -0.00505 -0.00252 0.00240 0.0664 0.0693 0.0813 0.0941
(0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.133) (0.136) (0.138) (0.139)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.0532 0.0527 0.0504 -- 0.0602 0.0727 0.0732
(0.147) (0.150) (0.150) (0.152) (0.156) (0.157)
Epidemict-2 -- -- 0.122 0.134 -- -- 0.125 0.141
(0.171) (0.173) (0.176) (0.178)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.0736 -- -- -- -0.0481
(0.181) (0.188)
Floodt 0.108 0.0795 0.0791 0.0679 0.0581 0.0467 0.0508 0.0395
(0.0794) (0.0827) (0.0835) (0.0842) (0.0823) (0.0849) (0.0857) (0.0866)
Floodt-1 -- 0.0641 0.0534 0.0567 -- 0.0223 0.0187 0.0240
(0.0852) (0.0868) (0.0870) (0.0882) (0.0898) (0.0902)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.0444 0.0309 -- -- 0.0274 0.0139
(0.0885) (0.0903) (0.0923) (0.0944)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.0918 -- -- -- 0.0907
(0.0942) (0.0995)
Stormt 0.0525 0.0136 -0.00814 -0.00309 0.0484 0.0168 -0.00999 -0.0127
(0.0751) (0.0865) (0.0907) (0.0960) (0.0779) (0.0895) (0.0937) (0.0991)
Stormt-1 -- 0.0311 0.0127 -0.000748 -- 0.0463 0.0268 0.0156
(0.0909) (0.0969) (0.0987) (0.0948) (0.101) (0.103)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.0100 0.00791 -- -- 0.0221 0.0130
(0.0936) (0.0983) (0.0973) (0.103)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.0202 -- -- -- 0.00202
(0.101) (0.107)
Wildfiret 0.209 0.163 0.0182 0.0271 0.0922 0.0993 -0.00820 0.0230
(0.363) (0.375) (0.394) (0.402) (0.377) (0.386) (0.410) (0.417)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.156 -0.176 -0.265 -- -0.285 -0.266 -0.342
(0.415) (0.433) (0.444) (0.420) (0.436) (0.450)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- -0.382 -0.386 -- -- -0.450 -0.443
(0.489) (0.496) (0.494) (0.504)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -0.268 -- -- -- -0.352
(0.539) (0.542)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E8. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of All Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Note: All regressions are panel logit models that include the full set of control variables (same as in Tables ). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Control variable estimates are not displayed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Extreme Coldt 0.895** to 1.097** P1,P2,P3,P4 -- --
Extreme Heatt-1 0.926* to 0.947* P2,P3,P4 -- --
Extreme Heatt-2 1.459** to 1.47*** P3,P4 1.421** to 1.450** P7,P8
Extreme Heatt-3 1.216** P4 1.121* P8
Floodt 0.150** P1 -- --
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix E Tables E1 through E7. Only significant 
coefficients are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Yes Yes
Table E9. Determinants of Civil War Incidence : Significant Coefficients from Individual Event 
Conditional (Fixed Effects) Logit Models, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Yes Yes
No Yes
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Extreme Coldt 0.846* to 0.948** P1,P2,P3,P4 -- --
Extreme Heatt-2 1.475** to 1.480** P3,P4 1.518** to 1.534*** P7,P8
Extreme Heatt-3 1.170* P4 1.189* P8
Floodt 0.150** P1 -- --
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix E Table E8. Only significant coefficients are 
presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table E10. Determinants of Civil War Incidence : Significant Coefficients from All Events Conditional 
(Fixed Effects) Logit Models, 1945-1999 (n=2659)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
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F. Civil War Incidence Estimated With Fixed 
Effects Linear Probability Model  
 
 
In appendix F I estimate equations (3) and (4) using the fixed effects linear probability 
econometric method. I also expand equation (3) by adding up to three lags of a given 
climate change related disaster event, as well as time fixed effects. Table F0 below relates 
estimated models to econometric specifications in the paper. Tables F1 through F7 
provide estimates of models P1 through P8 for each disaster event. Table F8 provides 
estimates of models P1 through P8 for all disaster events jointly. Table F1 provides 
estimates for drought events; F2 for extreme cold temperature events; F3 for extreme heat 
events; F4 for epidemic outbreaks; F5 for flood events; F6 for storm events; and F7 for 
wildfire events.  
 
Table F0. Description of Appendix F Tables 
Model Lags on a disaster variable Equivalence to equations in the paper 
P1 0 Equation (1) 
P2 1 Equation (1)+Disastert-1 
P3 2 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2 
P4 3 Equation (1)+Disastert-1+ Disastert-2+ Disastert-3 
P5 0 Equation (2)-Disastert-1-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
P6 1 Equation (2)-Disastert-2-Disastert-3 
P7 2 Equation (2)-Disastert-3 
P8 3 Equation (2) 
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Droughtt 0.0143 0.00946 0.00914 0.00872 0.00866 0.00638 0.00637 0.00617
(0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.0166 0.0143 0.0139 -- 0.00799 0.00792 0.00770
(0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Droughtt-2 -- -- 0.00761 0.00381 -- -- 0.000254 -0.00141
(0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0135)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.0127 -- -- -- 0.00577
(0.0130) (0.0132)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00277* -0.00279* -0.00281* -0.00282* -0.0135*** -0.0135*** -0.0135*** -0.0135***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224)
log(Population Density) 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.0247 0.0247 0.0247 0.0246
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253)
log(% mountains) 0.0596*** 0.0596*** 0.0595*** 0.0593*** 0.0895*** 0.0894*** 0.0894*** 0.0892***
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.506*** -0.506*** -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.385***
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0702)
1(Oil producer) -0.0373* -0.0373* -0.0373* -0.0373* -0.0441** -0.0441** -0.0441** -0.0440**
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0279 0.0286 0.0288 0.0294 0.0418* 0.0420* 0.0420* 0.0422*
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0995*** 0.0994*** 0.0994*** 0.0994*** 0.0981*** 0.0980*** 0.0980*** 0.0980***
(0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997)
PolityIV 0.000301 0.000302 0.000297 0.000288 -0.000448 -0.000450 -0.000450 -0.000456
(0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000878) (0.000878)
1(Anocracy) 0.0711*** 0.0714*** 0.0715*** 0.0718*** 0.0730*** 0.0732*** 0.0732*** 0.0733***
(0.00965) (0.00965) (0.00965) (0.00966) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00972)
Constant 1.068*** 1.063*** 1.061*** 1.058*** 0.273* 0.274* 0.274* 0.275*
(0.0943) (0.0943) (0.0944) (0.0944) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.532 0.532 0.532 0.532
Table F1. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling Frequency for Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Extreme Coldt 0.0696*** 0.0605** 0.0580** 0.0578** 0.0523** 0.0460* 0.0442* 0.0443*
(0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.0501* 0.0429 0.0427 -- 0.0363 0.0309 0.0309
(0.0261) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0266)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.0466* 0.0458* -- -- 0.0365 0.0371
(0.0269) (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0273)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- 0.00712 -- -- -- -0.00465
(0.0292) (0.0294)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00291* -0.00302* -0.00312* -0.00314* -0.0134*** -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0133***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224)
log(Population Density) 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.0286 0.0304 0.0315 0.0314
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254)
log(% mountains) 0.0571*** 0.0556*** 0.0542*** 0.0540*** 0.0870*** 0.0854*** 0.0840*** 0.0842***
(0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0212)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.503*** -0.501*** -0.500*** -0.500*** -0.384*** -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.385***
(0.0684) (0.0683) (0.0683) (0.0683) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701)
1(Oil producer) -0.0376* -0.0378* -0.0379* -0.0379* -0.0445** -0.0448** -0.0449** -0.0449**
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0273 0.0274 0.0274 0.0274 0.0413* 0.0413* 0.0412* 0.0412*
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0999*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.0983*** 0.0986*** 0.0988*** 0.0988***
(0.00993) (0.00993) (0.00993) (0.00993) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997)
PolityIV 0.000156 7.16e-05 2.22e-05 1.45e-05 -0.000504 -0.000533 -0.000542 -0.000540
(0.000832) (0.000833) (0.000834) (0.000834) (0.000878) (0.000878) (0.000878) (0.000878)
1(Anocracy) 0.0701*** 0.0698*** 0.0697*** 0.0697*** 0.0724*** 0.0723*** 0.0723*** 0.0722***
(0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00963) (0.00963) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970)
Constant 1.070*** 1.067*** 1.064*** 1.063*** 0.293* 0.303** 0.309** 0.308**
(0.0941) (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.532 0.533 0.533 0.533
Table F2. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Extreme Heatt 0.0199 0.0165 0.0190 0.0181 0.00911 0.00650 0.00890 0.00819
(0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.0297 0.0235 0.0251 -- 0.0236 0.0178 0.0193
(0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0320)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.0557* 0.0515 -- -- 0.0515 0.0481
(0.0327) (0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0331)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 0.0309 -- -- -- 0.0262
(0.0333) (0.0334)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00277* -0.00284* -0.00295* -0.00303* -0.0136*** -0.0136*** -0.0136*** -0.0136***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00164) (0.00164) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224)
log(Population Density) 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.0250 0.0256 0.0265 0.0271
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0254)
log(% mountains) 0.0579*** 0.0558*** 0.0519** 0.0499** 0.0889*** 0.0871*** 0.0832*** 0.0813***
(0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0217)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.502*** -0.498*** -0.491*** -0.488*** -0.382*** -0.379*** -0.373*** -0.372***
(0.0686) (0.0687) (0.0688) (0.0689) (0.0703) (0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0705)
1(Oil producer) -0.0375* -0.0375* -0.0373* -0.0369* -0.0444** -0.0444** -0.0442** -0.0440**
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0270 0.0269 0.0269 0.0268 0.0412* 0.0411* 0.0408* 0.0407*
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0996*** 0.0996*** 0.0999*** 0.1000*** 0.0981*** 0.0981*** 0.0983*** 0.0984***
(0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997)
PolityIV 0.000294 0.000279 0.000246 0.000236 -0.000440 -0.000442 -0.000457 -0.000456
(0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000877)
1(Anocracy) 0.0705*** 0.0705*** 0.0704*** 0.0704*** 0.0728*** 0.0727*** 0.0727*** 0.0727***
(0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970)
Constant 1.072*** 1.069*** 1.062*** 1.059*** 0.273* 0.274* 0.274* 0.276*
(0.0942) (0.0943) (0.0944) (0.0944) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.532 0.532 0.532 0.532
Table F3. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Epidemict 0.0147* 0.0118 0.0107 0.0105 0.0176* 0.0150 0.0141 0.0140
(0.00870) (0.00897) (0.00901) (0.00902) (0.00903) (0.00922) (0.00925) (0.00926)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.0130 0.0102 0.00998 -- 0.0137 0.0115 0.0113
(0.00986) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103)
Epidemict-2 -- -- 0.0156 0.0149 -- -- 0.0144 0.0140
(0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- 0.00596 -- -- -- 0.00287
(0.0119) (0.0121)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00261 -0.00256 -0.00251 -0.00249 -0.0133*** -0.0132*** -0.0131*** -0.0131***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224)
log(Population Density) 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.0213 0.0193 0.0181 0.0179
(0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254)
log(% mountains) 0.0583*** 0.0575*** 0.0567*** 0.0564*** 0.0879*** 0.0870*** 0.0861*** 0.0859***
(0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.384*** -0.385***
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701)
1(Oil producer) -0.0369* -0.0363* -0.0356* -0.0355* -0.0444** -0.0440** -0.0436** -0.0435**
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0278 0.0282 0.0285 0.0286 0.0418* 0.0421* 0.0421* 0.0421*
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0996*** 0.0999*** 0.0999*** 0.0999*** 0.0978*** 0.0980*** 0.0981*** 0.0981***
(0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997)
PolityIV 0.000265 0.000238 0.000237 0.000236 -0.000402 -0.000394 -0.000364 -0.000359
(0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000878)
1(Anocracy) 0.0697*** 0.0692*** 0.0686*** 0.0686*** 0.0721*** 0.0717*** 0.0713*** 0.0713***
(0.00965) (0.00966) (0.00967) (0.00967) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00971)
Constant 1.060*** 1.052*** 1.044*** 1.042*** 0.261* 0.255* 0.253* 0.252*
(0.0945) (0.0947) (0.0948) (0.0950) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.532 0.532 0.533 0.533
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table F4. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Epidemic Outbreaks, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Floodt 0.0230*** 0.0187*** 0.0165*** 0.0144*** 0.0192*** 0.0159*** 0.0141*** 0.0124**
(0.00497) (0.00512) (0.00518) (0.00523) (0.00504) (0.00517) (0.00523) (0.00527)
Floodt-1 -- 0.0184*** 0.0152*** 0.0129** -- 0.0151*** 0.0124** 0.0104*
(0.00530) (0.00543) (0.00549) (0.00535) (0.00548) (0.00553)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.0148*** 0.0118** -- -- 0.0128** 0.0102*
(0.00557) (0.00566) (0.00561) (0.00570)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.0163*** -- -- -- 0.0151***
(0.00578) (0.00582)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00325** -0.00360** -0.00379** -0.00392** -0.0133*** -0.0132*** -0.0131*** -0.0130***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00223)
log(Population Density) 0.178*** 0.171*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.0245 0.0249 0.0251 0.0250
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0252)
log(% mountains) 0.0470** 0.0396* 0.0351* 0.0315 0.0773*** 0.0701*** 0.0654*** 0.0611***
(0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0216)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.492*** -0.486*** -0.482*** -0.480*** -0.379*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.378***
(0.0683) (0.0683) (0.0683) (0.0682) (0.0701) (0.0700) (0.0700) (0.0700)
1(Oil producer) -0.0360* -0.0347* -0.0334* -0.0327 -0.0435** -0.0427** -0.0417** -0.0412**
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0259 0.0259 0.0259 0.0257 0.0387* 0.0380* 0.0373* 0.0366*
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0994*** 0.0990*** 0.0994*** 0.0998*** 0.0978*** 0.0974*** 0.0976*** 0.0978***
(0.00992) (0.00991) (0.00991) (0.00990) (0.00996) (0.00996) (0.00995) (0.00995)
PolityIV 0.000132 7.83e-05 4.17e-05 3.15e-05 -0.000436 -0.000399 -0.000375 -0.000329
(0.000830) (0.000830) (0.000829) (0.000829) (0.000876) (0.000876) (0.000876) (0.000875)
1(Anocracy) 0.0721*** 0.0733*** 0.0740*** 0.0744*** 0.0742*** 0.0754*** 0.0761*** 0.0766***
(0.00963) (0.00963) (0.00963) (0.00962) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970)
Constant 1.024*** 0.997*** 0.980*** 0.963*** 0.280* 0.286* 0.290* 0.293**
(0.0946) (0.0948) (0.0950) (0.0951) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.526 0.527 0.528 0.529 0.533 0.534 0.534 0.535
Table F5. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Stormt 0.00815** 0.00518 0.00417 0.00349 0.00619* 0.00385 0.00312 0.00278
(0.00372) (0.00442) (0.00454) (0.00469) (0.00373) (0.00444) (0.00456) (0.00471)
Stormt-1 -- 0.00560 0.00377 0.00341 -- 0.00440 0.00307 0.00290
(0.00450) (0.00488) (0.00492) (0.00452) (0.00490) (0.00494)
Stormt-2 -- -- 0.00457 0.00365 -- -- 0.00331 0.00285
(0.00473) (0.00499) (0.00474) (0.00501)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- 0.00288 -- -- -- 0.00144
(0.00500) (0.00503)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00331** -0.00349** -0.00359** -0.00364** -0.0139*** -0.0140*** -0.0140*** -0.0140***
(0.00165) (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00224) (0.00225) (0.00225) (0.00225)
log(Population Density) 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.0253 0.0253 0.0254 0.0254
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253)
log(% mountains) 0.0452** 0.0410* 0.0387* 0.0378* 0.0784*** 0.0750*** 0.0733*** 0.0727***
(0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.503*** -0.503*** -0.502*** -0.503*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.384***
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0702)
1(Oil producer) -0.0361* -0.0358* -0.0356* -0.0354* -0.0433** -0.0431** -0.0430** -0.0430**
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0268 0.0268 0.0268 0.0267 0.0409* 0.0410* 0.0410* 0.0409*
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0993*** 0.0993*** 0.0994*** 0.0994*** 0.0979*** 0.0979*** 0.0979*** 0.0979***
(0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997)
PolityIV 0.000291 0.000280 0.000276 0.000278 -0.000415 -0.000410 -0.000403 -0.000397
(0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000831) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000877) (0.000878)
1(Anocracy) 0.0711*** 0.0712*** 0.0714*** 0.0715*** 0.0733*** 0.0734*** 0.0735*** 0.0736***
(0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00970) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00971)
Constant 1.065*** 1.062*** 1.060*** 1.060*** 0.277* 0.278* 0.279* 0.279*
(0.0942) (0.0942) (0.0942) (0.0942) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.532 0.532 0.532 0.532
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table F6. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Wildfiret 0.0171 0.0163 0.0158 0.0153 0.0101 0.0106 0.0115 0.0120
(0.0179) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0189)
Wildfiret-1 -- 0.00415 0.00387 0.00336 -- -0.00295 -0.00235 -0.00186
(0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0197)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- 0.00262 0.00230 -- -- -0.00574 -0.00544
(0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0213)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- 0.00469 -- -- -- -0.00457
(0.0224) (0.0225)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00292* -0.00295* -0.00297* -0.00299* -0.0136*** -0.0136*** -0.0136*** -0.0136***
(0.00164) (0.00165) (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224)
log(Population Density) 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.0253 0.0252 0.0251 0.0250
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0254)
log(% mountains) 0.0579*** 0.0576*** 0.0575*** 0.0573*** 0.0886*** 0.0888*** 0.0891*** 0.0893***
(0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0213)
1(Noncontiguous state) -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.505*** -0.384*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.383***
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0702)
1(Oil producer) -0.0371* -0.0370* -0.0370* -0.0369* -0.0442** -0.0442** -0.0443** -0.0444**
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
1(New State) 0.0270 0.0270 0.0270 0.0269 0.0412* 0.0412* 0.0412* 0.0413*
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219)
1(Instability) 0.0997*** 0.0997*** 0.0998*** 0.0998*** 0.0981*** 0.0981*** 0.0981*** 0.0981***
(0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00994) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.00998)
PolityIV 0.000256 0.000249 0.000246 0.000239 -0.000454 -0.000451 -0.000447 -0.000442
(0.000833) (0.000833) (0.000834) (0.000834) (0.000878) (0.000878) (0.000878) (0.000879)
1(Anocracy) 0.0706*** 0.0706*** 0.0706*** 0.0707*** 0.0728*** 0.0728*** 0.0728*** 0.0728***
(0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00971)
Constant 1.075*** 1.075*** 1.074*** 1.074*** 0.277* 0.276* 0.275* 0.274*
(0.0941) (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.532 0.532 0.532 0.532
Table F7. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Droughtt 0.00992 0.00646 0.00574 0.00436 0.00531 0.00406 0.00345 0.00247
(0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0125)
Droughtt-1 -- 0.0125 0.0124 0.0127 -- 0.00430 0.00605 0.00630
(0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0133)
Droughtt-2 -- -- 0.00274 0.000902 -- -- -0.00425 -0.00413
(0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0135)
Droughtt-3 -- -- -- 0.00647 -- -- -- -0.000422
(0.0131) (0.0133)
Extreme Coldt 0.0603** 0.0507** 0.0442* 0.0453* 0.0459* 0.0395 0.0342 0.0354
(0.0250) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0260)
Extreme Coldt-1 -- 0.0318 0.0271 0.0258 -- 0.0219 0.0187 0.0181
(0.0264) (0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0271)
Extreme Coldt-2 -- -- 0.0272 0.0282 -- -- 0.0215 0.0240
(0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0279)
Extreme Coldt-3 -- -- -- -0.00890 -- -- -- -0.0173
(0.0299) (0.0300)
Extreme Heatt 0.00507 0.00196 -0.00183 -0.00186 -0.00227 -0.00472 -0.00732 -0.00725
(0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0311) (0.0316) (0.0319) (0.0320)
Extreme Heatt-1 -- 0.0152 0.0116 0.00497 -- 0.0133 0.0103 0.00452
(0.0318) (0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0319) (0.0324) (0.0326)
Extreme Heatt-2 -- -- 0.0348 0.0338 -- -- 0.0365 0.0364
(0.0335) (0.0339) (0.0336) (0.0341)
Extreme Heatt-3 -- -- -- 0.00500 -- -- -- 0.00809
(0.0342) (0.0343)
Epidemict 0.0103 0.00655 0.00592 0.00478 0.0150* 0.0117 0.0111 0.0104
(0.00877) (0.00903) (0.00906) (0.00908) (0.00908) (0.00927) (0.00930) (0.00932)
Epidemict-1 -- 0.00772 0.00499 0.00540 -- 0.0101 0.00790 0.00810
(0.00991) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Epidemict-2 -- -- 0.00780 0.00688 -- -- 0.00850 0.00786
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Epidemict-3 -- -- -- -0.00493 -- -- -- -0.00552
(0.0120) (0.0122)
Floodt 0.0203*** 0.0168*** 0.0151*** 0.0141*** 0.0174*** 0.0147*** 0.0134** 0.0126**
(0.00519) (0.00534) (0.00539) (0.00546) (0.00524) (0.00538) (0.00543) (0.00549)
Floodt-1 -- 0.0168*** 0.0143** 0.0131** -- 0.0141** 0.0120** 0.0110*
(0.00559) (0.00570) (0.00573) (0.00563) (0.00574) (0.00577)
Floodt-2 -- -- 0.0150** 0.0133** -- -- 0.0135** 0.0122**
(0.00584) (0.00592) (0.00588) (0.00596)
Floodt-3 -- -- -- 0.0170*** -- -- -- 0.0162***
(0.00600) (0.00604)
Stormt 0.00307 -0.000148 -0.00285 -0.00168 0.00228 -0.000233 -0.00265 -0.00139
(0.00396) (0.00458) (0.00476) (0.00488) (0.00398) (0.00460) (0.00478) (0.00490)
Stormt-1 -- 0.000756 -0.000148 -0.00169 -- 0.000844 0.000208 -0.00127
(0.00469) (0.00503) (0.00515) (0.00471) (0.00505) (0.00518)
Stormt-2 -- -- 1.08e-05 -0.000373 -- -- -4.52e-05 -6.19e-05
(0.00488) (0.00514) (0.00490) (0.00517)
Stormt-3 -- -- -- -0.00290 -- -- -- -0.00328
(0.00513) (0.00515)
Wildfiret 0.00208 -0.00520 -0.00516 -0.00749 -0.000657 -0.00560 -0.00449 -0.00539
(0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0196)
Wildfiret-1 -- -0.0126 -0.0159 -0.0154 -- -0.0152 -0.0172 -0.0161
(0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0203)
Wildfiret-2 -- -- -0.00943 -0.0124 -- -- -0.0139 -0.0155
(0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0218)
Wildfiret-3 -- -- -- -0.00395 -- -- -- -0.0111
(0.0227) (0.0228)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.527 0.528 0.529 0.530 0.534 0.534 0.535 0.536
Table F8. Determinants of Civil War Incidence Controling for Frequency of All Disaster Events, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Note: All regressions are fixed effects linear probability models that include the full set of control variables (same as in Tables ). Standard 
errors in parentheses. Control variable estimates are not displayed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Extreme Coldt 0.0578** to 0.0696*** P1,P2,P3,P4 0.0442* to 0.0523** P5,P6,P7,P8
Extreme Coldt-2 0.0458* to 0.0466* P3,P4 -- --
Extreme Heatt-2 0.0557* P3 -- --
Epidemict 0.0147* P1 0.0176* P5
Floodt 0.0144*** to 0.0230*** P1,P2,P3,P4 0.0124** to 0.0192*** P5,P6,P7,P8
Floodt-1 0.0129** to 0.0152*** P2,P3,P4 0.0104* to 0.0124** P6,P7,P8
Floodt-2 0.0118** to 0.0148*** P3,P4 0.0102* to 0.0128** P7,P8
Floodt-3 0.0163*** P4 0.0151*** P8
Stormt 0.00815** P1 0.00619* P5
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix F Tables F1 through F7. Only significant 
coefficients are presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table F9. Determinants of Civil War Incidence : Significant Coefficients from Individual Event Fixed 
Effects Linear Probabilty Models, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Variables Significant Coefficients Models Significant Coefficients Models
Extreme Coldt 0.0442* to 0.0603** P1,P2,P3,P4 0.0459* P5
Floodt 0.0141*** to 0.0203*** P1,P2,P3,P4 0.0126** to 0.0174*** P5,P6,P7,P8
Floodt-1 0.0131** to 0.0168*** P2,P3,P4 0.0110* to 0.0141** P6,P7,P8
Floodt-2 0.0133** to 0.0150*** P3,P4 0.0122* to 0.0135** P7,P8
Floodt-3 0.0170*** P4 0.0162*** P8
Control Variables
Country Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects No Yes
Note:  Summary of selected coefficients from Appendix F Table F8. Only significant coefficients are 
presented. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table F10. Determinants of Civil War Incidence : Significant Coefficients from All Events Fixed Effects 
Linear Probabilty Models, 1945-1999 (n=6278)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
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G. Civil War Duration Models 
 
In appendix G I estimate civil war duration using Cox proportional hazard model 
(column 1 in each table), Exponential survival model (column 2 in each table), Weibull 
survival model (column 3 in each table), Gompertz survival model (column 4 in each 
table), Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) discrete time proportional hazards model and a panel 
logit model. . Table G1 provides estimates for drought events; G2 for extreme cold 
temperature events; G3 for extreme heat events; G4 for epidemic outbreaks; G5 for flood 
events; G6 for storm events; and G7 for wildfire events. Table G8 provides estimates of 
all the aforementioned models for all disaster events jointly. 
 
 
Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Drought -0.117* -1.377** -1.485** -1.415** -1.400** -1.460**
(0.0616) (0.591) (0.593) (0.593) (0.594) (0.603)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.190*** 1.136*** 1.351*** 1.191*** 1.415*** 1.467***
(0.286) (0.274) (0.289) (0.282) (0.344) (0.371)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.088*** 0.987*** 1.283*** 1.075*** 1.055*** 1.190***
(0.354) (0.338) (0.362) (0.353) (0.371) (0.409)
1(Not contiguous) 0.528* 0.378 0.510* 0.432 0.399 0.425
(0.290) (0.294) (0.302) (0.302) (0.319) (0.330)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.129*** -1.129*** -1.314*** -1.226*** -1.200*** -1.238***
(0.385) (0.371) (0.383) (0.390) (0.384) (0.397)
1(Contraband) -1.335*** -1.291*** -1.386*** -1.353*** -1.349*** -1.388***
(0.462) (0.445) (0.448) (0.452) (0.464) (0.469)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00401 -0.00479 -0.0231 -0.0163 0.00877 -0.00121
(0.00369) (0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0517) (0.0580) (0.0609)
log(Population Densityt) 0.00140 -0.0590 -0.0634 -0.0587 -0.0746 -0.0730
(0.0104) (0.0924) (0.0933) (0.0927) (0.0989) (0.105)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00467** 0.0252 0.0288 0.0265 0.0266 0.0299
(0.00214) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0185) (0.0197)
Constant -- -2.420*** -3.006*** -2.509*** -2.393*** -2.349***
(0.379) (0.453) (0.394) (0.399) (0.423)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G1. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Drought Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
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Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Extreme Cold -0.00989 -0.0206 -0.883 -0.937 -1.110 -1.119
(0.0491) (0.0516) (0.919) (0.918) (0.946) (0.983)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.218*** 1.187*** 1.437*** 1.277*** 1.559*** 1.638***
(0.286) (0.299) (0.288) (0.280) (0.336) (0.371)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.121*** 1.180*** 1.461*** 1.262*** 1.267*** 1.415***
(0.354) (0.382) (0.360) (0.352) (0.385) (0.431)
1(Not contiguous) 0.539* 0.406 0.575* 0.490 0.439 0.468
(0.293) (0.296) (0.304) (0.303) (0.338) (0.351)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.216*** -1.170*** -1.387*** -1.290*** -1.312*** -1.350***
(0.390) (0.380) (0.383) (0.386) (0.391) (0.411)
1(Contraband) -1.254*** -1.056** -1.252*** -1.214*** -1.266*** -1.305***
(0.460) (0.445) (0.447) (0.450) (0.474) (0.486)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00193 -0.0727 -0.00156 0.00584 0.0355 0.0296
(0.00352) (0.0903) (0.0507) (0.0517) (0.0626) (0.0658)
log(Population Densityt) -9.09e-05 0.135 -0.0596 -0.0583 -0.0878 -0.0798
(0.0103) (0.139) (0.0926) (0.0924) (0.103) (0.109)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00470** 0.0139 0.0339* 0.0316* 0.0338* 0.0366*
(0.00215) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0190) (0.0205)
Constant -- -2.658** -3.102*** -2.654*** -2.571*** -2.554***
(1.318) (0.455) (0.396) (0.416) (0.439)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G2. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Extreme Cold Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Extreme Heat -17.60 -13.63 -12.82 -14.03 -16.03 -15.63
(4.175e+07) (861.9) (586.6) (1,063) (1,670) (2,043)
Coup/revolution 1.203*** 1.238*** 1.440*** 1.278*** 1.406*** 1.637***
(0.285) (0.271) (0.288) (0.280) (0.273) (0.370)
Eastern Europe 1.133*** 1.167*** 1.445*** 1.228*** 1.317*** 1.369***
(0.354) (0.335) (0.361) (0.351) (0.337) (0.428)
Not contiguous 0.531* 0.460 0.586* 0.498 0.520* 0.482
(0.291) (0.295) (0.304) (0.303) (0.295) (0.349)
Sons of the soil -1.221*** -1.226*** -1.392*** -1.287*** -1.283*** -1.349***
(0.390) (0.371) (0.383) (0.387) (0.371) (0.410)
Contraband -1.241*** -1.169*** -1.242*** -1.204*** -1.180*** -1.303***
(0.459) (0.445) (0.447) (0.449) (0.445) (0.485)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00244 0.00689 -0.00750 -0.000112 0.0129 0.0216
(0.00341) (0.0507) (0.0504) (0.0515) (0.0505) (0.0649)
log(Population Densityt) -4.09e-05 -0.0551 -0.0573 -0.0545 -0.0592 -0.0769
(0.0102) (0.0915) (0.0921) (0.0916) (0.0920) (0.109)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00487** 0.0306* 0.0340* 0.0314* 0.0312* 0.0364*
(0.00215) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0204)
Constant -- -2.569*** -3.093*** -2.631*** -2.561*** -2.534***
(0.378) (0.454) (0.393) (0.380) (0.435)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G3. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Extreme Heat Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
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Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Epidemic 0.0161 0.105 0.0781 0.0955 0.103 0.131
(0.0172) (0.176) (0.179) (0.177) (0.179) (0.190)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.225*** 1.271*** 1.470*** 1.308*** 1.586*** 1.668***
(0.286) (0.273) (0.289) (0.281) (0.339) (0.372)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.119*** 1.146*** 1.424*** 1.205*** 1.181*** 1.341***
(0.354) (0.336) (0.362) (0.352) (0.383) (0.427)
1(Not contiguous) 0.558* 0.506* 0.625** 0.539* 0.510 0.539
(0.292) (0.297) (0.305) (0.304) (0.334) (0.348)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.271*** -1.272*** -1.432*** -1.331*** -1.346*** -1.402***
(0.398) (0.375) (0.388) (0.392) (0.393) (0.413)
1(Contraband) -1.291*** -1.204*** -1.274*** -1.238*** -1.291*** -1.338***
(0.460) (0.445) (0.447) (0.450) (0.473) (0.486)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00115 0.0131 -0.00174 0.00605 0.0298 0.0281
(0.00358) (0.0510) (0.0508) (0.0520) (0.0607) (0.0647)
log(Population Densityt) -0.00322 -0.0665 -0.0678 -0.0654 -0.0907 -0.0911
(0.0106) (0.0916) (0.0924) (0.0918) (0.102) (0.109)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00474** 0.0283 0.0317* 0.0290 0.0303 0.0335*
(0.00216) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0203)
Constant -- -2.661*** -3.172*** -2.715*** -2.629*** -2.646***
(0.387) (0.461) (0.400) (0.416) (0.445)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G4. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Epidemic Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Floods -0.00422 -0.0793 -0.111 -0.0948 -0.0766 -0.0821
(0.0103) (0.120) (0.124) (0.123) (0.122) (0.129)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.213*** 1.224*** 1.425*** 1.269*** 1.533*** 1.604***
(0.286) (0.274) (0.290) (0.282) (0.341) (0.371)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.119*** 1.127*** 1.410*** 1.202*** 1.171*** 1.324***
(0.354) (0.336) (0.361) (0.351) (0.381) (0.423)
1(Not contiguous) 0.545* 0.454 0.575* 0.497 0.461 0.487
(0.291) (0.297) (0.304) (0.304) (0.334) (0.346)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.204*** -1.173*** -1.312*** -1.235*** -1.255*** -1.291***
(0.394) (0.383) (0.394) (0.396) (0.400) (0.419)
1(Contraband) -1.263*** -1.180*** -1.256*** -1.226*** -1.263*** -1.298***
(0.459) (0.445) (0.447) (0.450) (0.472) (0.481)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00238 0.00742 -0.00916 -0.00197 0.0251 0.0198
(0.00343) (0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0518) (0.0606) (0.0639)
log(Population Densityt) 0.000517 -0.0490 -0.0464 -0.0463 -0.0731 -0.0668
(0.0105) (0.0923) (0.0930) (0.0925) (0.102) (0.109)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00469** 0.0288 0.0327* 0.0299* 0.0308 0.0338*
(0.00218) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0188) (0.0202)
Constant -- -2.527*** -3.047*** -2.591*** -2.504*** -2.482***
(0.392) (0.461) (0.403) (0.421) (0.448)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G5. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Flood Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
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Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Storms 4.49e-05 -0.0881 -0.113 -0.101 -0.0911 -0.0919
(0.00634) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.115) (0.116)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.219*** 1.221*** 1.424*** 1.269*** 1.525*** 1.597***
(0.286) (0.273) (0.289) (0.281) (0.340) (0.369)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.122*** 1.123*** 1.412*** 1.202*** 1.173*** 1.324***
(0.354) (0.335) (0.361) (0.351) (0.380) (0.421)
1(Not contiguous) 0.552* 0.443 0.564* 0.487 0.450 0.479
(0.291) (0.297) (0.304) (0.304) (0.333) (0.345)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.231*** -1.174*** -1.327*** -1.244*** -1.253*** -1.291***
(0.390) (0.376) (0.386) (0.390) (0.393) (0.411)
1(Contraband) -1.268*** -1.211*** -1.302*** -1.266*** -1.291*** -1.325***
(0.462) (0.445) (0.448) (0.452) (0.471) (0.479)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00222 0.00850 -0.00835 -0.00132 0.0260 0.0199
(0.00358) (0.0511) (0.0511) (0.0520) (0.0605) (0.0637)
log(Population Densityt) -0.000745 -0.0401 -0.0351 -0.0362 -0.0637 -0.0568
(0.0112) (0.0937) (0.0946) (0.0941) (0.103) (0.110)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00474** 0.0290 0.0333* 0.0303* 0.0309 0.0340*
(0.00216) (0.0179) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0202)
Constant -- -2.501*** -3.021*** -2.565*** -2.478*** -2.453***
(0.393) (0.461) (0.404) (0.421) (0.448)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G6. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Storm Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Wildfires 0.0179 0.208 0.269 0.202 0.171 0.295
(0.0456) (0.462) (0.471) (0.464) (0.473) (0.574)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.218*** 1.252*** 1.461*** 1.293*** 1.560*** 1.634***
(0.286) (0.272) (0.289) (0.280) (0.337) (0.368)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.117*** 1.120*** 1.401*** 1.184*** 1.165*** 1.313***
(0.354) (0.340) (0.365) (0.356) (0.384) (0.426)
1(Not contiguous) 0.545* 0.484 0.609** 0.522* 0.492 0.518
(0.292) (0.295) (0.304) (0.303) (0.330) (0.344)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.235*** -1.252*** -1.428*** -1.317*** -1.325*** -1.376***
(0.391) (0.372) (0.386) (0.390) (0.389) (0.407)
1(Contraband) -1.271*** -1.192*** -1.269*** -1.231*** -1.275*** -1.315***
(0.459) (0.445) (0.447) (0.450) (0.471) (0.482)
GDP/capita, lagged -0.00190 0.00892 -0.00572 0.00175 0.0257 0.0212
(0.00353) (0.0509) (0.0506) (0.0517) (0.0602) (0.0636)
log(Population Densityt) -0.00112 -0.0567 -0.0586 -0.0564 -0.0813 -0.0783
(0.0102) (0.0912) (0.0917) (0.0913) (0.101) (0.107)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00467** 0.0276 0.0309* 0.0284 0.0297 0.0328
(0.00216) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0188) (0.0202)
Constant -- -2.599*** -3.133*** -2.663*** -2.575*** -2.568***
(0.374) (0.451) (0.390) (0.404) (0.428)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G7. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of Wildfire Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
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Variables Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards Logit
Drought -0.128** -1.377** -1.488** -1.412** -1.418** -1.462**
(0.0614) (0.591) (0.594) (0.593) (0.592) (0.606)
Extreme Cold -22.10 -14.00 -12.98 -13.94 -15.62 -16.47
(0) (1,209) (759.0) (1,194) (1,626) (3,800)
Extreme Heat -0.00755 -0.986 -0.838 -0.936 -1.127 -1.190
(0.0534) (0.901) (0.893) (0.900) (0.924) (0.985)
Epidemic 0.0169 0.201 0.157 0.186 0.199 0.223
(0.0184) (0.179) (0.185) (0.183) (0.181) (0.196)
Flood -0.00614 -0.0309 -0.0676 -0.0463 -0.0264 -0.0285
(0.0124) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.136) (0.145)
Storm 0.00411 -0.0165 -0.0376 -0.0276 -0.0152 -0.0142
(0.00689) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.117)
Wildfire 0.0386 0.400 0.477 0.389 0.495 0.502
(0.0494) (0.543) (0.550) (0.546) (0.547) (0.651)
1(Coup/revolution) 1.174*** 1.111*** 1.308*** 1.156*** 1.273*** 1.476***
(0.286) (0.279) (0.292) (0.285) (0.281) (0.381)
1(Eastern Europe) 1.091*** 1.061*** 1.313*** 1.134*** 1.219*** 1.284***
(0.354) (0.345) (0.363) (0.356) (0.345) (0.426)
1(Not contiguous) 0.502* 0.337 0.438 0.375 0.385 0.359
(0.295) (0.301) (0.307) (0.306) (0.302) (0.347)
1(Sons of the soil) -1.146*** -1.153*** -1.283*** -1.219*** -1.213*** -1.288***
(0.400) (0.395) (0.405) (0.407) (0.396) (0.431)
1(Contraband) -1.311*** -1.270*** -1.365*** -1.326*** -1.287*** -1.394***
(0.468) (0.447) (0.449) (0.452) (0.447) (0.480)
log(GDP/capita, lagged) -0.00323 0.000133 -0.0225 -0.0120 0.00697 0.00901
(0.00408) (0.0515) (0.0522) (0.0528) (0.0513) (0.0652)
log(Population Densityt) -0.000206 -0.0537 -0.0431 -0.0478 -0.0606 -0.0679
(0.0123) (0.0971) (0.0981) (0.0976) (0.0977) (0.113)
Democracy (–10 to 10, lagged) 0.00474** 0.0298* 0.0332* 0.0311* 0.0303* 0.0360*
(0.00221) (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0204)
Constant -- -2.412*** -2.916*** -2.464*** -2.408*** -2.343***
(0.416) (0.471) (0.422) (0.419) (0.475)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table G8. Determinants of Civil War Duration Controlling for Frequency of All Climate Change Related Events, 1945-1999 (n=1102)
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APPENDIX 3 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER IV 
 
A.  Continuous Models Without And With Time-Varying Covariates 
Table A1. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay - quantity of oil spilled between 1970 and 1978, (period 1978-2009, n=129) 
  Exponential Gompertz Lognormal Loglogistic Cox 
Pre 1978 oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) 0.1208*** 0.2112*** -0.0937*** -0.1032*** 0.2345*** 
 
(0.0410) (0.0741) (0.0295) (0.0308) (0.0802) 
Square of pre 1978 oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) -0.0036 -0.0066 0.0024* 0.0029* -0.0073* 
 
(0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0042) 
Population (in millions) 0.0014** 0.0023** -0.0012*** -0.0010*** 0.0026*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
PolityIV 0.0078 0.0234 -0.0042 -0.0039 0.0228 
 
(0.0113) (0.0195) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0184) 
Trade openness 0.0040*** 0.0071*** -0.0027*** -0.0025*** 0.0072*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0018) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) -0.0054 -0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0020 0.0112 
 
(0.0357) (0.0587) (0.0208) (0.0256) (0.0622) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.0380 0.0324 0.0230 0.0250 0.0042 
 
(0.0374) (0.0547) (0.0237) (0.0203) (0.0513) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0017*** 0.0029*** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** 0.0037*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs (days/365) 0.0512* 0.0630* -0.0318* -0.0284* 0.0553 
 
(0.0264) (0.0378) (0.0187) (0.0159) (0.0362) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0406*** 0.0599*** -0.0333*** -0.0344*** 0.0647*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0121) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0131) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) 0.0007 0.0053 -0.0009 -0.0024 0.0065 
 
(0.0070) (0.0121) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0107) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0019 -0.0040 
 
(0.0041) (0.0071) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0067) 
Latitude -0.6584 -0.9621 0.5204 0.6030 -0.8868 
 
(0.6743) (1.0170) (0.4834) (0.4508) (0.9614) 
Constant -10.6508*** -12.7305*** 9.9578*** 9.9363*** 
   (0.3660) (0.5785) (0.2406) (0.2101)   
Shape parameter 
 
0.000258*** -0.715*** -1.326*** 
 Log-likelihood -140.0 -112.1 -94.3 -91.5 -395.4 
AIC 308.0 254.2 218.6 212.9 816.8 
BIC 348.1 297.1 261.5 255.8 854.0 
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Table A2. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay -number of oil spill incidents between 1970-1978 (period 1978-2009, n=129) 
  Exponential Gompertz Lognormal Loglogistic Cox 
Pre 1978 oil spill incidents (in tens) 0.2011 0.3706 -0.2097 -0.1725 0.5488* 
 
(0.1987) (0.3139) (0.1972) (0.2449) (0.3223) 
Square of pre 1978 oil spill incidents (in tens) -0.0015 -0.0167 0.0006 0.0022 -0.0360 
 
(0.0387) (0.0685) (0.0271) (0.0289) (0.0669) 
Population (in millions) 0.0015** 0.0025** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** 0.0029*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
PolityIV 0.0097 0.0250 -0.0060 -0.0052 0.0244 
 
(0.0116) (0.0197) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0185) 
Trade openness 0.0034** 0.0060*** -0.0024** -0.0021** 0.0059*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0018) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) -0.0303 -0.0363 0.0260 0.0175 -0.0305 
 
(0.0471) (0.0644) (0.0486) (0.0676) (0.0634) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.0254 0.0117 0.0293 0.0313 -0.0206 
 
(0.0390) (0.0585) (0.0245) (0.0222) (0.0538) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0017*** 0.0029*** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** 0.0037*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs (days/365) 0.0511* 0.0598 -0.0349* -0.0286 0.0522 
 
(0.0279) (0.0383) (0.0209) (0.0187) (0.0362) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0420*** 0.0605*** -0.0342*** -0.0349*** 0.0647*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0123) (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0131) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) 0.0018 0.0054 -0.0033 -0.0040 0.0077 
 
(0.0075) (0.0136) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0112) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0015 0.0015 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0016 
 
(0.0042) (0.0076) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0067) 
Latitude -0.7786 -1.1516 0.5650 0.6411 -1.0675 
 
(0.6613) (0.9774) (0.4804) (0.4441) (0.9168) 
Constant -10.5752*** -12.4596*** 9.9492*** 9.8832*** 
   (0.3773) (0.5501) (0.2669) (0.2405)   
Shape parameter 
 
0.0002*** -0.6791*** -1.2816*** 
 Log-likelihood -141.31 -115.28 -98.39 -96.17 -398.51 
AIC 310.62 260.55 226.79 222.34 823.02 
BIC 350.65 303.45 269.68 265.24 860.20 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table A3. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay - quantity of oil spilled and oil spill incidents between 1970 and 1978 (period 1978-2009, n=129) 
  Exponential Gompertz Lognormal Loglogistic Cox 
Pre 1978 oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) 0.2040*** 0.3285*** -0.1287*** -0.1375*** 0.3140*** 
 
(0.0486) (0.0866) (0.0390) (0.0388) (0.0911) 
Square of pre 1978 oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) -0.0107*** -0.0163** 0.0056** 0.0060** -0.0138** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0065) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0068) 
Pre 1978 oil spill incidents (in tens) -0.2325 -0.1845 0.0522 0.0594 0.1450 
 
(0.2973) (0.5370) (0.2070) (0.2113) (0.5732) 
Square of pre 1978 oil spill incidents (in tens) 0.1438* 0.1810 -0.0721 -0.0747 0.1118 
 
(0.0829) (0.1497) (0.0604) (0.0620) (0.1562) 
Population (in millions) 0.0014** 0.0021** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** 0.0024*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
PolityIV 0.0067 0.0217 -0.0038 -0.0040 0.0213 
 
(0.0113) (0.0198) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0188) 
Trade openness 0.0042*** 0.0075*** -0.0027*** -0.0025*** 0.0072*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0019) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) -0.0621 -0.0855 0.0446 0.0446 -0.0805 
 
(0.0391) (0.0551) (0.0388) (0.0540) (0.0561) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.0505 0.0425 0.0193 0.0198 -0.0019 
 
(0.0426) (0.0630) (0.0271) (0.0239) (0.0606) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0017*** 0.0029*** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** 0.0038*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs (days/365) 0.0508* 0.0636 -0.0318* -0.0289* 0.0581 
 
(0.0269) (0.0387) (0.0189) (0.0162) (0.0371) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0455*** 0.0669*** -0.0353*** -0.0357*** 0.0704*** 
 
(0.0081) (0.0140) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0147) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) 0.0015 0.0072 -0.0018 -0.0032 0.0092 
 
(0.0071) (0.0117) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0103) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0001 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0054 
 
(0.0041) (0.0070) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0067) 
Latitude -0.8749 -1.3007 0.5888 0.6339 -1.1747 
 
(0.6833) (1.0443) (0.4785) (0.4345) (0.9823) 
Constant -10.7100*** -12.8719*** 9.9797*** 9.9554*** 
   (0.3770) (0.6122) (0.2430) (0.2145)   
Shape parameter 
 
0.0003*** -0.7221*** -1.3318*** 
 Log-likelihood -139.5 -110.8 -93.5 -90.6 -393.9 
AIC 310.9 255.5 221.0 215.2 817.8 
BIC 356.7 304.2 269.6 263.8 860.7 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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B. Continuous Models With Time-Varying Covariates 
 
Table B1. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay - concurent quantity of oil spill specifications (period 1978-2009, n=2499) 
  
Exponential Gompertz Lognormal Loglogistic Cox 
Discrete Time 
Proportional 
Hazards 
Logit 
Oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) 2.1996 4.1245** -2.1051** -1.8068 0.2302 2.4010 2.4547 
 
(1.9781) (1.9293) (0.9453) (1.1081) (0.2267) (2.1440) (2.5553) 
Square of oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) -2.53220 -4.28485** 2.24201** 2.11897* -0.38908 -2.62998 -2.83026 
 
(1.81325) (1.96681) (0.88083) (1.18786) (0.30148) (2.58968) (2.71662) 
Population (in millions) 0.0021*** 0.0029*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 0.0004*** 0.0022** 0.0023** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
PolityIV 0.0467*** 0.0183 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0017* 0.0475*** 0.0486*** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0176) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0009) (0.0179) (0.0167) 
Trade openness 0.0054*** 0.0061*** -0.0022*** -0.0020*** 0.0005*** 0.0054*** 0.0058*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0021) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) -0.0190 -0.0074 -0.0065 -0.0100 0.0042 -0.0198 -0.0165 
 
(0.0195) (0.0274) (0.0090) (0.0075) (0.0029) (0.0404) (0.0352) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.1684*** 0.0840 0.0075 0.0169 0.0050** 0.1725** 0.1760** 
 
(0.0407) (0.0519) (0.0216) (0.0172) (0.0021) (0.0868) (0.0879) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0019*** 0.0036*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** 0.0008*** 0.0020* 0.0021* 
 
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs 
(days/365) 0.0705** 0.0745* -0.0340* -0.0267 0.1040** 0.0715*** 0.0732* 
 
(0.0283) (0.0400) (0.0205) (0.0177) (0.0412) (0.0208) (0.0420) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0451*** 0.0788*** -0.0367*** -0.0376*** 0.0718*** 0.0467*** 0.0497*** 
 
(0.0069) (0.0111) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) -0.0027 0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0019 0.0045 -0.0032 -0.0029 
 
(0.0084) (0.0135) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0070) (0.0118) (0.0115) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0019 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0004 0.0020 0.0018 
 
(0.0039) (0.0062) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Latitude -0.8631 -1.2049 0.6008 0.7608** -0.7941 -0.8924 -0.9580 
 
(0.6678) (0.9847) (0.4481) (0.3674) (0.9132) (1.0424) (0.9997) 
Constant -5.2278*** -7.7019*** 4.1418*** 4.0511*** 
 
-5.2459 -5.3138*** 
  (0.3983) (0.6254) (0.2554) (0.2271)   -0.0001 (0.5919) 
Shape parameter 
 
0.1185*** -0.7521*** -1.3834*** 
   Log-likelihood -127.3 -96.1 -87.3 -84.0 -382.2 -384.5 -384.1 
AIC 282.7 222.3 204.6 197.9 790.3 795.0 798.2 
BIC 364.2 309.6 292.0 285.3 866.1 870.7 885.6 
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Table B2. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay -concurrent oil spill incidents (period 1978-2009, n=2499) 
  Exponential Gompertz Lognormal Loglogistic Cox DTPH Logit 
Oil spill incidents (in tens) -0.9628 -0.7127 0.2754 0.2211 0.1061 -1.0285*** -1.3101 
 
(0.7468) (0.6236) (0.3253) (0.2910) (0.1253) (0.3775) (0.8490) 
Square of oil spill incidence (in tens) 0.0874 0.0617 -0.0025 0.0111 -0.0300 0.0962 0.1063 
 
(0.0999) (0.0933) (0.0658) (0.0586) (0.0291) (0.1114) (0.1296) 
Population (in millions) 0.0020*** 0.0029*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** 0.0004*** 0.0021*** 0.0021* 
 
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
PolityIV 0.0483*** 0.0233 -0.0016 0.0003 0.0017* 0.0491*** 0.0504*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0177) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0009) (0.0147) (0.0167) 
Trade openness 0.0055*** 0.0061*** -0.0022*** -0.0020*** 0.0004*** 0.0057*** 0.0060*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0021) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) 0.0132 0.0279 -0.0273** -0.0299*** 0.0042 0.0138 0.0396 
 
(0.0235) (0.0298) (0.0108) (0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0000) (0.0470) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.1960*** 0.1125* -0.0185 0.0003 0.0050** 0.2009*** 0.2104** 
 
(0.0452) (0.0579) (0.0287) (0.0206) (0.0023) (0.0666) (0.0857) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0020*** 0.0036*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** 0.0008*** 0.0021** 0.0022** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs 
(days/365) 0.0675** 0.0718* -0.0328 -0.0267 0.0999** 0.0678*** 0.0708* 
 
(0.0289) (0.0399) (0.0211) (0.0179) (0.0399) (0.0151) (0.0422) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0436*** 0.0720*** -0.0357*** -0.0366*** 0.0722*** 0.0456*** 0.0483*** 
 
(0.0075) (0.0121) (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0114) (0.0046) (0.0114) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) -0.0033 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0026 0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0024 
 
(0.0096) (0.0143) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0118) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0019 0.0024 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0021 0.0022 0.0011 
 
(0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0070) 
Latitude -0.6895 -0.8375 0.5723 0.7106* -0.8862 -0.7276 -0.7983 
 
(0.6908) (0.9970) (0.4757) (0.3995) (0.9018) (0.4454) (0.9840) 
Constant -5.2153*** -7.5309*** 4.1174*** 4.0519*** 
 
-5.2321*** -5.3192*** 
  (0.4022) (0.6319) (0.2641) (0.2315)   (0.2020) (0.5934) 
Shape parameter 
 
0.1133*** -0.7306*** -1.3665*** 
   Log-likelihood -128.6 -99.4 -89.9 -86.5 -382.9 -385.9 -385.2 
AIC 285.3 228.9 209.9 203.0 791.7 797.8 800.3 
BIC 366.8 316.2 297.2 290.3 867.4 873.5 887.7 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Table B3. Determinants of MARPOL legislative delay -concurrent oil spill quantity and incidents (period 1978-2009, n=2499) 
  Exponential Gompertz Lognormal Loglogistic Cox DTPH Logit 
Oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of tons) 3.4263* 5.2880** -2.5243*** -2.1503** 0.0922 3.6424 3.9761 
 
(2.0822) (2.1850) (0.9397) (1.0046) (0.3444) (2.2543) (2.5390) 
Square of oil spill quantity (in 10,000s of 
tons) 
-3.1761* -4.9559** 2.4546*** 2.2388** -0.2865 
-2.62998 
-3.6681 
 
(1.8355) (2.0926) (0.8106) (0.8996) (0.3770) (2.58968) (2.5773) 
Oil spill incidents (in tens) -1.4403* -1.2541 0.4468 0.3264 0.1442 -1.5284* -1.8438* 
 
(0.8663) (0.8647) (0.3944) (0.3680) (0.1839) (0.9016) (1.1052) 
Square of oil spill incidence (in tens) 0.0021 0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0022 0.0023 
 
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
Population (in millions) 0.0021*** 0.0029** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** 0.0004*** 0.0022* 0.0022* 
 
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
PolityIV 0.0476*** 0.0202 -0.0013 0.0006 0.0016 0.0481*** 0.0499*** 
 
(0.0127) (0.0176) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0010) (0.0164) (0.0168) 
Trade openness 0.0054*** 0.0061*** -0.0023*** -0.0021*** 0.0005*** 0.0055*** 0.0059*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0021) 
GDP (in hundreds of billions of 1990$) 0.0047 0.0190 -0.0276*** -0.0301*** 0.0025 0.0047 0.0323 
 
(0.0244) (0.0316) (0.0087) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0355) (0.0489) 
Oil production (thousands of barrels) 0.1867*** 0.0915* -0.0023 0.0090 0.0049** 0.1916** 0.2005** 
 
(0.0426) (0.0524) (0.0221) (0.0171) (0.0023) (0.0858) (0.0891) 
Oil tankers (100,000s of tons) 0.0021*** 0.0037*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 0.0008*** 0.0022** 0.0023** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Average time to ratify previous IEAs 
(days/365) 
0.0670** 0.0710* -0.0345* -0.0271 0.1084*** 0.0676** 0.0704* 
 
(0.0287) (0.0401) (0.0207) (0.0178) (0.0415) (0.0334) (0.0424) 
Total number of previous IEAs ratified 0.0477*** 0.0792*** -0.0372*** -0.0382*** 0.0735*** 0.0503*** 0.0526*** 
 
(0.0073) (0.0112) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0119) 
Land area (100,000s of sq.km) -0.0045 -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0050 -0.0053 -0.0038 
 
(0.0101) (0.0145) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0068) (0.0123) (0.0119) 
Coastline length (thousands of km) 0.0032 0.0042 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0036 0.0025 
 
(0.0046) (0.0067) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0048) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
Latitude -0.8822 -1.1396 0.6075 0.7812** -0.8616 -0.9476 -0.9885 
 
(0.6764) (0.9841) (0.4536) (0.3657) (0.9007) (0.8533) (1.0016) 
Constant -5.2287*** -7.6570*** 4.1653*** 4.0754*** 
 
-5.2530*** -5.3388*** 
  (0.3981) (0.6227) (0.2555) (0.2269)   (0.4666) (0.5938) 
Shape parameter 
 
0.1173*** -0.7502*** -1.3856*** 
   
Log-likelihood -125.6 -95.1 -86.4 -82.9 -381.8 -382.6 -381.9 
AIC 283.3 224.2 206.7 199.8 793.5 799.1 797.8 
BIC 376.5 323.2 305.7 298.8 880.9 898.1 896.8 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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